Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

2016

Moral Distress and the Health Care Organization
Andy Kondrat
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss
Part of the Bioethics and Medical Ethics Commons

Recommended Citation
Kondrat, Andy, "Moral Distress and the Health Care Organization" (2016). Dissertations. 2137.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/2137

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 2016 Andy Kondrat

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO

MORAL DISTRESS AND THE HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY

BY
ANDY KONDRAT
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
AUGUST 2016

Copyright by Andy Kondrat, 2016
All rights reserved.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This dissertation is truly the product of a team effort, and there are many people
who helped make it possible. First, I would like to thank my dissertation director, Dr.
Dave Ozar, whose steady guidance and brilliant advice made writing this dissertation
much more pleasant than it had any right to be. Dr. Ozar and the rest of my committee,
Dr. David Ingram, Dr. Jennifer Parks, and Dr. Vicki Wike, provided me with constructive
criticism and suggestions that helped strengthen this work. I’ve said many times that not
once did I receive a comment that wasn’t spot-on and able to improve my thinking on a
subject. They, to a fault, understood this project and how they could help it grow.
A few friends in the graduate program at Loyola have helped me get through the
last eight years. Kyle and Tim, thanks for always being available to take a step back and
gain perspective, often over beers. Christina, thank you for maintaining my sanity over
the better part of a decade, which must have been no easy feat.
I have received unfailing support from my family throughout my graduate career;
more than I could ever repay. Katie and Barrett always kept my spirits light, especially
with pictures of toddlers and dogs. John Williams’ encouragement has been invaluable.
My late grandmother would have been proud of me today, even if she never would have
admitted it. Andrew and Drew, along with all the Breunigs, Simmons’, Griffins, Collins’,
Zimmermans, other Griffins, Bells, Glowatys, and more were always there to provide
respite at any time I needed.
iii

And, of course, my parents, Bill and Cheryl Kondrat. It is not an exaggeration to
say this would not have been possible in any way, shape, or form without their ceaseless
love, encouragement, and support. I am so very fortunate to have parents who actually
thought getting a PhD in philosophy was a good idea (I’m still on the fence about the
matter), and they never doubted for a second that I would succeed. I hope that, in part,
this dissertation proves them right.

iv

For my parents, who knew before I did that I should pursue philosophy,
and then let me find out for myself

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

iii

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND DESCRIPTION OF MORAL DISTRESS
Introduction
Moral Distress Defined
The Literature Describing Moral Distress
What Moral Distress Isn’t
Alternate Definitions of Moral Distress
Not Only Nurses
The Impact of Moral Distress on Health Care Professionals and Institutions
The Causes of Moral Distress and the Focus of This Project
Conclusion

1
1
4
7
14
18
20
22
27
31

CHAPTER TWO: THE HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION AS MORAL AGENT
Health Care Organizations Have Obligations
Arguments for Group Agency
“Something More”: Non-summative Group Agency
Health Care Organizations as Hierarchies
Hierarchies and Moral Distress
Example of Ethically Insufficient Responses to Moral Distress
Conclusion

33
33
35
41
49
52
54
63

CHAPTER THREE: THE CONTENT-THIN COMMON MORAL FRAMEWORK
Inclusion of the Morally Distressed Health Care Professional
Inclusion of Other Involved Health Care Professionals
Bringing the Morally Distressed and Other Health Care Professionals Together
The Content-Thin Common Moral Framework
The Goals and Values of Professional Health Care
Conclusion

64
65
69
74
75
86
93

CHAPTER FOUR: MORAL STRANGERS, MORAL FRIENDS, AND MORAL
ACQUAINTANCES
Moral Friends and Moral Strangers
Moral Acquaintances
Conclusion

95
96
110
123

CHAPTER FIVE: DISCOURSE ETHICS AS A RESPONSE TO MORAL
DISTRESS
Communicative Action
Discourse Ethics
Discourse Ethics and Moral Acquaintances
Conclusion

125
127
134
140
146

vi

CHAPTER SIX: PRACTICAL PROPOSALS FOR HEALTH CARE
ORGANIZATIONS
A Case Analysis of a Negative Response to Moral Distress
How Health Care Organizations Can Positively Address Moral Distress
Unit-Based Ethics Conversations
Additional Questions
Conclusion

147
148
156
163
169
172

REFERENCE LIST

175

VITA

182

viii

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND DESCRIPTION OF MORAL DISTRESS
Introduction
Over the past three-plus decades, a literature has emerged identifying, defining,
and addressing the experience of moral distress in health care professionals. Since the
introduction of the concept in 1984, many writers have discussed moral distress as a
nursing ethics issue, or more broadly as a clinical ethics issue, but there has been almost
no literature addressing moral distress in health care professionals as an organizational
ethics issue. This dissertation is an attempt to fill that gap.
The format of the dissertation is as follows: Chapter One surveys the literature on
moral distress, and provides a working definition of what it means to experience it. In
doing so, moral distress is differentiated from moral dilemmas and conscientious
objection in health care. This chapter also discusses the causes of moral distress, its
scope, and its effects on health care professionals, health care organizations, and the
patients they care for. Finally, it delineates the particular contexts in which moral distress
occurs that are the specific focus of this project.
Chapter Two makes the argument that moral distress ought to be seen as an
organizational ethics issue, and that an institution that does not respond to moral distress
in its health care professionals is failing in its moral obligations. This argument rests on
the premise that groups generally, and health care organizations specifically, are capable
1
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of moral agency. The main arguments in support of this claim are summarized in this
chapter. Following that, examples of what is currently being done by health care
organizations to address moral distress are examined, and the argument is made that the
most prevalent responses are hierarchically structured; that is, situations of moral distress
are typically handled through an appeal to institutionally established patterns of
hierarchical authority. The first major normative thesis of the dissertation is introduced at
this point; namely, that such a hierarchical response is an ethically incorrect response to
moral distress in health care professionals, and that a morally superior response can be
identified by examining the defects of contemporary responses.
Chapter Three provides a detailed argument for why efforts to address moral
distress hierarchically should not be implemented as an organization’s primary ethical
response to moral distress, and ought to be replaced by a response that respects the moral
equality of health care professionals. To this end, an argument for including the morally
distressed individual in the resolution process is defended, followed by an argument for
the inclusion of other health care professionals in the discussion and resolution of moral
distress, even if they are not among the morally distressed individuals. This will then lead
to the introduction and explanation of what this dissertation calls the “content-thin
common moral framework” that is shared by most health care professionals in American
society (and other similar societies). In order to explain this framework, Michael
Walzer’s “thick/thin” distinction of moral concepts is introduced, as is the concept of a
common professional morality, and the existence of such a common morality among
most health care professionals in American society will then be defended.
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By sharing this common professional morality, health care professionals share,
at least broadly and blandly, key concepts about their professional obligation to uphold
the goals and values of professional health care. Because of this, the content-thin
common moral framework is available to provide the means to create the peer-to-peer,
equality based, inclusive, non-hierarchical forum that is needed for health professionals
to discuss and resolve situations of moral distress.
Building on the content-thin common moral framework, Chapter Four studies the
contrasts between “moral friends,” “moral strangers,” and “moral acquaintances”
developed and discussed most directly by H. Tristam Engelhardt and Kevin Wm. Wildes
in order to develop the philosophical basis for the model of moral distress resolution
proposed in this dissertation. This chapter argues that because their common professional
morality creates a content-thin common moral framework in which to discuss moral
matters, health care professionals can be considered moral acquaintances, who
sufficiently understand each other’s moral worlds that they can share their various
perspectives within it. If this is the case, then Engelhardt’s moral strangers’ purely
procedural, content-free moral context is not the only available response to moral
distress. However, because health care professionals are moral acquaintances and not
moral friends, a thoroughgoing, content-full response is not available and would also be
inappropriate. What will be needed, therefore, is the middle ground of a content-thin
response to moral distress, and so a procedure for achieving this kind of discussion
should be developed.

Chapter Five appeals to Jürgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action and
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rules of discourse ethics to provide such a procedure in the form of rules and premises
that health care professionals, as moral acquaintances, can use to create the forum for a
content-thin procedural response to moral distress. The chapter will show that, in
“everyday” communication, health care professionals interact with each other much in
the way described by Habermas’ theory of communicative action. However, when moral
distress is experienced, and a resolution of the moral distress situation is needed,
Habermas’ theory of discourse ethics can provide procedural rules appropriate for moral
acquaintances, using their content-thin common moral framework as a basis for their
discussions, to address moral distress in the proper way.
In Chapter Six, an example of an insufficient moral distress resolution process
will be analyzed, and by highlighting how a health care organization can fail its
obligation to respond to moral distress, the chapter will then be able to offer suggestions
for practical positive institutional responses. In the chapter’s concluding remarks, some
unresolved questions raised in this dissertation will be acknowledged, and areas for
further investigation will be identified.
Moral Distress Defined
Though there is basic and generic agreement in the literature on what moral
distress is and when it occurs, there is not, in fact, a specific or technical definition for
moral distress. The term “moral distress,” in relation to how it is understood today, first

appeared in 1984 in Andrew Jameton’s Nursing Practice: The Ethical Issues. Jameton
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1

contrasts moral distress with two other types of ethical problems found in hospitals:
moral uncertainty and moral dilemmas.2 Moral uncertainty occurs when one does not
know which moral principles apply, or cannot even articulate what the moral problem is,
in a given situation. Moral dilemmas arise when two or more moral principles or other
moral standards apply to a morally problematic situation, but these are at odds with one
another regarding which course of action each would support. Moral distress, finally,
occurs “when one knows the right thing to do, but institutional constraints make it nearly
impossible to pursue the right course of action.”3
Jameton provides an example—a case in which a hospital’s procedures state that
all patients admitted to the hospital must receive unnecessary blood tests, which incurs
both cost and risk—and states that moral distress could occur if a nurse believed adhering
to these procedures is unethical but “staff nurses employed by the hospital have neither
the personal authority nor access to decision-making channels needed to change the
practice. Moreover, it is personally risky for staff to criticize a practice that helps the
hospital make ends meet.”4 Jameton does not elaborate on the concept of moral distress

As Jameton refers to moral distress as an “ethical issue,” it is important to note that he
does not draw a distinction between the definition of “moral” and “ethical.” The literature
on moral distress has continued to use the two interchangeably, and that will be the case
in this dissertation as well.
1

2

Jameton differentiates the three types of moral problems, but then interestingly
conflates, or even ignores, the issue throughout the rest of his work.
3

Jameton, Nursing Practice, 6.

4

Jameton, Nursing Practice, 6.
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further, but his description provided the nucleus around which all subsequent
discussions have revolved: moral distress occurs when someone knows the ethical thing
to do, but is unable to act on it due to constraints of some sort.
Since Jameton originally coined the term, numerous different proposals have been
given for a definition of moral distress, including one more by Jameton himself. Within a
decade of introducing it, Jameton had refined the concept by dividing the phenomenon
into the separate categories of (1) initial distress and (2) reactive distress.5 Epstein and
Hamric, though preferring the terms “moral distress” and “moral residue” to label the two
categories, state that initial moral distress is felt during the acute phase of a situation
occurring, while the moral residue is the lingering discomfort felt when the situation is
over, but the morally distressed person still carries the weight of having had her values
compromised.6 Most writers, however, do not separate these two stages while discussing
moral distress.7 Instead, the differences among definitions more often are in regard to
either the kinds of feelings that “count” as moral distress, or the contexts in which or the
sources from which they arise. But the bulk of the literature, as will be shown, agrees
enough on central themes and signs of moral distress to build an adequately clear
description of moral distress to work with in this dissertation.

5

Jameton, “Dilemmas of Moral Distress.”

6

Epstein and Hamric, “Moral Distress, Moral Residue, and the Crescendo Effect.”

7

Though this dissertation does not explicitly address moral residue, the suggestions for
how to resolve moral distress offered here would likely also have a positive effect on the
reduction of moral residue.

7
The Literature Describing Moral Distress
Two of the five articles in a 2012 issue of HEC Forum dedicated to moral distress
make the claim that because, as Pauly, Varcoe, and Storch state, “moral distress is
defined variously in different studies,”8 there is currently no standardized, dependable
definition of moral distress. Furthermore, these authors believe that these different
definitions are an impediment to dealing with moral distress: “Research and action on
moral distress has been constrained by lack of conceptual clarity and theoretical
confusion as to the meaning and underpinnings of moral distress.”9 Hamric agrees,
stating that though the term is now three decades old, “alternative definitions and
concepts abound and there is no central agreement on the key definitional features of the
phenomenon.”10 However, there are many articles that work with relatively similar
descriptions of moral distress, and therefore an adequately clear description of this
phenomenon can be arrived at by looking at those descriptions to see what they have in
common. It’s interesting to note, as well, that though Pauly and colleagues and Hamric
here state that the concept remains unclear, each of those authors provide definitions of
moral distress in other articles. In other words, even those authors who discount the
existence of a coherent definition of moral distress use the term comfortably and assume
that their readers know what it means well enough.

8

Pauly, Varcoe, and Storch, “Framing the Issues,” 2.

9

Pauly, Varcoe, and Storch, “Framing the Issues,” 1.

10

Hamric, “Empirical Research on Moral Distress,” 40.
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There are four core themes comprising the experience of moral distress that
emerge in almost all the literature: a morally distressed individual (1) believes she knows
what the ethical course of action to take is, but (2) is prevented in some way from
following that course, or must in fact do, or cooperate in doing, otherwise, due to (3)
internal or external constraints. In doing so, she (4) acts in a manner contrary to her
personal or professional values, which undermines her integrity and authenticity.
The first theme, and chronologically the first step in moral distress, is that the
individual believes she knows what the ethical course of action to take is: she has made
what some writers call a “moral decision” or a “moral choice” about what ought to be
done.11 Although the strong claim has been made that in a moral distress situation the
individual knows the ethically correct course of action,12 a weaker claim, namely that the
individual believes she knows or has a conviction regarding what the ethically correct
course of action is, seems more appropriate.13 This distinction is not only important for
descriptive purposes, but for normative purposes as well (that is to say, for how moral
distress can be resolved successfully, which will be discussed later in this dissertation).
Descriptively speaking, moral distress is a reaction to what one sees occurring (or
not occurring) and, as will be shown later, one that involves a “psychological
Corley, “Nurse Moral Distress,” 643; Viney, “Ethical Decision-Making Experiences,”
186; Zuzelo, “Exploring the Moral Distress of Registered Nurses,” 344-45; Austin et al.,
“To Stay or to Go,” 199; Rushton, “Defining and Addressing Moral Distress,” 161.

11

Elpern, Covert, and Kleinpell, “Moral Distress of Staff Nurses,” 523; Rushton,
“Defining and Addressing Moral Distress,” 161.
12

Austin et al., “To Stay or to Go,” 198-99; Epstein and Hamric, “Moral Distress, Moral
Residue, and the Crescendo Effect,” 331; Kälvermark et al., “Living With Conflicts,”
1077; Schwenzer and Wang, “Moral Distress in Respiratory Care Practitioners.
13

disequilibrium” or “negative feeling state.” But because moral distress is an
14

9

15

individual’s (emotional and/or physical) reaction to what she regards unethical, it cannot
be the case that the individual must be taken to know what the ethical course of action is
in order to experience moral distress, for that would imply that her moral judgment about
the matter must be correct to in order to say that she is “really” experiencing moral
distress. It does not make sense to require that the individual must actually be correct in
order to acknowledge that she feels the negative symptoms associated with her belief
about the matter. Saying that moral distress only occurs when the distressed individual
knows the correct course of action is therefore too high an epistemic bar to set, given the
empirical reality of moral distress and the fact that it can be felt even if the distressed
individual is mistaken for some reason or another in her conviction.
The second component of a moral distress situation is that, given that an
individual believes she knows what the ethical course of action is, or believes she knows
that the course about to be undertaken is unethical, she is nevertheless unable to perform
that action, or must do or be complicit in doing what she thinks is unethical. Put most
simply, she is “not able to ‘do the right thing’” (which, in practice, may translate into
participating in the wrong thing).16

14

Corley, “Nurse Moral Distress,” 643.

15

Viney, “Ethical Decision-Making Experiences,” 186.

16

Pauly et al., “Perceptions of Moral Distress,” 562.
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The reasons for this inability are the third core feature of moral distress, which
are internal (i.e., personal) or external constraints.17 External constraints can include, for
example, “coworkers’ attitudes, inadequate staffing, the hierarchy of medical power,
policy constraints, and financial limitations.”18 External constraints can also include
demands of patients and/or families that health care professionals deem not to be in the
patient’s best medical interest. Situations of this latter sort arise from the primacy placed
on patient/surrogate autonomy in our health care system, even when the
patient’s/surrogate’s preferred course of action is at odds with medical recommendations.
The division between internal and external constraints is common to many
authors on moral distress and corresponds to many first-person reports of moral distress.
But as will be argued below more fully, any constraint labeled “internal” is in fact a
symptom of an external constraint over which the morally distressed person has no
control. This is the principal reason why it will be argued that, when determining how
moral distress ought to be resolved, individual responses are likely to fail and
organizational action is ordinarily required. It is also why, when appropriate
organizational action is undertaken (as will be explained in this dissertation), so-called
“internal” causes of distress may be resolved in the same way as external causes of moral
distress.

Ulrich, Hamric, and Grady, “A Growing Problem,” 20. See also Austin et al., “To Stay
or to Go,” Epstein and Hamric, “Moral Distress, Moral Residue, and the Crescendo
Effect” and Rushton, “Defining and Addressing Moral Distress.”
17

18

Schwenzer and Wang, “Moral Distress in Respiratory Care Practitioners,” 2967.

For example, two common types of internal constraints are “a lack of moral
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courage”19 and “personal inhibition.”20 As will be shown later, organizational structures
are almost always involved when a distressed individual feels that she lacks courage, or
she feels unable to address an ethical failing. Attempting to fix internal constraints only at
the individual level overlooks the fact that the individual is often, through no fault of her
own, ill-equipped to solve her own distress when no organizational mechanism is in place
to address moral distress.
In fact, organizational mechanisms can contribute to and, in fact, exacerbate the
moral distress; still worse, blaming the victim of the moral distress for its existence can
create a vicious circle if she experiences further moral distress from being unable to
resolve it. Thus, stating oversimply that moral distress comes from within (1) ignores the
fact that an external factor is almost always one cause of the moral distress situation, and
(2) implies that the individual should be able to address the problem on her own, because
the moral distress is her fault. This incorrectly attributes responsibility and often blame to
a person reacting to a barrier most likely placed by someone or something other than
herself.
A further weakness of the internal/external distinction was hinted at in the above
explanation, but should be made explicit. One factor that can cause or contribute to moral
distress is the circumstance in which the health care team of which a health care
professional is a part decides to act in a way she believes to be ethically incorrect. This

19

Austin et al., “The Balancing Act,” 89-90.

20

Schwenzer and Wang, “Moral Distress in Respiratory Care Practitioners,” 2967.
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kind of situation does not fit neatly into the internal/external distinction, for the health
care professional is a member of the team that has decided to act in a way she deems
morally incorrect. Thus, while the decision comes from within the group, it comes from
outside the individual. Unfortunately, this specific iteration is not often directly addressed
in the moral distress literature. But as medical practice in health care institutions becomes
more frequently, and necessarily, team-based care, this type of moral distress situation
will happen more and more often. As the number of health care professionals that care for
a single patient increases, the possibility for disagreement, conflict, and distress also
increases, especially as power dynamics come into play.
Take, for example, a typical patient in the ICU of a good-sized hospital. On any
given day, participating in the care of this patient will be: a number of nurses (at least one
per shift), resident coverage (at least two a day), an attending physician (one of several
rotating weekly or more often, with coverage and call as needed), respiratory therapist,
pharmacologist, lab technicians, x-ray and radiology specialists, and depending on the
level and type of illness of the patient, one or more of the following specialists: infectious
disease, nephrology, catheterization lab, oncology, allied health, hematology,
hospice/palliative care, and a number of other possibilities. Contemporary medical
practice is necessarily team practice, and there is plenty of room for conflict among the
above health care professionals before patients and families are even involved as decision
makers in the course of care. Thus, it seems clear that, in addition to the other constraints
to acting on an ethical decision, moral distress can arise when the health care team, or the
authoritative body in charge of the team (say, the attending physician), acts in a way that

13
one of its members believes to be ethically inappropriate, and that person does not
have the power to effectively raise objections to, or in any case to change, that decision.
The fourth component of moral distress is that the individual acts (or the team of
which she is a part acts) “in a manner contrary to [her] personal or professional values.”21
Because a health care professional in a moral distress situation is helpless to
“translate…moral choices into moral action,” the fact that she must act “in a manner
contrary to personal and professional values undermines the individual’s integrity and
authenticity.”22 Even though, as stated above, a health care professional ordinarily ought
not blame herself for experiencing moral distress, the fact that she is unable to alter what
she sees as morally wrong causes her to feel as if she has “failed to act ethically,”23 or is
even complicit in the moral wrongdoing. Moral distress, then, is not merely disagreeing
with the decision made by another. By being unable to change the decision while playing
either an active or passive role in its implementation, in moral distress the individual feels
uprooted from her personal and professional values, or even that she has violated those
values or duties.24
Moral distress, then can be defined as follows: An instance of moral distress
occurs when an individual believes she knows what the ethical course of action to take is,
but is prevented from implementing that course or must do or cooperate in doing

21

Elpern, Covert, and Kleinpell, “Moral Distress of Staff Nurses,” 523.

22

Rushton, “Defining and Addressing Moral Distress,” 161.

23

Austin et al., “The Balancing Act,” 90.

24

Epstein and Hamric, “Moral Distress, Moral Residue, and the Crescendo Effect,” 331.
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otherwise, due to external or internal constraintss; and in doing so, she acts (or is
complicit in, or views herself as acting complicitly) in a manner contrary to her personal
or professional values, undermining integrity and authenticity.
What Moral Distress Isn’t
Before proceeding, however, it is important for the sake of clarity to differentiate
moral distress from what it is not, which includes such categories as moral dilemmas,
moral stress, and conscientious objection in health care.
As was noted above, in his original work on moral distress Jameton differentiated
moral distress from moral dilemmas (as well as from moral uncertainty, but as moral
uncertainty involves not even knowing what the problem is, it is so far removed from
moral distress it need not be addressed further here). Moral distress is not the agony that
comes with not knowing what the ethical course of action is, or which of two or more
conflicting ethical principles or other moral standards should take precedence in a given
situation. Being unsure of what to do in a given clinical scenario, as in a moral dilemma,
is not a cause of moral distress as the concept is currently understood, even if this is a
cause of moral stress.
In a situation with a moral dilemma, for example, there might be a conflict
between patient autonomy and nonmaleficence (to use two “standard” principles of
bioethics), “but to act on one necessarily precludes acting on the others [sic]. While doing
something right, the person is also doing something wrong, by not doing something else
that is right.”25 Or, it could be that “the ethically correct course of action is in doubt,”26

25

Corley, “Nurse Moral Distress,” 637.
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but some action is required (in health care dilemmas, unlike in theoretical ones, not
coming to a decision still creates an outcome), so there is a moral dilemma as to which
course of action to choose. Moral dilemmas are about picking the most ethical action,
while moral distress is the reaction to the belief that the action (or lack thereof) being
picked is unethical, and being unable to do otherwise. The question raised with moral
dilemmas might be, “What should we do?” The question moral distress might prompt is,
“How can we be doing this?”
Conscientious objection in health care professionals also differs from moral
distress in important respects. According to Mark Wicclair’s detailed study, health care
professionals “engage in acts of conscientious objection when they: (1) refuse to provide
legal and professionally accepted goods or services that fall within the scope of their
professional competence, and (2) justify their refusal by claiming that it is an act of
conscience or is conscience-based.”27 Given this definition, Wicclair identifies four
differences between conscientious objection and moral distress in the work of health care
professionals.
The first is that “moral distress is considerably more pervasive than conscientious
objection.”28 For as will be shown the causes of moral distress are both diverse and
myriad, while conscientious objection is often “limited to a few specific goods and
services, such as EC [emergency contraception], family planning, abortion, palliative

26

Elpern, Covert, and Kleinpell, “Moral Distress of Staff Nurses,” 523.

27

Wicclair, Conscientious Objection in Health Care, 1.

28

Wicclair, Conscientious Objection in Health Care, 9.

sedation, and organ donation after cardiac death.” A health care professional, then, is
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far more likely not only to witness, but experience, moral distress, than she is to feel the
need to perform an act of conscientious objection.
Secondly, Wicclair claims that moral distress most often is the result of a
violation of “generally recognized ethical and professional norms,” while an act of
conscientious objection occurs when one’s personal ethical beliefs are violated.30 If a
health care professional is experiencing moral distress, she can usually point to some
agreed-upon professional or ethical standard being ignored or impinged upon (indeed,
these agreed-upon standards will play an important role in the proper resolution of moral
distress situations, as will be discussed in Chapter Three). Conscientious objection,
however, occurs when a health care professional disagrees ethically with “procedures that
do not violate professional standards.”31 Thus, while a conscientious objector believes a
course of action is unethical in spite of what is professionally appropriate, moral distress
occurs because a health care professional believes a course of action is professionally
wong.
The third difference Wicclair notes is that while conscientious objection is an act
of refusal to provide care in a given way, “moral distress arises from an inability to
refrain from: (1) acting inappropriately, (2) participating in inappropriate action, and/or

29

Wicclair, Conscientious Objection in Health Care, 9.

30

Wicclair, Conscientious Objection in Health Care, 10.

31

Wicclair, Conscientious Objection in Health Care, 10. Emphasis added.

(3) preventing others from acting inappropriately.” When experiencing moral

17

32

distress, it is not that an individual refuses to act unethically, but that she can do nothing
else other than act unethically, or at least be complicit in or be unable to prevent an action
she considers morally wrong. She cannot withdraw from the situation as a conscientious
objector attempts to do, but instead is forced into the psychological disequilibrium of
being unable to avoid being be a part of that which she believes to be morally
inappropriate.
Finally, Wicclair proposes that, because the belief spurring conscientious
objection is rooted so deeply in the individual performing it, to do otherwise and to act
against one’s conscience is far more likely to be “an act of self-betrayal” than instances
of moral distress, which instead involve “actions that are perceived to be morally
inappropriate.”33 Here, Wicclair is attempting to show that performing actions that one
conscientiously objects to is experienced as being a far more egregious violation of
oneself than acts (or acts of omission) that give rise to moral distress. But the literature on
moral distress shows that moral distress can also undermine integrity and authenticity, so
Wicclair’s fourth distinction may not hold up under more careful examination. It is
therefore noteworthy that Wicclair also hedges here; he uses the phrase “morally
inappropriate” when most authors use stronger phrases like “morally wrong” or “ethically
right” in relation to moral distress. However, Wicclair is correct in stating that moral
distress need not only occur when an action or procedure is “contrary to one’s core moral

32

Wicclair, Conscientious Objection in Health Care, 10. Emphasis in the original.

33

Wicclair, Conscientious Objection in Health Care, 10-11. Emphasis in the original.
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beliefs,” as is the case in conscientious objection. This lower threshold than is
characteristic of conscientious objection, however, is the reason why moral distress is as
prevalent as it is in health care professionals, and thus a matter requiring serious moral
attention.
Alternate Definitions of Moral Distress
Because there has been so much discussion in the literature about what counts as
moral distress, it is worth briefly noting and setting aside the proposals that are most at
odds with the mainstream on this point, as there are a few writers on moral distress whose
definitions of the term differ markedly from the one offered as a working definition in
this dissertation. Oberle and Hughes state that “Misunderstandings and even conflicts
with doctors, resulting from an inability to influence decisions and decision-making
processes” were causes of moral distress in nurses.35 Austin, meanwhile, writes (as one of
the three different definitions she has provided among her various works) that moral
distress refers to “experiences of frustration and failure arising from struggles to fulfill
their moral obligations to patients, families, and the public.”36 In both cases, these authors
are outside the mainstream of scholarly work. Oberle and Hughes are applying the term
“moral distress” to what sound like disagreements or confusion, which, while potentially
stressful, are different from the undermining of values that stems from being unable to
pursue the ethical course of action; that is, Oberle and Hughes set the bar too low for
34
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moral distress. Austin, meanwhile, has provided too little information to sufficiently
define moral distress. It seems that her description could just as easily apply to what
Jameton termed “moral dilemmas,” as Austin’s wording does not include a reason why
there is a struggle to fulfill a moral obligation (remembering that moral dilemmas can
occur when competing ethical standards exist, it could be that one moral obligation is
going unfulfilled for the sake of another one). Furthermore, Austin does not say that, in
this struggle, the outcome is that the health care professional must engage in or be
complicit in an act she deems unethical. Again, the bar is set too low to call this an
adequate definition of moral distress, given how the topic is treated in the work of most
authors.
In a similar vein, Sporrong and colleagues say that a “broader definition” of moral
distress is appropriate because it can “‘occur due to situations…where the health care
provider feels she or he is not able to preserve all interests and values at stake’. This
means that the concept includes stressful responses to ethical dilemmas also when a
desired action has been pursued.”37 Førde and Aasland state that moral distress can be
caused “by conflicting ideals and by moral uncertainty.”38 Thus, these authors explicitly
collapse the distinction between moral distress and moral dilemmas even though this
distinction is found in the rest of the relevant literature.
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Not Only Nurses
Much of the moral distress literature discussed up to this point has focused on
nurses.39 For, since it is a historical fact that nurses have been expected to care for
patients without being able to direct the care, moral distress is most obviously a nursing
issue, and it makes sense that the majority of the moral distress literature has focused and
continues to focus on nurses. That being said, however, a number of studies have shown
that moral distress exists across the health care professions. Moral distress has been found
in doctors across the spectrum of specialties,40 as well as newly-minted doctors in
residency programs.41 Pharmacists and pharmacy assistants, in both pharmacies and
clinical settings, experience moral distress.42 Respiratory therapists report “moral distress
in many areas of their practice.”43 Austin and colleagues have studied moral distress in
both psychologists44 and psychiatrists.45 In one study on home-based palliative care,
moral distress was reported in nurses, personal support workers, occupational therapists,
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physiotherapists, and speech language pathologists. Non-medical specialists such as
social workers47 and health care managers48 also experience moral distress. It seems
clear, then, that moral distress is not solely a nursing issue, but can affect any health care
professional that interacts with institutions or other professionals in the course of
providing care for patients: that is to say, all health care professionals. Furthermore, as
physicians, like most other health care professionals, are more and more frequently
becoming employees of hospitals and of health systems (e.g., hospitalists, or belonging to
health system-owned group medical practices), it seems likely that physician providers
will experience moral distress more frequently.49
In addition, in the Moral Distress Scale developed by Corley and colleagues to
assess the types and rates of moral distress in nurses, many of the 32 different markers for
moral distress are scenarios that would affect all health care professionals. Consider, for
example, markers such as “perform a procedure when the patient is not adequately
informed about procedures which he/she is about to undergo” or “follow the family’s
wishes to continue life support even though it is not in the best interest of the patient.”50
Hamric has in fact created multiple versions of the Moral Distress Scale that are
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specialty-specific, including specialized caregivers like pediatric physicians, and a
catchall category of “other” health care providers. Therefore this dissertation will not
limit its focus to nursing, but instead address moral distress in health care professionals
generally, even though much of the scholarly work that has been done on the subject has
focused on nurses and their experiences of moral distress.51
The Impact of Moral Distress on Health Care Professionals and Institutions
Moral distress affects individual health care professionals in different ways.
However, some general themes have emerged in the literature regarding its effects on the
people experiencing it, and in turn the effects moral distress has on team dynamics and
patient care. For moral distress has effects both internal and external to the individual.
Physical reactions to moral distress include bodily pain “such as sweating,
headaches, nausea and diarrhea, and crying,”52 as well as sleep dysfunctions including
insomnia.53 In one small study of critical care nurses, emotional responses included
sadness, anger, frustration, and disgust.54 Feelings of powerlessness are common.55
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Nurses experiencing moral distress stated they were reluctant to come to work or care
for patients, as well as emotional and physical withdrawal from others.56 Left unchecked,
moral distress can lead to a loss of self-worth.57 Ultimately, the effects of moral distress
can lead to professional burnout,58 or cause an individual to leave her profession
entirely.59
All of the above symptoms also have, not surprisingly, a detrimental external
effect on professional conduct and collaboration. This is not only due to the turnover that
comes with morally distressed health care professionals leaving their profession, though
turnover does lead to lost expertise, short-staffing, and added work and stress put on
those that remain. It is also due to the fact that morally distressed health care
professionals and their peers “may experience poor communication, lack of trust…and
lack of collaboration across disciplines.”60 This will have a clear effect on team cohesion,
especially, as will be discussed later, when moral distress arises from hierarchical
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processes that frustrate attempts to do what one thinks is right. For now, it is enough
to note that nurses who are criticized for making suggestions or left out of the decision
making process “frequently feel powerless to influence care situations and some no
longer attempt to implement moral judgment due to frustration and anger provoked from
lack of physician response to their input in previous ethical situations.”62 High quality
health care depends on, and demands, a team valuing the expertise of each member to the
full extent that her expertise can be provided and is relevant, and when one team member
does not feel that she is an equal part of the caring and decision making process, moral
distress can easily occur, negatively affecting the unity of team practice: those that feel
“left out” rarely keep a collaborative spirit about them.
The above outcomes of moral distress, in turn, have clear effects on patient care.
As mentioned above, much of the research in moral distress has focused on nursing, and
in the literature on effects of moral distress on patient care, the focus has been almost
entirely on nurses, as nurses are seen as the locus of active care for the patient. However,
as was shown above, “moral distress is not unique to any one professional discipline
within healthcare.”63 Thus, when reviewing the effects discussed in the nursing literature,
it is easy to see how the effects, like much of the moral distress research, easily be
applied to all health care professionals. Rushton states that nurses experiencing moral
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physical care; they…physically withdraw from the bedside, barely meeting the patient’s
needs.”64 Likewise, a small study of nurses reported physical withdrawal, decreased
interactions with families and patients, and requests not to care for a specific patient.65 In
critical care situations, “the role of the nurse as collaborator of care and patient advocate
is a crucial one best served by primary nurses. Nurses reluctant to act in a primary nurse
role prevents the patient from being able to obtain these important benefits and may put
the patient at risk for problems related to ineffective communication, fragmented care,
and lack of patient and family advocacy.”66 And, indeed, one study found that patients
experienced “increased pain, longer hospital stays, and inadequate and inappropriate
care” when nurses were experiencing moral distress.67
It might be argued that these internal symptoms and external effects of moral
distress would be, while unfortunate, relatively unimportant if the phenomenon happened
infrequently enough. Though most quantitative studies on moral distress are small in
sample size, and though there is no evidence for the strong claim that every health care
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professional experiences moral distress on a daily, weekly, or even monthly basis, the
majority of health care professionals report experiences of moral distress.68
Corley has done the most work in attempting to quantify the prevalence of moral
distress, having in 2001 created the Moral Distress Scale (MDS) mentioned above. The
MDS has also been appropriated and modified by other researchers, though the individual
modifications—not to mention the differing definitions of moral distress used in the first
place—make comparison across studies difficult. Further, almost every quantitative study
of moral distress was specific to nursing, though Førde and Aasland’s study of doctors in
Norway found that 51 percent of doctors surveyed expressed moral distress.69 Pauly and
colleagues surveyed nurses in British Columbia, and found that “On a scale of 0-6, the
mean moral distress intensity was 3.88…Only two items on the 38-item [modified from
the original 32 in Corley’s 2001 study] MDS scale had frequencies lower than the
midpoint of 3.”70 The most telling statistic, however, might be that in Corley’s original
2001 paper, 15 percent of nurses reported that they had actually left a job due to moral
distress.71 Thus, while Hamric might overstate the matter when she says that “moral
distress is a nearly universal phenomenon in the everyday [medical] ethics arena,”72 it
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seems that the effects of moral distress cut a wide enough swath that they necessitate
attention.
The Causes of Moral Distress and the Focus of This Project
Given the above, it is clearly important to determine what actually causes health
care professionals to experience moral distress. With moral distress occurring so often, it
is not surprising to find that the catalysts for moral distress are myriad. Studies have
found that moral distress can be caused by fairly distant external factors such as
organizational decisions made far from the direct care setting like inadequate staffing or
lack of institutional or professional support, but more common in the literature are
instances of moral distress arising in clinical situations involving, for example,
unnecessary or futile treatment, aggressive treatment that is not in the patient’s best
interest, a lack of truth-telling,73 initiating life-saving actions that only prolong death, and
inappropriate use of resources.74 Nurses can also experience moral distress when
witnessing untreated pain or suffering in patients, seeing patients treated as objects,
confronting or butting heads with health policy parameters, when a patient’s dying is
prolonged without providing the patient/family with proper information regarding
choices, when disagreeing with end-of-life decisions,75 and carrying out orders for
unnecessary tests or treatments.76 A study in Sweden comprising physicians, pharmacists,
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and nurses found additional sources of moral distress from lack of resources, conflicts
between rules and praxis, conflicts of interest, and lack of support structures.77 In a study
involving dying patients in the intensive care unit (ICU), both nurses and doctors ranked
their top three situations of moral distress in the same order: following a family’s wishes
to continue life support when it is not in the patient’s best interest, initiating life-saving
actions that ultimately only prolong a patient’s death, and continuing to participate in care
for a patient when no one will decide to stop life support.78
Rather than trying to speak directly to all of these causes of moral distress, this
dissertation will focus on those that stem from conflicts between a health care
professional and either a) other health care professionals, or b) patients and families. That
these are the most salient cases of moral distress is supported by an internal study from
the former head of the NorthShore University Health System’s Institutional Ethics
Committee, E. Dennis Murphy. In Murphy’s analysis, a full 60 percent of ethics
consultations conducted by the Committee over a number of years involved a health care
professional experiencing moral distress because the professional saw something as
inappropriate in the course of a patient’s treatment, whether due to another professional’s
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decisions, or demands by the patient or family. 67 percent of cases were categorized as
“conflict in management” of care, whether between staff and family, or intraprofessionally. Further, “The majority of consults are done in the inpatient setting, with
medical floor units and ICU’s contributing more than 90% of our requests.”79 That is to
say, more than 90 percent of the time, ethics consults were requested to address a specific
case, as opposed to more general systemic concerns. Conflicts between health care
professional and institution, so prevalent in Jameton’s original definition of moral
distress, were the occasion for this Committee’s intervention in only three cases out of
138.
Thus, while the theoretical bioethics literature often discusses the ethical
challenges of resource allocation and institutional hamstringing as causes of moral
distress, this study from one Ethics Committee and the causes listed above point to a
different pattern of moral distress that has been under-represented in the theoretical
bioethics literature. To fill that gap, the focus of this dissertation will be on moral distress
in clinical situations where the protagonists are health care professionals themselves,
along with patients and families.
As mentioned above, these include causes of moral distress such as cases of futile
or unnecessary treatment, treatment that is both aggressive and not considered in the
patient’s best interest, failure to meet the standard of informed consent, and a lack of
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Institutional Ethics Committee).80
Given that the above posits that patients and families can be, in effect, a cause of
moral distress, it would seem to follow that they can also experience moral distress when
disagreements arise with the professionals caring for them. However, they, too, are
outside the scope of this dissertation. The first reason is a theoretical one, for patients and
families do not necessarily participate in the shared moral obligations of health care
professionals, and these shared obligations will be the basis for the response to moral
distress offered in this dissertation. The second reason is practical, in that it would be
nearly impossible to create a properly structured forum for addressing patients’ and
families’ moral distress like the structured discussions by involved health care
professionals that will be proposed in this dissertation. The hope is that for most health
care institutions, those in the roles of social worker, care manager, or chaplain can assist
patients and their families in relevant ways.
Health care organizations can address, however, what one study found to be the
most common source of moral distress: “a misalignment between healthcare
professionals.”81 That is to say, even if the cause of moral distress initially stems from the
wishes of a patient or family, the decision of how to proceed given those wishes will
reside with the health care team, and it is here moral distress will therefore often arise and
cause tension among health care professionals (e.g., someone on the team has to agree to
80
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fulfill those wishes, and other health care professionals on the treating team may
experience moral distress because of it). Thus, however the distress of patients and
families could be best addressed, the focus of this dissertation is on this “misalignment”
among health care professionals which, because of its negative effects, must be addressed
by the health care organization and that means (as will be shown) it must be resolved
among and by these health care professionals.
It should also be acknowledged that other health care providers (i.e., nonprofessional) and employees of a health care organization may experience moral distress
related to their caregiving roles. Chapter Two will argue that the respect a health care
organization owes all its employees, and the efforts and goals they share, means that a
health care organization ought to attempt to resolve moral distress in all its staff.
However, as it will be shown in Chapter Three, the moral distress resolution process
detailed in this dissertation rests on a shared professional morality. Whether or not this
common ethical framework exists for non-professional staff of a health care organization
(or if an individual organization itself can create one for its employees) is not examined
in this dissertation, though it is an area for further thought, and Chapter Six will briefly
offer some notes on what direction that thinking could take.
Conclusion
This chapter introduced and defined moral distress, including its effects on health
care professionals and patient care, and delineated the scope of this project. Chapter Two
will turn to the health care organization, and make the claim that health care
organizations have an obligation to address moral distress in its health care professionals,
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which presupposes the concept of group agency, which will also be explained.
Following that, some examples of current organizational responses to moral distress will
be examined, and it will be shown that they fail due to a reliance on institutional
hierarchies, which will be seen to be an ethically insufficient way to address moral
distress.

CHAPTER TWO
THE HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION AS MORAL AGENT
As Chapter One has explained, moral distress has detrimental effects on health
care professionals, and affects their ability to practice according to their profession’s
expertise and engage in the best patient care. This chapter will argue that when these two
effects of moral distress are present in a health care institution and are not properly
addressed, this constitutes an ethical failure of that institution because of the obligations
on the part of a health care organization (i.e., at the organizational level) to strive first of
all for the health of its patients through the expertise of its health care professionals. But
is it correct to say that a health care organization has obligations and can act in unethical
ways? An affirmative answer to this question will be defended in this chapter; and
therefore moral distress must be viewed as a matter of organizational ethics and it is the
responsibility of each health care organization to respond to moral distress and not doing
is a moral failure of that institution.
Health Care Organizations Have Obligations
In “Organizational Ethics in Health Care: Toward a Model for Ethical Decision
Making by Provider Organizations,” The National Working Group on Health Care
Organizational Ethics convened by the Institute for Ethics at the American Medical
Association examines norms from “business ethics, professional ethics, and law and
social context” in an attempt to determine what priorities health care organizations ought
33
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to honor if they are said to be upholding ethical standards. Ultimately, the Working
Group identified two main priorities for health care provider organizations. The first
priority is that of health care itself. Not only from a business perspective, but more
importantly from its presenting itself to the larger society as a health care organization,
the care of its patients must be its highest priority. Thus a health care institution’s profit
motive and other goals must be subjugated to its care-oriented mission as a health care
organization.
The second priority the Group identifies is that patient care be provided by means
of the expertise of health care professionals in clinical matters. As the Group states,
“there is a powerful, continuing role for health professionals’ expertise in determining
what counts as health for patients and therefore what sorts of interventions are beneficial
to their health.”2 If these two priorities are not met, the result is a health care organization
failing to meet its ethical obligations, and the undermining of the organization’s mission.
The descriptions of the causes and effects of moral distress in Chapter One show
that moral distress occurs when a health care professional has reason to believe that her
expertise is being ignored or overridden, and the results of such moral distress frequently
include a lowered level of care which can put patients at risk. Thus, it is clear that moral
distress, if not addressed, will effectively cause a health care organization to fall short in
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meeting both priorities central to its mission, and thus can create an institution whose
commitment to ethical conduct, and thus its integrity, can be questioned.
Because moral distress can, in effect, threaten the core of what a health care
organization ought to be focused on providing, and thus is an organizational issue, it is
imperative that the problem be addressed at the level of the health care organization.
Later in this chapter some proposed responses to moral distress will be examined that are
either not generated at the organizational level, or are organizationally insufficient ways
of dealing with the issue. Chapter Three will lay the moral groundwork for an appropriate
response by a health care organization to its health professionals’ moral distress, and the
remaining chapters will propose a concrete organizational mechanism for achieving this.
The thesis that health care organizations have obligations in this matter, however,
presupposes that groups like health care organizations are capable of acting as single
entities and can have moral obligations and be held responsible for their actions. That is,
it presupposes that they are capable of group agency. Since there are admittedly writers
who disagree with the claim that agency can be attributed to groups, a discussion of the
arguments in favor of this presupposition is appropriate at this point. The following will
summarize arguments for group agency generally, and then focus on corporate (as
opposed to the broader term “group”) action, and finally on group agency of health care
organizations specifically.
Arguments for Group Agency
One reason for thinking about groups as unitary actors (agents) is that there is an
intuitive way in which assigning group agency makes logical and semantic sense:

Margaret Gilbert states that the notion “that social groups are subjects of action and
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cognition clearly accords with one way in which collectives are commonly spoken and
thought about.”3 To put it another way, David Copp states that group action—and group
intentionality—is entailed in our descriptions of many events. Taking an example from
semi-recent history, Copp discusses the British invasion of the Falkland Islands.
In this example, we feel (semantically) comfortable speaking about Great Britain
intentionally invading the Falkland Islands, Argentina intentionally defending them, and
early in the conflict, England intentionally sinking the Argentine ship General Belgrano.4
We tend to take these statements as fact. Without actually thinking about it, in using this
sort of language to discuss these events, we are tacitly affirming that nations or militaries
are able to intentionally make, and successfully execute, plans. Copp calls this “the
Intuitive Argument.” By taking it as a fact of history that Britain sank the General
Belgrano, he writes, “Intuitively, we hear this literally, as ascribing to Britain the action
of intentionally sinking something, the same kind of action we would ascribe to Margaret
Thatcher in saying she intentionally sank her dinghy.”5 What this intuition leads us to is
the idea that when we talk about a collective entity performing an action, we are
decidedly not meaning to say only that the individuals making up the collective, or
3
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certain individuals in the group, intentionally performed that action. A collection of
individual soldiers, or the members of British Parliament, didn’t invade the Falkland
Islands: England did, an England that is a different entity from the sum of its parts.
Borrowing language from Gilbert, this makes England a non-summative group.6
For another example of a non-summative group, consider the phrase “In 2014 the
San Francisco Giants won the World Series.” It would be very difficult to disassociate
group agency from the meaning of that phrase, and instead break agency down to the
individual level. There are a few reasons for this. First, “San Francisco Giants” does not
apply to a specific set of people. Rosters change throughout the season, with different
players on the team, and yet the whole is always the San Francisco Giants. Even in a
single game, it is very rare that all nine players that start the game are still playing at the
end of it (having been replaced by substitutes), and yet we still feel very comfortable
saying the Giants, as a group, won or lost that game. That ascription of the outcome
applies to individual Giants players that didn’t get on the field that day and even those
who happen to be rehabbing from injuries on the Giants’ minor league teams.
This brings us to a second reason: when we assign agency in such a case, there’s
not even a clear definition of the individuals we are speaking of as comprising the group
“San Francisco Giants.” The players are surely included, but does it also include the
manager? The third base coach? Or the team’s scouts, or even the General Manager? The
point here is that the set of individuals that make up the group “San Francisco Giants” is
both fluid and fuzzy, especially at the edges, and yet when we talk about the group itself,
6
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we ordinarily have a clear understanding of our meaning. This is the presupposition
Copp is discussing with the Intuitive Argument.
In this baseball example there is a third reason, not appealing to the Intuitive
Argument, why think about the Giants as a non-summative group, and not a collection of
players and their individual achievements. If we think about each individual hit, walk,
catch, or play that ultimately contributed to the Giants winning the World Series, it
becomes clear that the championship cannot be explained with just a description of each
of these individual actions or even the additive collection of them. For there is something
above and beyond a mere accounting of each player’s actions in a season which makes it
sensible to talk about the team winning the World Series, and not a collection of players.
One way to call attention to what that something is, is to say that individual actions only
make sense in context of “winning the World Series” if they also refer to something other
than the collection of these individual actions put together. Crucially, the individuals’
performance of those actions only makes sense in the actual situation because they are
done on behalf of the team; that is, because they contribute to the group action by which
the Giants won the World Series.
Each individual player is related to each other player by virtue of being part of the
group, and there is a structure in place that informs how the group, as a unit, operates,
and this structure organizes and makes sense of each individual action. In baseball, those
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structures are, broadly, things like the goals and rules of the game, and more
specifically things like the team’s lineup and strategy. These structures allow the
individual actions to make sense, in that they are done in the context of a larger group
action.
Moving the discussion to speaking explicitly about corporations and similar
organizations now, Larry May makes much the same point about the structure of a
corporation as was just made about the structure of a baseball team. It is worth quoting
him at some length to see the parallels:
…[S]tatements made about the corporation are not simply statements made about
the corporation’s members seen as discrete human persons. Such statements also
refer to an organizational structure whereby several persons, who are members of
Gulf Oil Company, are designated as those who will decide where all of the
members will work. The use of the fictitious phrase “Gulf Oil Company left
Pittsburgh” can be justified by reference to the decision structure which related
and partially transformed the actions of individual board members and employees
of this corporation.8
As the rules of the game and the strategy of gameplay are to baseball, so too are its
organizational structure and decision making processes to a corporation. May is claiming
that, much as individual players can make up a team that itself is said to act, (“The Giants
bunted the runner to third base”), a corporation is said to act when the members of the
group act as the corporation (“Gulf Oil Company left Pittsburgh”). When statements such
as these are made, May argues, collective action—group agency—is occurring. He calls
this “vicarious agency” because it is distinguishable from the actions of the individuals
who make up the group, and even distinguishable from the additive sum of all the
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individual actions (much like a collection of runs and outs cannot add up to winning
the World Series). May states that there is a formal relationship between corporation and
employee, because of which actions performed by an employee can only be fully
described by referencing the causal role organizational structures have in rendering that
action as a corporate one. Though it is an individual person (or, say, board of directors)
who may implement a policy or vote on a plan, May says that “it is impossible to
describe accurately the acts that occur in the corporate setting merely by referring to acts
of the individual members of a corporation, and not mentioning in the description a
causal role of the structure of the corporation.”9 In regard to the Gulf Oil example, if
attempting to describe the moving from Pittsburgh as a series of events (voting to move,
buying a new building, each employee leaving the town, etc.), this portrayal “would fail
to capture the fact that Gulf Oil Co. acted” in some important way that is more than the
sum of its parts.10
For May, “vicarious agency” allows for corporations to be evaluated in moral
terms because, even though an individual or group might be acting on behalf of the
corporation, that action would not take place without a corporate intention.11 There is
“something more” than just an individual action. A number of writers such as David
Ozar, Kenneth Goodpaster, and Peter French have attempted to determine what that
“something more” might be.
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“Something More”: Non-summative Group Agency
In order to tease out a better understanding of this “something more,” it is
useful to focus for a moment on very small groups of people, and Ozar has provided a
well-constructed summary of the point being made here.12 Let’s say, he proposes, that
while at a conference, you see a friend, and the two of you decide to get a drink that
evening, or go for a jog the next morning. Then, let’s say that at the time when the two of
you previously agreed to meet, you show up, while your friend does not. In this case,
Ozar claims that you would be justified in judging that your friend had failed to do what
she ought to have done and, if pressed to explain your displeasure at her, you would
probably say something like “We agreed to meet” or “We had a plan” or something to
that effect. As Ozar states, there is “something” created, above and beyond two
individuals each deciding on an action, which now exists, and non-conformity to that
something is grounds for a negative judgment. That something is contained in the “we” in
“We had a plan.”13
The point that Copp, May, and Ozar are all generally making is that it simply
doesn’t seem to be the case that a group decision or action can be adequately described as
the sum of its individual parts. Whether we speak of this in terms of “something more” or
that a group is “non-summative,” the point is that once certain conditions are in place
12
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This same theme has been further supported by Gilbert by the introduction of the
notion of “group intention” in On Social Facts and in articles and books since then, and
by a number of other scholars developing her work over the last decades.
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regarding the individuals who constitute a group, the group must be described as a
single actor in its own right, with actions that are partly constituted by but not reducible
to the individual actions of its members. As Ozar states, when a group makes a decision,
“this ‘something more’ has precisely to do with [the] unitary character of the decision,
that it is one decision—i.e. one decision by the parties acting together.”14 For present
purposes, where the focus is on health care organizations, this unitary character can be
discussed most easily in terms of Goodpaster’s Moral Projection theory and French’s
Corporate Internal Decision Structure theory in order to better explicate what that
“something more” actually is.
In “The Concept of Corporate Responsibility,” Kenneth Goodpaster also argues
that groups—in this case specifically corporations—make decisions and act as unitary
agents and not simply as a sum of their parts. He states that not shifting the analysis of
decision making in a corporation from the individual to the organization itself “fails to
take seriously enough the fact that organizations are more than simple collectives or
groups of persons without structure, like passengers on a train.”15 Mirroring an idea of
Gilbert’s, he continues: “The actions and decisions of corporations are not usually a
simple function of any single manager’s values. Even the chief executive officer of a
corporation often must, in his or her leadership role, work indirectly in efforts to guide
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the large organization toward its goals.” In effect, Goodpaster is saying that the moral
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analysis of a corporation’s actions cannot be reduced to a moral analysis of the
individuals within the corporation, because, again, an organization is more than simply
the sum of its parts; Goodpaster refers to the “joint force”17 of all the individuals in a
corporation much in the same way Gilbert refers to “joint commitment”18 or Ozar to
“something more.”19
Once the conditions necessary for attributing group agency are fulfilled,
Goodpaster states, then his theory of moral projection becomes relevant; namely, that it is
therefore normatively appropriate “to look for and foster moral attributes in organizations
by analogy with those we look for and foster in individuals.”20 In a morally responsible
individual,21 Goodpaster believes there are four essential elements for making a decision:

16

Goodpaster, “The Concept of Corporate Responsibility,” 10.

17

Goodpaster, “The Concept of Corporate Responsibility,” 10.

18

Gilbert, “Who’s to Blame?” 105.

19

There is no guarantee that a given plurality of individuals will fulfill the conditions
required for their actions together to count as the unitary agency of the group as such.
That is, some sets of persons that may be treated socially as units may nevertheless fall
short of being unitary group agents. But determining when this is the case depends on
identifying the requisite conditions, which is the task that the work of May, Ozar, and
Goodpaster summarized here is focused on. The rest of this dissertation will assume that
we are discussing health care organizations that do fulfill these conditions. See also
comments made at the end of this section.
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perception, reasoning, coordination, and implementation. Goodpaster’s task, then, is
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to see if those four elements can be mapped onto how a corporation makes decisions. If
he is able to do so, it looks like we may be better equipped to see what that “something
more” is in group agency.
Goodpaster thinks it is clear that corporations can engage in perception. For
any given corporation is always gathering data for many different purposes (marketing,
production, personnel, finance, etc.), and these data are “processed through various parts
of the organization, purified, clarified, simplified, and ultimately either ‘forgotten’ or
stored for use in decision-making by line management.”23 That is, we speak of
organizations not only gathering, but processing information, which looks and is
conceptually different from individuals looking for, gathering, and then pooling data
together.
According to Goodpaster, a corporation can be said to morally reason in an
informal manner when it contains an “understood but unwritten set of values” that create
something of a corporate culture.24 Formally, a corporation can introduce mechanisms
that promote ethical decision making, whether they be corporate codes and guidelines,
appointment of ethics officers, or creating incentives for morally laudable achievements.
For example, the Ford Motor Company, Goodpaster says, failed to exercise moral
reasoning when designing the Pinto as an extreme fire hazard. It would be impossible to
22
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identify some specific individual or individuals responsible for the problems with the
Pinto without also invoking the idea of group agency and therefore group responsibility.
That is, to speak accurately we must say that it is the corporation, the Ford Motor
Company, that put profit above safety.
A corporation coordinates when is able to balance moral and non-moral
considerations, the latter category including things like economic objectives and
regulatory compliance. Goodpaster admits this is a difficult task for an organization to do
effectively, as it “consists of integrating the formal and informal mechanisms of moral
reasoning with the wider set of organizational needs and goals,”25 but it also seems clear
that this is something that can happen either explicitly or organically, and it is such
coordination that points to a non-summative description of group agency. That is, a
corporation may simply “have a way of doing things” that yields such coordination; it is
not necessary that a specific person or persons balance competing objectives, since an
organization’s culture can arise that secures certain values and goals over others.
Finally, Goodpaster states that implementation is the process by which a
corporation is able “to motivate and facilitate effective organizational responses to plans
and policies.”26 That is to say, once the first three tasks of decision making are completed
and a response to a situation that is acceptable to the corporation as such is determined,
then a corporation, much like an individual, must actually do that thing. Even if the CEO
is the one to give ultimate approval to some sort of plan, Goodpaster states that she is
25

Goodpaster, “The Concept of Corporate Responsibility,” 13.

26

Goodpaster, “The Concept of Corporate Responsibility,” 13.

doing so in the context of group agency, instantiating the corporation’s decision and
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the corporation’s acting, even if (or especially if) she personally would choose to do
otherwise.
Thus, with Goodpaster’s analysis of corporate decision making, we can see one
notion of why the “something more” of non-summative group agency is relevant in an
organizational setting and Goodpaster’s moral projection thesis can apply to corporate
actions. Peter French’s discussion of a Corporate Internal Decision Structure fleshes out
Goodpaster’s ideas even more, and French has also helpfully written about the moral
obligations of health care organizations specifically. Indeed, when his account is applied
to corporations, including health care organizations, French provides an explicit answer
for what the “something more” is that turns the decisions of individuals into the decisions
of a corporation as plural subject.
In various writings in which French attempts to show that a corporation ought
to be treated as a moral person, he relies on what he calls a Corporate Internal Decision
Structure (CID Structure), which has two distinct parts. The first is an organizational
chart that demarcates levels of power and station, and the second is a “corporate decision
recognition rule(s),” which functions to differentiate a person’s decision from a decision
of a corporation (especially when those decisions happen to overlap).27 The CID
Structure serves to subordinate and synthesize any person’s actions into the mechanism
of a corporate decision. The organizational chart of a corporation is an important part of
the synthesis process, because it gives decision making power to a position, or a web of
27
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positions, as opposed to a specific person: “That a particular person holds a particular
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position with a firm is a contingent property of that corporation.”28 What is important is
not who fills that position, but how that position is related to other positions in the
organization. The organizational chart, according to French, provides the grammar for
corporate decision making, while the CID Structure as a whole are the rules of the
decision making.29 The CID Structure is what turns a number of actions by individual
persons into a group decision, into the “something more” of group agency. For it maps
the connections of the group members and indicates why their actions constitute a
singular decision of a plural subject—in this case, a corporation. French writes: “What I
mean by that is that the CID Structure not only organizes the various human beings in the
organization into a decision-making and acting entity, it makes it possible for us and
those within the organization to describe what is happening as an organization’s actions,
plans, positions, etc. and not just as the actions of a specific manager or officer of the
organization. In absence of the structure, many of the activities of the humans and
machines would be utterly unintelligible.”30
For French, then, the CID Structure consists in the rules that explain how a
decision made by, for example, the three members of the Board of Executives is, in fact,
a corporate decision, in that the CID Structure can show that if a decision was made in
order to implement corporate policy in accordance with company procedure, then it was
28
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done for corporate reasons, it can be considered an intentional act of the organization
itself.31
In regard to health care organizations in particular, French sees no significant
difference between their CID Structures and those of any other sort of formal
organization. Health care organizations have managerial structures, corporate models of
organization, and policies that provide the rules for unitary action.32 Because of this,
French says, health care organizations (if they fulfill these conditions) can be said to act
as group agents, and indeed French sees numerous examples of this. “They set admission
policies and procedures, make contracts with physicians and other providers, negotiate
payments with insurance carriers, HMOs, and patients, open and close clinics and various
types of units, relocate hospital facilities, make deals with various government agencies,
purchase equipment, upgrade facilities, report financial statements to various entities and
individuals, etc.”33 Assuming the relevant conditions of group agency have been met,
then all of these actions can be properly attributed to the organization itself, as its CID
Structure provides the rules for its group agency.
The preceding section provided a brief account of arguments for group agency
generally, and more specifically, group agency for corporations. Thus, going forward, we
hopefully have clear picture of what is being discussed when we talk about a health care
organization acting, and having an obligation to respond to moral distress situations. And
31
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though the argument for group agency is an important one, even if one disagrees with
the position whose defense has been summarized here, it would still fall to individual
decision makers within a health care organization to enact change, and the proposals in
the following chapters regarding how to respond adequately to health professionals’
moral distress would still apply to them as individual decision makers. This same
conclusion also follows regarding decision makers in health care institutions that are not
sufficiently unified in their agency to be considered unified moral agents.
Health Care Organizations as Hierarchies
Another important structural characteristic of health care organizations besides
the fact that they can exhibit group agency is that health care organizations are structured
hierarchically.34 The ramifications of this fact on how organizations ought to respond to
health professionals’ moral distress will be explored later in this chapter and the next. But
it is important to indicate the consequences of this structural characteristic of health care
organizations on their typical ways of responding to perceived problems (e.g., moral
distress).
Any discussion of corporate decision making or action relies on a tacit
understanding of the power relationships within that organization, as was just explained
in terms of French’s CID Structure. The CID Structure includes “an organizational or
34
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meets the relevant conditions) is a group agent.

50
responsibility flow chart that delineates stations and levels within the corporate power
structure,”35 which should be familiar to anyone that has looked at an organizational chart
delineating who reports to whom in any given organization. Indeed, hierarchy in an
organization is referenced explicitly any time someone talks about “my boss,” or “the Csuite,” or even says, “You need to talk to HR about that.”
For another example of the existence of corporate hierarchies, Boyle and
colleagues cite the rational systems approach to organizations as the standard approach to
understanding organizations in the business ethics literature, and as a rational system, “an
organization has (1) a visible set of hierarchical authority relations in which (2) work
activities are governed by formal rules and clearly defined criteria for evaluation,
relations that (3) are designed to pursue some set of goals.”36 All corporations necessarily
rely on hierarchical structures in order to operate, and health care organizations are no
different. At a broad level, French states “Hospitals, whether or not they are for profit,
mirror the corporate model in their managerial structures. The same can be said of clinics,
HMO’s, and the insurance companies that now virtually control the delivery of health
care in the society.”37 Regardless of how the mission (or tax status) of a health care
organization might differ from more “traditional” companies, structurally, it will look
like very much those companies, complete with their complex hierarchies.
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The importance of this fact about health care organizations and the challenge as
it pertains to moral distress is that, as they do anywhere, hierarchies in health care
organizations create superior-subordinate relationships, as well as more subtle power
dynamics among team members or between different sections of the institution.38 Though
these hierarchies and relationships are both unavoidable and necessary in an organization,
Boyle and colleagues realize that they also might stifle an individual’s ability to speak up
when she has issues with those above her in the CID Structure or organizational chart:
“The reality of power relationships, and many staff members’ perceptions of power and
its possible use against them, mitigates against the likelihood that most employees will
take courageous positions or even raise uncomfortable questions.”39
Boyle and colleagues also note that this power disparity has long existed in a
special way in the clinical setting between, for example, physicians and nurses,40 and that
this may be the catalyst for moral distress when a nurse believes she can’t speak out
regarding a physician’s decision that she sees as ethically troubling.41 Hamric, Epstein,
and White point out the link between corporate structure and moral distress in noting that
“moral distress is rarely if ever only about [a] particular case. On digging more deeply,
team, unit, and even systems problems that underlie these individual patient situations
38
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become clear—poor communication routines between providers, lack of unit-to-unit
interaction, lack of policy to guide appropriate action, inadequate staffing, inappropriate
use of resources, and hierarchical hospital structures that limit providers’ abilities to be
assertive.”42
It is clear, then, that hierarchies in health care organizations can be a cause of
moral distress, or at least often inhibit adequately responding to it. In light of this, this
dissertation will argue that organizational responses to moral distress that are themselves
specifically hierarchical in nature are ethically insufficient. Unfortunately, as the next
section will explain, the organizational mechanisms for moral distress resolution that
have been offered up to this point fall short in this respect. They either attempt to solve
moral distress in an explicitly hierarchical way, or are sufficiently dependent on the
hierarchy of roles and offices that they will most likely be stymied in their efforts.
After explaining here how the dependence of these efforts on the respective
organizations’ hierarchical structure undercuts the achievement of their intended goal,
this dissertation will then argue that an alternative, non-hierarchical approach is the ideal
response to moral distress. But first it is important to demonstrate that there are very
practical reasons why moral distress should not be addressed hierarchically.
Hierarchies and Moral Distress
The first practical reason why moral distress should not be addressed
hierarchically is that it may be the case that moral distress is, in fact, being caused by

Hamric, Epstein, and White, “Moral Distress and the Healthcare Organization,” 141.
Emphasis added.
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institutional hierarchies or structures that impact the relations of health care
professionals to one another and to patients and their families. In such instances, the
affected health care professional will typically not feel that she can appeal to, or within,
those same structures for relief. For example, if a resident’s moral distress stems from
taking part in carrying out the decision of the attending physician to whom she reports
and who will evaluate her performance as a resident, the resident may well think
reporting this to anyone could put her at professional risk beyond the moral distress itself.
The analogy to a potential corporate whistleblower is clear in regard to the latter’s fear of
repercussions for reporting corporate wrong-doing. In such cases, the established and
recognized hierarchy is a component of the causation for the moral distress, as the
realistic resident “cannot do anything other” than what her attending physician orders.
Thus, as was mentioned in Chapter One, the person experiencing moral distress might
actually feel doubly constrained because she also feels distress in that she is unable to
report her moral distress and have it be resolved appropriately (i.e., without negative
professional consequences).
The second practical reason to avoid a hierarchical response to moral distress
stems from an argument that will be discussed more fully in the next chapter: all health
care professionals are moral reasoners capable of contributing to a discussion of the
circumstances in which moral distress arises. Even if it were a case of moral distress
being felt by only one person, other health care professionals are going to be involved at
least indirectly or be on the same team, and will often be able to understand the
circumstances underlying another person’s experience of moral distress and very likely
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can be instrumental in its resolution. Furthermore, since differing ethical judgments
among team members may be the catalyst for someone’s moral distress and the fact that a
morally distressed team member may negatively impact inter-professional relationships
or medical care provided, the other team members involved in the case are causally or
contextually related to the moral distress experience. A hierarchical organizational
response (i.e., one that does not allow for peers to come together as moral equals to
discuss the causes for, experiences of, and possible solutions to, a moral distress
situation) may well mean that the professional relationships and medical care affected by
the situation might remain damaged even if some other sort of resolution has been
organizationally effective. It is therefore crucial from a simple practical point of view, so
it can attend to its main obligation as a health care organization (i.e., the health of its
patient), that an organization’s response to moral distress explicitly attend to the possible
negative impact of its hierarchical structure on these efforts.
Example of Ethically Insufficient Responses to Moral Distress
Though much has been written about moral distress, there are only a small
number of proposals that exist on how to address it. Unfortunately, each of the following
proposals either attempt to solve the problem hierarchically or would most likely be
stymied by the very hierarchical approach that may have caused the moral distress in the
first place.43 For example, Rushton devised the “four A’s” for addressing moral distress,44
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which has since been adopted by the American Association of Critical-Care Nurses
(AACN),45 and anecdotally is quite popular as a teaching tool for how to respond to
moral distress. Rushton and the AACN provide four steps as a “framework for support”
for nurses who are looking for “a catalyst for positive change” in the face of moral
distress.46 Though both Rushton and the AACN state that health care organizations are
responsible for addressing moral distress,47 the proposals they provide in the four A’s
framework put much of the burden on the nurses themselves, which will be shown to be
ineffective in a hierarchical health care organization.
The four A’s are ask, affirm, assess, and act. A nurse is supposed to first ask
herself if what she is feeling is, in fact, moral distress. If she believes it is, the next step is
to affirm the moral distress and affirm a commitment on her part to take care of herself,
along with her professional obligation to act to address the moral distress. Third, the
nurse is directed to make a thorough assessment of the source and severity of the moral
distress, and then assess her own readiness to act “to rise above the moral distress.”48
Finally, the nurse is instructed to act by “[initiating] specific actions that address the
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source of distress.” The AACN provides some examples of what this action might
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look like, with the overall gist being that the nurse must be responsible for changing the
practices of the unit, with others’ buy-in if possible, but alone if necessary.50
What Rushton and the AACN fail to account for, however, is the fact that moral
distress is often caused, or exacerbated, by hierarchical organizational structures or team
dynamics. When this is so, then given the hierarchy of roles in the organization, the
distressed individual already cannot act in any other way and thus cannot change the
underlying situation, at least not easily or effectively, since acting according to the four
A’s presumes her the ability to act to address the distress by, for example, changing the
practices of the unit, single-handedly if necessary. That is to say, the very same
hierarchies that were a catalyst for the moral distress in the first place aren’t going to
allow for a nurse to enact organizational change. For example, if a nurse can’t alter the
course of a patient’s care, it seems unlikely she’ll have the standing to affect the
underlying structures that stop her from being able to alter the course of patient care. As
was explained in Chapter One, health care professionals often feel helpless in their
experiences of moral distress precisely because of the hierarchical structure of the
organization, and Rushton and the AACN are begging the question by saying, “If you
feel like there’s nothing you can do to solve your distress, the best thing to do is solve the
cause of your distress.” It’s a solution that ignores the reality of the hierarchy of a health
care organization, and instead places the burden of resolving moral distress and its causes
49
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on the already-distressed individual. Though Rushton and the AACN are careful to
avoid language that blames nurses for their distress, they do nevertheless place the
responsibility for fixing it with them as individuals. This could easily create a feedback
loop of moral distress, in which the distressed individual is unable, thanks to
organizational hierarchies, to alleviate her distress, and then becomes distressed at her
inability to enact change to address the original distress.
A small study by Beumer provides empirical backing for this analysis. In this
study, a workshop was held for ICU nurses that was meant to define and identify moral
distress, and the 4 A’s model was introduced as a strategy to address moral distress when
it occurred. Questionnaires were completed before and after the workshop to gauge the
effects of the education and implementation of strategies. The responses from nursing
staff to the questionnaires administered after the workshop showed that “staff reported no
change in empowerment about speaking up if patient’s care was perceived as futile,”51
and that “there was no change in staff response to being listened to and respected when
mentioning an ethical concern” to others.52 While the study did report some positive
outcomes stemming from the workshop, the markers that relate to nursing staff’s ability
to address moral distress within a hierarchy were underwhelming. In other words, tools
like the 4 A’s that focus on empowering the person experiencing moral distress only are
effective if the affected individual can speak up, and when the organization’s hierarchy is
Beumer, “The Effect of a Workshop on Reducing the Experience of Moral Distress in
an Intensive Care Unit Setting,” 265.
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operating in the usual way, the person experiencing moral distress rarely has this
ability. The same criticism befalls Corley, creator of the moral distress scale, when she
states that “nurse empowerment” is a key to decreasing moral distress.53
Daar’s article “A Clash at Bedside” also provides an ethically insufficient solution
to moral distress dependent on hierarchies when discussing the role of the physician’s
professional conscience as a factor in medical decision making. Though Daar does not
use the phrase “moral distress” specifically, her description of professional conscience
makes it clear that moral distress is the phenomenon she is addressing. For example, what
she describes is precisely the distress inherent in a situation in which a patient feels
“empowered” to seek treatments that physicians consider “medically futile or
inappropriate.”54 In addition, many of the cases she analyzes are paradigmatic moral
distress cases and at one point Daar states that “The nurses were feeling trapped by an
endless treatment plan that obliged them to provide treatment they did not believe was
appropriate or could benefit a dying patient.”55
In attempting to provide a solution for physicians who are directed by patients or
their surrogates to provide medically futile care, Daar also employs the institutional
hierarchy to resolve situations of moral distress. Daar proposes what she calls a
“treatment evaluation board” (TEB) as an appropriate use of bureaucratic power to
resolve moral distress. The TEB would be used as forum in which physicians could (1)
53
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discuss their disagreements over the course of treatment requested by patients, (2)
determine how to meet the needs of the patient, and (3) decide how to transfer the patient
to another physician or hospital, as needed.56 While these goals are potentially useful
steps for resolving moral distress, Daar’s recommendation regarding what the board
should look like reveals the same kind of ethically problematic dependence of hierarchal
solutions as the authors discussed above. As Daar states, “Ideally, a TEB should be
composed of two members from the full-time medical staff, one member who represents
the hospital administration (this member should serve as the chair of the board), and one
member who is a hospital social worker…In addition, for each case presented to the
board, the chair should appoint one member of the medical staff who has expertise in the
particular disease or injury from which the patient suffers.”57
Note, however, that not included on this board is the health care professional that
is experiencing the moral distress. Instead, the situation is handed over (or up) to hospital
administration to be dealt with via the TEB. This explicitly hierarchical approach takes
away the voice of, and the proper share of the decision making from, the morally
distressed person, as well as other health care professionals who might be involved. It
transfers conflict resolution power to the institution, without acknowledging that a
morally distressed health care professional, and her peers, ought to be part of the
conversation of how the distress, and the situation causing it, will be resolved. In fact, the
TEB does nothing to resolve the impact of the distress on the individual, or its effect on
56
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the health care team or the organization, though perhaps it can remove the
patient/situation causing it in this one instance. This proposal also ignores both the
individual character of the experience of moral distress and the fact that, as will be shown
in Chapter Three, team members should have a place at the table to discuss the situation.
The bureaucratically impartial adjudication model that Daar proposes may remove the
specific catalyst for a given instance of moral distress, but that is not equivalent to
resolving the individual experience of moral distress.
Writing from the perspective of a registered nurse, Gutierrez offers a host of
strategies for removing moral distress from nurses and nursing practice that unfortunately
also depend on an appeal to the organization’s hierarchical structures. She does seem
more aware than Daar that those experiencing moral distress need to be able to own a part
of its resolution, and her proposals do suggest some awareness that she is asking those
hierarchies that cause distress to then produce the solution. For example, on the one hand
she suggests that the multiple parties in a morally distressing case “should be encouraged
to engage in open dialogue, whereby moral concerns are addressed in a respectful,
nonintimidating [sic] manner, thus empowering participants.”58 She also recommends
that forums be developed where nurses are able to tell their “concerns to physicians,
patients, and families” as a coping mechanism.59 In the end, however, none of her
recommendations explicitly recognize that, if a moral distress situation is one in which a
Gutierrez, “Critical Care Nurses’ Perceptions of and Responses to Moral Distress,”
238.
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nurse feels she can’t do the right thing, it is also quite likely she will be unable to voice
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that distress within the hierarchical structure causing the distress. While Gutierrez
recommends that there ought to be a way for nurses to talk about their distress, especially
to those people or entities that cause it, she nevertheless fails to explain how the hierarchy
can be changed to be accommodating of such dialogue.
Gutierrez does suggest that those at “high administrative levels” get “feedback
from nurses regarding lack of inclusion” in order to analyze causes of distress.60 While a
laudable goal, once again, this assumes that those experiencing moral distress should feel
comfortable enough to initiate a conversation about powerlessness with those in power,
and discuss the moral distress that the powerful or the hierarchy of roles they represent
may have helped to cause. Without some explanation of how this will be made possible,
it is difficult to see how Gutierrez’ suggestions are to be implemented to any effect. What
is needed are ideas, like the one this dissertation will offer, that do not depend on
hierarchical solutions to moral distress that are so often directly caused, or significantly
contributed to, by the hierarchical structure of the organization itself.
It might be argued that institutional policies on futile treatment and unilateral do
not attempt resuscitation orders (i.e., a hospital refusing to attempt resuscitation on a
given patient) are ways in which health care organizations attempt to use hierarchy to
avoid moral distress in their professionals. For a health care professional can appeal to
the organization’s policies and procedures of this sort for institutional support, at least in
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cases when the issue is to not provide that kind of treatment. Nevertheless, even if a
health care professional who may experience moral distress over continuing futile
treatment is able to appeal to such a policy, this does not address or even acknowledge
her moral distress. It is easily perceived as an institutional resolution of practical problem
in which, in effect, the health care professional relinquishes ownership of the situation to
the organization in order to do the right thing. Absent responses to moral distress that do
not refer the resolution to the organization and its hierarchical decision making
mechanisms, even policies like these can be seen as overlooking, or leaving in place, the
professional’s moral distress (i.e., leaving it to the person experiencing the distress to
resolve it alone). What is needed is a way to respond to moral distress that is done in
conjunction with the distressed individual, not in place of her.
Institutional policies such as these may resolve the specific case in which the
distress exists, but unless a way of properly addressing the moral distress is also in place,
they do so only by the institution taking the issue out of the hands of those distressed by
the case. This seems to be a resolution of fact, but not of feeling. The individual may be
glad that she doesn’t have to treat a patient anymore, but won’t feel that it was because
she was able to play an active, participatory role in the process.
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While such policies are inadequate for resolving moral distress for the reasons to be
offered here, organizational policies of this sort are very valuable in other ways, and there
are plenty of instances in which these policies are extremely useful and in which moral
distress isn’t an issue.
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Conclusion
Recalling that the two top priorities of a health care organization are to provide
health care services to patients and to do so by means of the expertise of health care
professionals in clinical matters, and that institutions can be held morally accountable for
not fulfilling its ethical obligations, it has been argued that the above examples of
hierarchical responses to moral distress fail to fulfill those priorities and that health care
organizations that rely on them are morally accountable for this failure. As discussed in
Chapter One, unresolved moral distress leads to disengagement from patient care,
emotional and physical withdrawal from others, and ultimately professional burnout.
These effects have clear implications on patient care, both directly (i.e., clinician-topatient contact) and indirectly (i.e., as these effects relate to team dynamics).
Furthermore, withdrawal from participation in patient care means that a morally
distressed person is not fully contributing her professional expertise, if at all, and most
likely feels that her expertise is being ignored by her patients, team members, and/or
institution. Thus, given the inadequacies of employing hierarchies as a response to moral
distress as shown above, a health care organization that does so can be held ethically
responsible for its failure to uphold its main priorities as a health care organization. A
better solution would be one that includes those that are distressed in resolving the
situation in concert with other health care professionals, meeting in a non-hierarchical,
equality-based, inclusive forum. The following chapters will explain the moral reasons
for preferring such a solution and describe a practical organizational mechanism for
achieving it.

CHAPTER THREE
THE CONTENT-THIN COMMON MORAL FRAMEWORK
Chapter Two made the argument that health care organizations are not responding
in an ethically adequate way and can be held morally accountable when they attempt to
resolve situations of moral distress in its health care professionals in what was described
as a “hierarchical” manner. This argument was based on the primacy of a provider health
care organization’s obligations to provide appropriate care to its patients and to assure
that the provision of health care is directed by the combined expertise of its health care
professionals. But there are further reasons for concluding that hierarchical efforts at
resolving moral distress are ethically insufficient.
This chapter’s arguments regarding the inadequacies of hierarchical approaches to
moral distress focus more closely on the concepts of equality and inclusion of all health
care professionals in addressing and resolving moral distress. It will offer two different
reasons to favor non-hierarchical, equality-based, inclusive responses to moral distress.
The first, which was suggested in Chapter Two, is an argument for the inclusion of the
morally distressed individual from the resolution of her moral distress. The second is an
argument for inclusion of other health care professionals in the discussion and resolution
of moral distress, even if they are not among the morally distressed individuals.
Following these arguments, a framework for non-hierarchical, equality-based, inclusive
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responses to moral distress will be outlined. The remaining chapters will then develop
this framework in fuller detail.
Inclusion of the Morally Distressed Health Care Professional
In Chapter One, it was shown that moral distress has myriad causes and effects
for all kinds of health care professionals. Another way of stating that fact is simply that
moral distress occurs in, and affects, different people, and people in different health care
professions, in different ways:1 there is no one, or “right,” way to experience moral
distress. This makes moral distress a personal, subjective experience. Even if it can be
appreciated to some extent by other persons, and at times can also be considered
communal in that many health care professionals can be involved in, and be distressed
by, the same situation,2 still the experience will always be personal. This stems from the
fact that part of what informs a person’s individual moral sensibility are her life
experiences and the process of how she reflects on and interprets the meaning of those
experiences. Because of this, how people have reflected on past experiences and
acclimated to those experiences and reflections into their lives has also helped to
individualize them, with the result that people will experience, internalize, and react to
moral distress in an individualized way. Though there may be experts in talking about
moral distress generally, the individualized nature of the experience means that each
individual person is the one best able to understand her own moral distress.

For a fuller analysis of this claim, see Houston et al., “The Intensity and Frequency of
Moral Distress Among Different Healthcare Disciplines.”
1

2

Varcoe et al., “Moral Distress: Tensions as Springboards for Action.”
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In other words, each individual is uniquely qualified to explain and talk about
her own moral distress, and it follows that all health care professionals who have
experienced moral distress are equally qualified to talk about their own moral distress. It
is the case that overlap of knowledge, vocabulary, and some experiences means that
health care professionals can intellectually understand another’s moral distress in order to
learn from the person’s description of it and identify similarities to their own
experiences.3 But even if the same situation is a catalyst for two health care
professionals’ moral distress, and the symptoms of the moral distress appear identical to
outsiders, the simple fact that the two people think and reflect differently means that it
will be experienced differently.
It should be made clear that the claim that all health care professionals are, so to
speak, experts in their own moral distress—because moral distress is first of all a
subjective experience—is not an argument for moral relativism, either descriptively or
normatively. As will be shown later in this chapter, commonalities among health care
professionals in regard to basic ethical norms make for the possibility of ethical
discussions, including those about moral distress situations, that are shareable in mutually
constructive ways. But the variability of experience means that health care professionals
cannot expect to fully understand one another’s moral distress, and for persons not
involved in the moral distress situation and those who are not health care professionals,
the extent to which a distressed person’s experience can be understood and shared is still
less.
This idea will be returned to in the next section, “The Inclusion of Other Health Care
Professionals.”

3

As noted above, there is no “one way” to experience moral distress; therefore
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the individualized experience of moral distress is not amenable to a “one size fits all”
resolution process. Because the morally distressed person has a unique understanding of
her experience of moral distress, not only should the resolution process include her, it is
the case that the process cannot be addressing her moral distress without her
participation. Therefore, as was argued in Chapter Two, hierarchical responses that
exclude the morally distressed individual can thus produce only an un-individuated
response, which in fact leaves the moral distress in place—and leaves unresolved its
negative effects both on patient care and on the morally distressed person’s expert
contributions to patient care.
But furthermore, Ozar and colleagues argue in Organizational Ethics in Health
Care that health care organizations have obligations to those professionals who provide
care to the organization’s patients. While these obligations do not ethically outweigh the
organization’s two prime obligations to patient care based on professional expertise,4 they
are nevertheless obligations that, if ignored by a health care organization, could leave that
organization open to moral criticism:
Within [health care] provider organizations there is also a special kinship between
the organization and the health care professionals…who are the direct providers
of health care to the organization’s patients. This special kinship, while founded
on the relationship of shared effort and common goals…is both strengthened and
deepened by the specific shared commitment of the provider organization and the
organization’s clinical staff…to serve the health of patients as priority 1 [of the
health care organization]. Because of this shared commitment about what is the

4

For a discussion of a rank order of the priorities see Ozar et al., Organizational Ethics in
Health Care, 11.
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highest priority for both of them, the sense of kinship will likely be greater in
this instance than in a provider organization’s relationships with other
stakeholders.5
So a health care organization that moves the resolution of a morally distressing situation
out of the hands of those experiencing it not only marginalizes them from participating in
a process in which they are uniquely qualified to participate, it also inhibits the resolution
of a situation that they experience as significantly negative and ethically challenging and
thus disregards the ethical relationship (the “special kinship”) it has an obligation to
build. Handing off the issue to a superior or to a different office or department, for
example, in an attempt to “solve” it sends a clear message that the person experiencing
moral distress is not respected as a unique individual or as a significant contributor to the
shared effort and common goals of the organization, and furthermore that their distress
and its negative psychological or physical effects are of only indirect concern to the
organization, to be mediated by the hierarchy. This would be yet another obligation (in
this case to its health care professionals) that a health care organization could be
criticized for failing to uphold.
While it is possible that an organization might sometimes successfully resolve a
moral distress situation in the same manner it solves, say, technology acquisition (i.e.,
through chain-of-command and levels of approval), it does so not only at the peril of
marginalizing the distressed health care professional’s moral experience and subjugating
it to someone else’s—someone who cannot adequately substitute their experience for the
experience of moral distress as felt by the individual experiencing it—but also at the peril

5

Ozar et al., Organizational Ethics in Health Care, 13.

69
of marginalizing and devaluing the person herself. That is to say, sometimes the
situation that causes moral distress may be solved via “normal” organizational channels,
but not the moral distress itself. A hierarchical response to moral distress that excludes
the morally distressed professional fails to grasp the point of what the resolution of moral
distress itself looks like—it targets the wrong problem because the true problem can only
be properly addressed if both the person’s understanding of the situation and the value of
the person experiencing it are treated as essential parts of the resolution process. An
organization’s failure to recognize this is clearly an ethical failing on the part of the
organization.
Inclusion of Other Involved Health Care Professionals
The argument for including other health care professionals in a moral distress
resolution, even if they themselves are not experiencing moral distress in the situation,
may be less obvious than the argument for including the morally distressed health care
professional, but is equally important to this dissertation’s framework. So this section will
argue that any other health care professionals who are involved in the morally distressing
situation should also be included in the process of resolving the moral distress of the
person experiencing it. There are both practical and more general philosophical reasons
for this inclusion. The practical reasons will be explained in this chapter. The more
general philosophical reasons will be explained in Chapter Four, where they will also be
seen to serve as grounding for how resolution of moral distress can occur.
As has been shown, hierarchical responses that exclude a person experiencing
moral distress from the resolution are ethically inappropriate, both because they prevent
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resolution from occurring (with the continued adverse effects of moral distress on
patient care and respect for professional expertise) and because they do not respect the
ethical relationship between the organization and health care professional. But it is
important to note, first, that not including other health care professionals also prevents
resolution from occurring (and thus the same continued adverse effects on patient care
and respect for professional expertise). This is because moral distress only occurs when
different participants in a situation have differing judgments about what ought to be done
in that situation (and at least one of the participants cannot act in accord with her belief of
what ought to be done). If the only participant in this situation who has a voice in the
resolution is the morally distressed person, then the moral views of those who have not
been given the opportunity to speak up will not be included in the resolution process,
which may in fact create more moral distress in those ignored health care professionals.
In other words, this is an argument for equality—specifically within the process of
resolving moral distress—of the moral views of all health care professionals involved in
the situation. If this argument is correct, it clearly implies the practical importance of
including the other health care professionals involved in the situation, if they choose to
participate.
There are a number of ways in which a person’s view of what ought to be done
can be in conflict with the moral views of others in a given situation, and so a concrete
example that was noted in Chapter One will be helpful here. A common situation is one
in which a health care team’s decision regarding treatment for a patient can cause an
individual member of that team to experience moral distress if she thinks the plan is

unethical and she is unable to alter her team’s choice. Suppose only the person
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experiencing moral distress participates in the resolution process (along with whomever
from outside the situation is representing the organization’s effort to resolve situations of
moral distress), but not the other care professionals in the situation. If the moral view of
the health care team is the action supported by those outside the situation, then little has
occurred to resolve the distressed person’s moral distress (and the situation differs little
from the hierarchical solutions criticized above). But if the moral view of the distressed
person is supported by those outside the situation, there is very good reason to expect the
non-participating members of the health care team to experience moral distress
themselves (as they also had made a decision about what the ethical thing to do is and
now are being told by the institution that they cannot act on it) and, in any case, to
experience to devaluing of themselves and their efforts at moral judgment found ethically
wanting in the previous section.
It was noted in Chapter One that a team member’s moral distress can have
repercussions on the rest of the team or staff. Recalling that moral distress can lead to
withdrawal from patient care, burnout, depression, and more, these symptoms can
negatively affect the ability to care for any given patient. But team members can also be
affected by another health care professional’s unresolved moral distress, leading perhaps
to a difficult work environment or having to “carry” a burned out team member by taking
on extra work. For obvious practical reasons, then, other health care professionals
involved in the situation should also take part in the process of resolution in order to
maintain team cohesion and thereby the highest quality of care for the patients.
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There are also reasons above and beyond restoration of team cohesion and its
positive impacts on patient care to include the other health care professionals in the
resolution process. Recall that the definition of moral distress posited in this dissertation
starts with the notion that a morally distressed person “believes she knows the ethical
course of action to take.” The word “believes” in the definition leads to an important
reason for the inclusion of other health care professionals in moral distress resolution: in
some cases, moral distress may arise not from a discordance of individuals’ values, but
instead from individuals having incomplete information. As Helft and colleagues state
when discussing one mechanism to address moral distress, “It is common that several
participants are only partially informed about the details of the case under discussion and
that such partial understandings contribute in important ways to feelings of [moral]
distress and, in some cases, to judgments that do not follow logically from a deeper
understanding of the facts.”6 That is to say, a morally distressed individual, believing she
knows what the ethical thing to do is, may lack information held by other team members
that has led them to choose a different course of action. Including those team members in
the conversation can perhaps bring this information to light, whether that information is a
new diagnosis or prognosis, previous conversations had between the patient and one of
the providers, or simply a different understanding of the underlying medical facts.
Including team members who may be able to provide that information, and by “probing
for details and inviting other staff to provide missing parts of the story,”7 it is possible to
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draw a fuller picture of what went into choosing option A instead of B which in and of
itself may resolve moral distress and may, in fact, lead a morally distressed person to
come to the decision that A is the “better” option.
In addition, the other health care professionals involved in the situation can
provide not only information, but interpretation of, and rationale for the importance of,
that information. They may, by explaining more carefully the basis of their ethical
thinking about the matter (perhaps because their reasons, both generally and specifically
ethically, come from different past experiences and different reflection on those
experiences from the morally distressed person’s), bring about a different ethical
judgment in the morally distressed person—or their exchange may enable both to change
in a manner both can accept. As Cowley states, “Moral reasons and judgements [sic] are
always declared within an embodied moral perspective on the situation.”8 The fact that
moral reasoning is applied differently by different people is not a relativist flaw in how
ethics is done; instead, it allows one person to help another see the same situation from a
more nuanced angle. Different perspectives allow for different vantage points on the
same set of facts, and each perspective may be relevant in a moral distress situation.
Therefore, given that all health care professionals (like all people) are moral reasoners
with experience reflecting on ethical issues, if any practitioner feels she can contribute to
the resolution of moral distress via her experience, she should be included.
In other words, including both the morally distressed individual(s) and the other
health care professionals involved in the situation is by far the most efficient method to
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approach the situation, that is, the method most likely to achieve resolution of the
moral distress. This is partly because those involved in the situation are more likely to see
its nuances, both factual and ethical, and also because, if outside actors have hierarchical
authority to determine what ought to be done in the case, the absence of the other health
care professionals involved in the situation will be more likely to produce the negative
consequences of hierarchal responses criticized in Chapter Two and above.9
Bringing the Morally Distressed and Other Health Care Professionals Together
This chapter has argued that when addressing moral distress, both the morally
distressed individual(s) and other health care professionals involved in the moral distress
situation ought to be included. Furthermore, Chapter Two showed that attempting to
address a moral distress situation through a hierarchical system is an ethically inadequate
response, and this implies (and will be made explicit in the next section) that a response
should acknowledge all participants as equally important to the resolution process. In
other words, whatever response is ultimately chosen, it must be one in which the morally
distressed individual(s) and other health care professionals can engage in dialogue with
each other. That is to say, if an ethically appropriate response includes all participants in
a non-hierarchical format, this would minimally require a process that includes discussion
among and between all participants. A discussion of this sort would instantiate the
reasons for including all participants in a moral distress situation, including giving voice
to those morally distressed, and allowing other health care professionals to share their
clinical expertise and their experience as moral reasoners.
9
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What is needed, then, is an understanding of how this discussion can take place.
In order to build this understanding, the next section will introduce and defend the
necessary moral framework for the discussion. Chapter Four will explore the participants’
relationship to each other within that discussion, and Chapter Five will provide process
and procedural rules to guide the discussion with the goal of resolving moral distress in
health care professionals.
The Content-Thin Common Moral Framework
This chapter has allowed for, and in fact relied on, differences in ethical
viewpoints between the morally distressed person(s) and other health care professionals
involved in a moral distress situation. At several points the claim has been made that
these differences are not insuperable, that is, that moral distress does not presuppose
moral relativism. This section will make explicit the reasons that moral relativism is not
an inherent feature of such situations and does not undercut the significance of the above
arguments. The following discussion of what will be described as a “content-thin
common moral framework” provides the philosophical foundation for the arguments
offered above for inclusion of both the morally distressed person and the other health care
professionals involved, as it explains why and how it is possible for them to successfully
discuss their differing moral views. It will also serve as a bridge to Chapter Four’s
exploration of what kinds of moral discussion are possible for “moral friends,” “moral
strangers,” and “moral acquaintances,” with the last category then being used as the
grounding for processes of moral distress resolution structured according to the premises
and rules that will be explained in Chapter Five.
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This section will posit and defend the thesis that among health care
professionals (or at the very least health care professionals practicing in our society and
societies like it) there is a mutually agreed-upon (either explicitly or tacitly) content-thin
common moral framework that health care professionals understand and adhere to.10 This
content-thin common moral framework does two things for purposes of the present
discussion. First, it delineates the types of experiences of moral distress that an ethically
serious health care organization should be held accountable to address and resolve (i.e.,
those that can appeal to a perceived violation of part of the framework), even when the
experience of moral distress itself is, as shown above, variable and subjective in an
important sense. Second, if this moral framework can be shown to be common to the
health care professionals involved in moral distress situations, it can provide the means
for creating a peer-to-peer non-hierarchical forum in which discussions about morally
distressing situations can take place. That is, if health care professionals are in basic
(though at times, very loose, and perhaps not even explicit) agreement about what is
meant by ethical health care practice—due to similarities in training and professionally
assumed moral commitments—then in any discussion of a moral distress situation it is
reasonable to accept as a starting point that the participants are equipped with a
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As will be made clear, this framework decidedly is not THE answer to all moral
quandaries. This is a looser understanding, based on the shared moral obligations of
health care professionals. In fact, “common moral framework” may not be the most exact
term—if a different, more explicative term could be thought of, it could replace the term
in this dissertation. One possibility is “shared convictions”: in addition to removing the
objection that health care professionals do not, in fact, explicitly use a moral framework,
this phrase implies that all health care professionals are imbued with the same
convictions about their role in fulfilling the goals and values of professional health care,
which will be discussed later in this chapter.
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professional moral compass that is, very broadly speaking, the same. Such a common
ethical grounding will also be a further reason for saying that the health care
professionals participating in the discussion are equal, and all should be treated as peers
in that discussion addressing the moral distress situation.
Before describing the framework itself, it is important to understand what is
meant by the expression “content-thin” when referring to that framework. Here, the word
“thin” is being used the same way that Michael Walzer uses it in Thick and Thin.11 It will
therefore be useful to explain Walzer’s meaning of the term, which will be the first step
in explaining how a content-thin common moral framework will be used by the “moral
acquaintances” discussed in Chapter Four.
Walzer builds his definition of “thin” by recalling a picture he saw on the news in
the lead-up to Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution in 1989. He saw people marching in
the street, carrying signs reading “Truth” and “Justice.” Walzer states, “I knew
immediately what the signs meant—and so did everyone else who saw the same picture.
Not only that: I also recognized and acknowledged the values that the marchers were
defending—and so did (almost) everyone else.”12 The realization that an understanding of
concepts such as “truth” and “justice” was available to Walzer, even though he had never
experienced the oppression the Czechoslovakian marchers were facing, led him to realize
that this is, in part, because the marchers weren’t appealing to a specific theory of truth,

In this dissertation, the word “thin” is almost always being used in conjunction with
“content” (as in “content-thin”), and as such refers to ethical concepts and meanings that
are being shared in the common moral framework.
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or to a particular understanding of justice. Instead, the call for justice was a call for, as
Walzer puts it, “common, garden variety justice.”13 This, Walzer states, is a thin, minimal
meaning (as opposed to thick, maximal meanings) of moral terms.
But thick and thin, Walzer explains, are not representative of two distinct
moralities; instead, “minimalist meanings are embedded in the maximal morality.”14 The
thin, minimal expression of morality is shallow, yet connects with the experiences of
(almost) everyone. The thick, maximal expression is deeper and comes with
“qualification, compromise, complexity, and disagreement.”15 That is, as meanings
become thicker, they also become more precise and the communities that support them
become smaller. Thus, thin moralities may be shared across different historical, cultural,
or political views, while at the same time they point to thicker concepts that will make
clear those differences in viewpoints once the participants dig deeper. Walzer expresses
this dichotomy eloquently, referring again to the marchers in Prague:
Clearly, when they waved their signs, they were not relativists: they would have
said…that everyone in the world should support their cause—should join them in
defense of ‘truth’ and ‘justice’…But when they turn to the business of designing a
health care system or an educational system for Czechs and Slovaks or arguing
about the politics of their union or separation, they will not be universalists: they
will aim at what is best for themselves, what fits their history and culture, and
won’t insist that all the rest of us endorse or reiterate their decisions.16
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Or, put more simply, “Minimalism makes for a certain limited, though important and
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heartening, solidarity. It doesn’t make for a full-blooded universal doctrine.”17 Though
they are limited, thin accounts of moralities can be helpfully shared by almost everybody;
indeed, over 25 years after the Velvet Revolution, an article in The Economist reported on
a protest in Argentina where marchers once again “carried signs demanding ‘truth’ and
‘justice’” from their government.18 And though any observer can understand what the
marchers are asking for in both protests, clearly the specific applications in both scenarios
are different—the thick, maximal meanings of “truth” and “justice” are different in 1989
Czechoslovakia than they are in Argentina a quarter of a century later. When thin
meanings are used, specificity is sacrificed for accessibility. As Stephen Hanson states,
“Though all rational moral persons may well agree that justice is important, they do not
agree on precisely how justice should be defined, much less on how to derive specific
consequences from it; though they all may agree that beneficence is important, they do
not agree on how important it is relative, to, say, the importance of respecting the
autonomy of one who is refusing a beneficent act.”19
Thin moral concepts use generic, common understandings as their starting
point—they are “broad and bland.”20 In this regard, thin moral concepts are “reasonable
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enough and universal enough” for all participants to come to a moral discussion with a
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baseline consensus about the thin meaning of those concepts.21
This dissertation will argue that health care professionals in our society (and in
other similar societies) share thin ethical principles related to their professions, and
enough so to form a framework—the content-thin common moral framework outlined
below. The content that is shared, and the framework that it builds, rests on what will be
referred to in this dissertation as a “common professional morality,” a term itself which
needs unpacking. Here, the “common morality” of common professional morality is used
in a way similar to how Tom Beauchamp and James Childress use the phrase in
Principles of Biomedical Ethics. As the authors state, “All persons who are serious about
living a moral life already grasp the core dimensions of morality. They know not to lie,
not to steal property, to keep promises, to respect the rights of others, not to kill or cause
harm to innocent persons, and the like…Because we are already convinced about such
matters, the literature of ethics does not debate them. Such debate would be a waste of
time.”22 Any morally serious person, Beauchamp and Childress state, knows that certain
ethical rules are basic building blocks for an ethical life, and they need not be proven or
defended.
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to ask whether or not there is a truly
common morality spanning all “morally serious” people and generations; but it is also not
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necessary for what is being argued for here. Instead, in discussing a “common
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professional morality,” this dissertation follows Beauchamp and Childress’s narrower
view regarding the ethics of health care professionals (in ours and similar societies). They
state, “Just as the common morality is accepted by all morally serious persons, so most
professions contain, at least implicitly, a professional morality with standards of conduct
that are generally acknowledged by those in the profession who are serious about their
moral responsibilities.”24 While the foundations of a general, or universal, common
morality can be—and are—debated and denied by people who consider themselves
“morally serious,”25 the relevance of a common professional morality within a given
society is implied in the concept of professionalism itself.26 In health care, specifically,
one cannot join a given health care profession while simultaneously disavowing the
ethical commitments that come with it. A professional is obligated, because of the
autonomy afforded professions and professionals by society, to work within the common
professional morality toward the goals of professional health care.27 Importantly, for the
discussion that follows, common professional morality, and the content-thin common
moral framework it supports, does not explicitly appeal to any one general moral theory
Saying that one must be “morally serious” in regard to universal morality is a
troublingly vague statement, especially if Beauchamp and Childress can only define
people as morally serious as those that buy into their proposed common morality.
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for its support; it is simply the requisite for practicing in a given profession. The
framework ensures that each member of a profession shares in a basic moral agreement
regarding their profession and what it means to act ethically as a member of it.28
Thus, because society grants professions and professionals a large degree of
autonomy based on the assumption that the members of the profession will police
themselves on matters of practice, conduct, and ethics, upon entering a profession the
newly-minted professional is expected to take up certain moral obligations, a
commitment often sworn symbolically by oath. These professional moral obligations are
what the various professional organizations’ codes aim to express, often in vague or
bland ways. But they are certainly expected to be treated as substantive when practiced.
Thus, a content-thin common moral framework for health care professions can be
described in this way: the broad, shallow ethical obligations and values that all health
care professionals necessarily commit to, and share, by reason of being health care
professionals.
Having defined it as such, two counter-arguments against the content-thin
common moral framework for health care professionals (in ours and similar societies) can
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It should be noted that this is not the same as claiming that all health care professionals
share the exact same set of (thick) ethical commitments. For example, bioethics literature
traditionally states that doctors have healing as a primary obligation (with different
specialties even having differing notions of what that means), while nurses focus first on
caring. However, returning to Walzer’s notion of “thin” mutual understanding, then the
claim can be made that all health care professionals are committed a (thin) set of
overlapping convictions that include the aforementioned healing and caring, among other
various moral concepts that are a part of the content-thin common moral framework and
will be discussed later in this chapter. A person from one health care profession could be
understood by a person from another health care profession when using these (thin)
concepts even if their rank order, for example, differs from profession to profession.
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be put forward and need to be carefully considered. The first is that the framework
doesn’t exist in the first place (much like one could argue against a general common
morality), and the second is that it is devoid of content, because its content either hasn’t
or can’t be determined. Explaining why these two counter-arguments fail will help
expound upon the framework and its content.
In making the first counter-argument, one might say that what is considered
ethical in health care is a moving target (e.g., withdrawing artificial nutrition or
mechanical ventilation in a brain-dead patient was once considered immoral but now is
generally accepted by health care professionals as ethically appropriate). There is no
common framework, the counter-argument goes, because health care professionals accept
different ethical standards at different times, not one that is shared by health care
professionals across time; this is why such shifting ethical standards may lead to
confusion regarding what is professionally correct at any specific point in time.
In response, it is easy to concede that what is considered ethical in health care
can, in some instances, shift. But professional ethics are grounded in the professions
themselves (and/or possibly in the agreement between society and a profession on what
role the profession should fill), as they exist and are understood at a given point in time.29
Professions (and societies) gradually change over time and some of these changes yield
adjustments in the moral framework they support. What matters is that health care
professionals agree on what constitutes the ethics of the health professions at that time,
and the commitment to uphold those ethical obligations remains constant. Taking on a
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professional role demands the acceptance of certain obligations, even if the content of
those obligations can and does change over time. That obligations might change does not
mean that fulfilling those obligations is optional for health care professionals.
As Beauchamp and Childress explain, “Health care professions typically specify
and enforce obligations for their members, thereby seeking to ensure that persons who
enter into relationships with these professionals will find them competent and
trustworthy. The obligations that professions attempt to enforce are role obligations, that
is, obligations determined by an accepted role.”30 The content-thin common framework
exists because the profession exists, and part of what it “means” to be a professional is to
conduct oneself in accord with the framework.
A more direct response to the claim that health care professionals’ moral
standards vary too much to support the argument being made here can be found by how
health care professions actually function. There are numerous examples of the application
of the content-thin common moral framework that point to the existence of shared ethical
commitments of health care professionals, and these examples come at many different
levels of the health care system. One obvious example has already been given: namely,
that the professions themselves often have their members commit to certain ethical
precepts, with the most notable examples being the Hippocratic and Osteopathic Oaths
for physicians. Professional associations, as well, prescript moral obligations for their
members, from the American Nurses Association’s Code of Ethics for Nurses to the
American Association for Respiratory Care’s Statement of Ethics and Professional
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Conduct. These few examples provide evidence that, for one who is a health care
professional, there is an obligation to think about the ethics of the profession as a basic
stipulation of being a member of the profession, and this in turn supports the idea that all
health care professionals should be attuned to that obligation, and have the same (broad
as it may be) commitment to ethical thinking. As Ozar and Sokol claim, “Many people,
both inside and outside of professions, hold that professions and professionals have
special obligations and consider this to be a central feature of their being professions and
professionals. When a group becomes a profession, this view holds, it is precisely in
doing so that it undertakes certain obligations. Similarly, when an individual becomes a
professional—a member of a profession—precisely in doing this he or she undertakes
certain obligations.”31
The second counter-argument to the content-thin common moral framework is the
notion that the actual (or at least current) content of the framework hasn’t been, or can’t
be, determined, and thus is in fact empty of content. An initial response to this is the
reminder that the content is, by its very nature, “broad and bland,” and thus can’t be fully
fleshed out. But a further response to this counter-argument is that the thin content of
what moral commitments health care professionals share today can in fact be found by
thinking about how the goals and the values of professional health care are articulated
and similar across the different health care professions. A look at the concepts provided
in typical statements of this sort can help uncover what is currently considered ethically
important to health care professionals. Delineating the goals of professional health care
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can help provide a language for what health care professionals are trying to do,
generally speaking, while the values can give voice to the why and how. Together,
describing these two facets of the ethics of the health care professions can reveal the
scaffolding of the content-thin common moral framework used by health care
professionals in our society (and similar societies) today.
The Goals and Values of Professional Health Care
The following survey of goals and values that health care professionals appeal to
is meant to give examples of what currently makes up the content in the content-thin
common moral framework, rather than provide an exhaustive study. Moreover, because
the examples provided here are for descriptive purposes, where they come from—that is,
whether internal to the morality of medicine and/or given from the outside (i.e.,
society)—is unimportant.32 Instead, this is an attempt to describe how health care
professionals are actually talking about goals of professional health care and what they
actually value. These descriptions of goals and values may be “broad and bland,” and
different individuals may imbue the goals and values with different meanings once
beyond the superficial level and into a “thick,” substantive discussion. But the thin
framework is, as explained above, minimal and serves as the scaffolding for more
substantive (thick) discussions. For it is purposely thin on content so that it can be shared
by all health care professionals.
32

Though comments in this dissertation make it relatively clear that its author thinks that
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In regard to the goals of medicine, in 1996 the Hastings Center, in partnership
with the World Health Organization, worked on a project searching for “general
consensus” on what those goals are.33 The Hastings Center did not take a stance on
whether the goals of medicine are internal or external to medicine itself, noting that even
though “medicine still has the capacity from within significantly to determine its own
course, it is highly influenced by the mores, values, economics, and politics of the
societies of which it is a part.”34 The report also states that it grounded its search for goals
not in a common morality, per se, but in the “common human nature” which “sooner or
later” leads all of us to get sick, go through physical deterioration, and experience pain
and suffering.35 Ultimately, the report identified four primary goals of medicine, and thus
of professional health care (see footnote 33): “The prevention of disease and injury and
the promotion and maintenance of health; The relief of pain and suffering caused by
maladies; The care and cure of those with a malady, and the care of those who cannot be
cured; The avoidance of premature death and the pursuit of a peaceful death.”36
A survey of the literature shows that others thinking about the issue generally
agree with the Hastings Center and World Health Organization, and because the aim here
The Hastings Center, “The Goals of Medicine,” Preface. This section reviews literature
on the goals of medicine, as it is assumed it is the goal of professional health care to
fulfill the overall goals of medicine. Though the focus or expertise of a specific health
care profession may mean it works to support or achieve these goals in different ways,
professional health care is still working toward these goals.
33

34

The Hastings Center, “The Goals of Medicine,” S6.

35

The Hastings Center, “The Goals of Medicine,” S6.

The Hastings Center, “The Goals of Medicine,” executive summary. Formatting and
punctuation altered.
36

88
is provide examples of what builds the content-thin common moral framework, the fact
that consensus arises across the spectrum lends credence to the fact that these goals are,
indeed, correctly considered to be some of the goals of medicine and professional health
care at this time. It is also worth noting that some of these thinkers interpret and apply the
goals differently (even when using basically the same vocabulary to define the goals),
which is a reminder that the content of the framework is necessarily thin and minimal, not
thick and maximal.
Brülde, for example, attempts to build a normative theory of the goals of medicine
in response to the Hastings Center report, as he finds that it “is lacking in certain
respects.”37 And yet, his seven goals map closely to the Hasting Center’s four: the goals
of medicine are “to promote functioning, to maintain or restore normal structure and
function, to promote quality of life, to save and prolong life, to help the patient to cope
well with her condition, to improve the external conditions under which people live, and
to promote the growth and development of children.”38 In another context, Varelius
comes up with seven of his own goals, which are very similar to the goals listed by The
Hastings Center and Brülde: “(1) avoidance of premature death, (2) preservation of life,
(3) prevention of disease and injury, (4) promotion and maintenance of health, (5) relief
of pain and suffering, (6) avoidance of harm, and (7) promotion of well-being.”39
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This brief survey of the goals of medicine provides a glimpse at what health
care professionals generally agree that professional health care should be working to
achieve. The values of the health care professionals, however, may differ among the
professions, given that each profession may have a different primary focal point. As Ozar
and Sokol point out, because of the specialization necessary to become a professional in
any given field, “there is always necessarily a certain limited set of values that are the
specific focus of each profession’s expertise.”40 However, in reviewing the discourse of
various health care professions, there are more similarities than differences in values.
Among the most-often referred to values in health care are the four ethical
standards proposed in Beauchamp and Childress’ version of principlism that guides so
many bioethical discussions: autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice.41
Beauchamp and Childress, however, also offer a list of virtues, which could also be
considered values for health care professionals, including “compassion, discernment,
trustworthiness, integrity, and conscientiousness.”42 In both discourse and practice, these
values are instrumental to both patients and other health care professionals, and an ability
to appeal to these values often provides the language for how to frame the obligations of
a given profession (e.g., “We need to listen to what the patient wants in order to respect
her autonomy”). They are not specific to any one health care profession, but to
professional health care generally, and thus all health care professionals.
40
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Even when looking at specific health care professions, it can be argued that
examples of each one’s values are, in fact, a part of the content-thin common moral
framework for all health care professionals, in that their values are thin enough to be
understood, and perhaps even appropriated, by other health care professions. Speaking
about physicians, Beauchamp states that they share values “of healing, palliation,
rehabilitation, removing discomfort, diagnostic testing, and the like.”43 In regard to
nursing, Benner and colleagues state that central moral principles for expert nurses
include “a concern for revealing and responding to patients as persons, respecting their
dignity,” and “caring for them in ways that preserve their personhood.”44 Yet nurses must
also possess “clinical knowledge, knowledge of the particular patient, science, and
clinical evidence” in order to provide excellent care.45 These values seem more
complimentary with those of physicians than contradictory or foreign.
The American Physical Therapy Association, as well, lists seven core values that
are easily recognizable by other health care professionals: “accountability, altruism,
compassion/caring, excellence, integrity, professional duty, social responsibility.”46 Ozar
and Sokol enumerate the central values of dentistry, in rank order: “the patient’s life and
general health; the patient’s oral health; the patient’s autonomy; the dentist’s preferred
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patterns of practice; aesthetic values; efficiency in the use of resources.” Though
some of these values refer specifically to dentistry, if stripped of their thick, substantive
specification, they could easily be understood by, or even affixed to, any other specialty
in health care. The thin values of health, autonomy, habituation, and just allocation are
not specific to any one profession, but to all of them. It is only when the content is
“thickened”—which is not required for the common moral framework to stand—that
divergences appear, which is to expected given Walzer’s discussion of thick and thin.
It should once again be stressed that the values discussed here are not meant to be
a definitive or comprehensive listing, but instead they are examples of the general values
presented by leaders in health care ethics and the specific health care professions. What
these examples show is that the values of different health care professionals coexist
within the same content-thin common moral framework: Even the profession-specific
values point back to “thinner” values shared by all health care professionals. And because
these values exist as a central feature of each of the health care professions prior to any
health care professional joining their chosen profession, “it is [those] values…that he or
she accepts and commits to, not some set of values of the individual practitioner’s own
devising.”48 That is to say, that each health care profession has identified these values as
those to be honored by its professionals is enough to say that they are the values that
should be honored, and the fact that the values across different professionals are similar
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enough to one another is enough to say that those health care professionals could easily
engage one another through the language of these values.
It is also important to remember that the above survey is not making a judgment
whether these goals and values should be the goals and values of professional health care.
Instead, these examples provide empirical evidence that there are goals and values that
are, circularly enough, being talked about as the goals of professional health care and the
values of health care professionals. Thus the idea of a content-thin common moral
framework has empirical support and can be posited as a starting point for discussions
about ethical issues and, of course, moral distress. That is to say, in voicing moral
distress, a health care professional will often appeal to a non-fulfillment of one of those
goals, or a violation of one of those values, and will expect to be understood by other
health care professionals because they share this content-thin common moral framework.
In one moral distress conversation, for example, the facilitator stated that “the
conversation helped the nurses articulate their feelings in terms of a violation of the code
of nurses that obliges nurses to respect their patients even in death.”49 Here a common
concept across health care professionals—respect for patients—was explicitly appealed
to, with the expectation that such language and meaning could be shared. The content of
the framework, and thus the shared understanding of the goals and values, is thin, and
thus digging into each health care professional’s particular (thick) use of the concepts
will expose differences. But as a starting point for discussion, this content-thin common
moral framework gives all health care professionals a shared basis of meaning that can be
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used to anchor ethical discussion. As Hanson aptly notes, in health care ethics, “At
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their hearts, different concepts cannot differ too dramatically—e.g., one cannot
legitimately understand ‘respect for autonomy’ as ‘providing the most good for the most
persons’ or ‘justice’ as ‘being as unfair as possible.”50
Conclusion
Chapter Two of this dissertation made the claim that health care organizations’
responses to moral distress are ethically inadequate if these responses are hierarchical, do
not include the morally distressed individual, or they ask health care professionals to
attempt to resolve their own moral distress within those hierarchies that may have caused
the moral distress in the first place. This chapter laid out additional reasons that using
hierarchies to respond to moral distress would be ethically inadequate, starting with a
second kind of argument for including the morally distressed health care professional,
and continuing with an argument for including other health care professionals involved in
the morally distressing situation.
Once both of these parties are to be included, it became clear that they will be
engaged in a discussion, or dialogue, of some sort. This realization raised the question
whether there is any common framework in which moral distress and the ethical
differences underlying it can be discussed. The fact that there is a content-thin common
moral framework for health care professionals (in ours and similar societies), a
framework that outlines those professionals’ shared ethical obligations and common
professional morality, means that the parties to a moral distress discussion can work from
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a shared starting point to discuss their moral views, their perceived obligations, and
their violations. In addition, this shared framework not only makes it possible for the
inclusion of both parties in productive dialogue, it also provides an argument for equality
among health care professionals. In that all health care professionals have access to this
content-thin common moral framework, they are peers in their ability to appeal to the
framework, and use it to discuss and resolve ethical issues, including instances of moral
distress. With this framework, a peer-to-peer, equality-based resolution of moral distress
situations may be accessible, and able to replace hierarchical mechanisms.
The question becomes, then, what that peer-to-peer, equality-based resolution of
moral distress might look like. To begin answering that, Chapter Four will appropriate
the content-thin common moral framework for health care professionals described in this
chapter, and apply it to the body of literature by H. Tristam Engelhardt and Kevin Wm.
Wildes on moral friends, moral strangers, and moral acquaintances, to show that because
of the framework, all health care professionals can be considered moral acquaintances.
The implications of this on the theoretical underpinnings of moral distress resolution will
then be fleshed out in Chapter Five.

CHAPTER FOUR
MORAL STRANGERS, MORAL FRIENDS, AND MORAL ACQUAINTANCES
Chapter Two of this dissertation argued that a health care organization that
responds to moral distress in its health care professionals with a hierarchically-based
solution can and should be judged as providing an ethically insufficient response. Chapter
Three provided further grounding for this argument and also argued for the inclusion of
all health care professionals involved in a moral distress discussion in its resolution, a
discussion that can be based on the content-thin common moral framework they share as
members of their health care professions.
In this chapter, then, it must then be asked: if a hierarchical response is ethically
insufficient, what is it to be replaced it with? What sort of discussion is needed and then
what sort of organizational strategy can be identified to provide for such discussions, so
that health care professionals engaged in the process of resolving moral distress will be
able to do so in a non-hierarchical, equality-based, inclusive way? This chapter proposes
that the philosophical foundation to begin answering these complex questions can be
uncovered by studying the writings of H. Tristam Engelhardt, Jr. and of Kevin Wm.
Wildes.
Englehardt’s Foundations of Bioethics introduced the categories of moral friends
and moral strangers into bioethical discourse, and Wildes added moral acquaintances to
fill in the gap between Engelhardt’s two extremes of moral relationships. The following
95
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sections will provide exegesis and analysis of this discussion, as well as link these
concepts to those presented in Chapters Two and Three. Engelhardt’s distinction between
moral strangers and moral friends, as summarized below, fails to provide space for the
kind of discussion needed for responding to moral distress (and this was not his intent).
But by expanding on his work in light of Wildes’ contribution of the concept of moral
acquaintances, a procedure for involved health care professionals’ resolution of moral
distress can be created, one that starts from the content-thin common moral framework
for health care professionals like the one described in the Chapter Three. Working from
these ideas as a theoretical basis, Chapters Five and Six will be able to propose a
methodology for these discussions and a practical answer to how health care
organizations can address moral distress in health care professionals.
Moral Friends and Moral Strangers
Engelhardt’s Foundations builds an approach to bioethics that grows out of the
observation that there is not a common morality in today’s world. Engelhardt looks at the
contemporary secular, pluralistic world, and believes that a universal content-full
morality is impossible given the multitude of ethical viewpoints and the lack of an
agreed-upon moral authority.1 He holds that it is simply not the case that, given the vast
moral differences among the globe’s inhabitants, any overarching agreement about moral
standards could ever be reached. The Enlightenment project of finding a content-full
morality through rationality is doomed to failure, according to Engelhardt:

Engelhardt often uses the term “secular” in reference to the world of moral strangers
that he observes around him, and not in a specific non-religious sense.
1
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It is not possible rationally to discover a canonical, moral account with content.
Appealing within moral reasons to moral intuitions fails; appealing outside moral
reason to consequences or to nature fails as well. Nor is it possible to appeal to the
structure or character of reason in order to secure content for the moral life. It
becomes impossible to establish any act or condition as intrinsically wrong by
appeal to generally available secular considerations. Against this failure of the
Enlightenment project to provide a secular grounding for morality, it is not
feasible to establish a secular humanist bioethics as one might have hoped.2
Engelhardt, himself a born-again Orthodox Christian, does believe that a
“particular religion, faith tradition, or ideology” could easily justify content for a
bioethical system,3 but as he will show, for better or for worse (and for Engelhardt this is
certainly “for worse”), Engelhardt does not see the possibility of a uniform ethic, even if
limiting his scope to the realm of bioethics. As Engelhardt expresses it, there are not
enough “moral friends” in the world to agree on the content to build any universally
shared ethics. So the task that Engelhardt’s sets for himself is to find a way for bioethics
to be conducted among “moral strangers,” that is, humans who find themselves
interacting with one another without any shared ethical content, frameworks, or authority.
Engelhardt explains this terminology as follows:
Moral strangers are persons who do not share sufficient moral premises or rules of
evidence and inference to resolve moral controversies by sound rational
argument, or who do not have a common commitment to individuals or
institutions in authority to resolve moral controversies…Moral friends are those
who share enough of a content-full morality so that they can resolve moral
controversies by sound moral argument or by an appeal to a jointly recognized
moral authority whose jurisdiction they acknowledge as derived from a source
other than common agreement.4
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In effect, moral friends adhere to the same ethical belief system or ethical authority,
and thus share “thick” notions of morality (and obviously therefore also share common
“thin” views as well). Thus, in the (relatively rare) case of ethical disagreement between
moral friends, the common morality between the disagreeing parties provides not only a
framework for resolution, but also with sufficient reflection, a correct answer, whether by
discussion, education, or a shared appeal to authority.
Since moral strangers (which from Engelhardt’s point of view is almost everyone)
do not share a common morality, appeal to authority is not feasible. Discussing and
educating about moral concepts will fail, as moral strangers start from radically different
frameworks, moralities, premises, etc. For example, think of a person of a given religious
faith trying to convince an atheist of her position on some ethical matter with the
argument “Because God says so” or trying to teach the atheist the relevant passages of
her sacred and authoritative text as justifying evidence. It doesn’t get her very far.5
It is important to stress that, beside the lack of common moral authority, even
appeal to rational argument cannot change the situation of moral strangers because their
rational arguments will appeal to non-shared moral theories and/or interpretations of
experience, such as in the example above. In his Foundations, Engelhardt analyzes a
number of moral theories, ranging from utility to intuitionism to hypothetical choice
theories to consensus theories, and concludes that all these content-full theories that claim

Engelhardt does make sure to state that moral strangers can “be the best of affective
friends” (Engelhardt, Foundations of Bioethics, 7). The term “moral stranger” is not
meant to imply actually non-knowing of the other person. Again, think of a religious
person and atheist, and now, instead of them arguing about ethics, picture them sharing a
meal or cheering on the same team at a baseball game together.
5
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to be based solely on reason or common sense will fail to resolve differences between
moral strangers due to their inability to couch any moral theory on grounds that can be
accepted by everyone.6 Instead of coming from reason alone, Engelhardt finds that “each
presupposes exactly what it seeks to justify: a particular moral content.”7 As each of their
arguments begs the question of moral content in that at least some content must be
assumed for the theories to find a foothold (even if each theory claims to come from pure
rationality), this moral content smuggled into the theory will not be shared by everyone
and thus each theory fails among moral strangers.
In the face of the multitude of religions and ideologies in the world each with its
own moral code, and humans’ apparent inability to base a content-full ethic on rationality
itself, Engelhardt is nevertheless determined to find a way for moral strangers to interact
and resolve ethical controversies, to bring us back from “the brink of nihilism” about the
mere possibility of there being any morality at all.8 The new ethic must, however, avoid
the pitfalls of any of the failed theories; namely, it must avoid smuggling any moral
claims held to be true into its premises. As Engelhardt states, “universality is approached
at the price of content.”9
Engelhardt articulates four possible ways moral strangers might be able to resolve
a given ethical controversy—force, conversion, rational argument, or agreement—and

6

See Engelhardt, Foundations of Bioethics, 40-65.

7

Engelhardt, Foundations of Bioethics, 42.

8

Engelhardt, Foundations of Bioethics, 65.

9

Engelhardt, Foundations of Bioethics, 59.
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argues that only agreement offers any hope of a successful resolution. Force does
not actually answer the underlying ethical question of why the imposed solution is
correct, even if it were effective in producing the appearance of consensus. Conversion
seems empirically to have failed, and even when conversions do occur, they don’t
produce conviction in the same moral content for each convert. And, as shown above,
rational argument doesn’t work as moral strangers are starting from different
foundational premises. Thus, Engelhardt is left with only one way to resolve moral
controversies in a secular world: by agreement. When moral strangers agree to
collaborate to answers a moral question, that agreement can create the (secular) moral
authority to guide those participating in the agreement.
Engelhardt’s authority of agreement is, in a sense, uncomplicated. It is “simply
the authority of the agreement of those who decide to collaborate.”11 That is it: if people
agree to, they can collaborate; but that is all this authority is—people agree to do what
they agree on, or agree on what is allowed or forbidden, and the authority created is
nothing but the authority of the agreeing—but for Engelhardt it is all there can be. So to
resolve a specific ethical dispute, it has to be enough—because there is nothing else—that
the participants agree to be governed by the decision they freely reach: they have granted
the decision authority by consenting to grant the decision authority. The parties involved
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Engelhardt, Foundations of Bioethics, 67-68.

Engelhardt, Foundations of Bioethics, 68. As Engelhardt uses the term “authority,” he
is referring to a “secular authority for moral content and moral direction” for moral
strangers via the procedure of agreement, even though Engelhardt would also argue that
the content only exists because it was agreed upon, and not because it stems from any
pre-existing content-full morality (Engelhardt, Foundations of Bioethics, 68).
11
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do not need to share any particular worldview, and in fact need to share nothing aside
from each choosing to agree and abide by what is agreed to; they share nothing other than
that they gave themselves permission to come to an agreement. But it is important to note
that permission, in Engelhardt’s use, is not a morally grounded act: “The appeal to
permission as the source of authority involves no particular moral vision or
understanding. It gives no value to permission.”12 Instead, it is the bare minimum of
scaffolding needed to support a secular ethic.
Thus, by way of participants’ permission to agree with one another to reach a
resolution on something, in which the mere fact of reaching a resolution via agreement
grants the authority of that resolution, Engelhardt believes that he has provided a purely
procedural method of adjudicating ethical disputes between moral strangers. He
summarizes his insight: “The principle of permission provides the minimum grammar for
secular moral discourse.”13
Engelhardt describes his theory as “procedural” because the principle of
permission is necessarily devoid of moral content so that his framework has the ability to
process moral dilemmas without referring to any widely-accepted content-full ethic (as
he has shown that they all fail among moral strangers). It is a method of resolution
without any content-full instruction on what is to be done or thought in each step. But
Engelhardt does posit, as the only real rule needed in this secular morality, that agreement

Engelhardt, Foundations of Bioethics, 69. It may provide some clarity for Engelhardt’s
meaning that in the first edition of Foundations, written in 1986, he used the term
“autonomy” instead of “permission.”
12

13

Engelhardt, Foundations of Bioethics, 123.

must be the result of permission—one’s own freely-given permission. No one can be
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required to act (or be acted upon) without her permission, that is, no one can be required
to act based on an agreement to which she has not willingly agreed. But for Engelhardt
this is an entailment of what is meant by permission and agreement. Thus, Engelhardt
places extremely strong emphasis on personal liberty. Indeed, Engelhardt states that
freedom from non-consensual interference in one’s life is all that is left of morality when
it is (necessarily) secular.
Because moral strangers cannot agree on moral content, and can only grant
permission for themselves to be used consensually in collaboration with others, whatever
consenting humans agree to do cannot be contested or stopped by anyone else outside of
that agreement who may find that collaboration repugnant—they have not consented to
be part of the agreement that gets its authority from the mere fact of that consent. They
have declined to enter into agreement with the others, and since they cannot appeal to
force, conversion, or rational argument to get their way, and as moral strangers lack a
common moral authority, they must stand aside from the other consenting persons’
agreement. Those that do not agree are on the outside, looking in on those that do grant
permission to be used.
Turning specifically to bioethics, Engelhardt believes that the primary tension in
bioethics is between permission and beneficence, because moral strangers have “no
common understanding…of the meaning of beneficence”14 even as health care
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professionals “have committed themselves to achieving the best interests of
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patients.”15 At the end of the day, however, Engelhardt says, “In the context of general
secular morality, the principle of permission always trumps the principle of
beneficence.”16 That is, since the concept of “doing good” carries no universal
understanding if one accepts the premise that moral strangers don’t share a content-full
idea of goodness, Engelhardt’s (or anyone else’s) personal views on beneficence cannot
be used to stop consenting humans from exercising their right to agree to grant authority
to their decision. No matter how repugnant Engelhardt finds their actions, in secular
morality it is beyond his power to stop them.17 It follows from this that the rallying cry of
secular ethics is “X has a moral right to do A, but it is wrong.”18 That is to say, in
Engelhardt’s own content-full version of morality, act A is a grievous wrong; but because
person X and Engelhardt are moral strangers, and have not granted each other permission
to use each other in agreement to create the authority of that agreement, as long as X has
reached agreement with other consenting humans to perform act A, X is allowed to do so.

15

Engelhardt, Foundations of Bioethics, 103. See Engelhardt, Foundations of Bioethics
Chapter 3, for a longer discussion on this tension. Note, however, that even as Engelhardt
denies common morality, he states that professional health care does have beneficence as
a value. In this regard, even in his secular ethics, Engelhardt cedes the possibility of a
common professional morality.
16

Engelhardt, Foundations of Bioethics, 127.
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For Engelhardt, this is not merely academic. As a born-again Orthodox Christian, he
states explicitly and repeatedly that he considers suicide and abortion moral evils, but that
they cannot be prohibited in a secular morality filled with moral strangers (for an
example, see Engelhardt, Foundations of Bioethics, 288).
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Given how minimal ethics can be for Engelhardt, and given that anyone who
does not enter into an agreement based on permission cannot have a say in the decision
that is made, with no ability to alter it—that is, they may believe that what is being done
is wrong but they cannot stop it or do otherwise—it should be easy to see that the
principle of permission, as formulated by Engelhardt, could actually cause moral distress
in health care professionals. In fact, Engelhardt seems to agree. In Bioethics and Secular
Humanism, he discusses a clinical scenario as it might play out within the principle of
permission:
Imagine, for example, an atheist patient asking a Catholic physician for
euthanasia within a secular social fabric that does not overstep the limits of its
authority. If the Catholic physician has prudently informed the patient in advance
of the physician’s moral commitments, the matter will be quite straightforward.
The physician will simply say, “Remember that my moral commitments forbid
me from either helping you or suggesting how you can secure help. That you must
see to on your own. Remember also that, although there are many euthanasia
societies that may assist you, and though the state will not interfere, all the costs
will have to be privately borne. Moreover, for the sake of your eternal salvation, I
sincerely suggest you reconsider the matter.” As the example shows us, there is
much that society must tolerate, given the limits of secular reason. The limits of
secular reason do not undermine moral commitments.19
Even if the above were truly “quite straightforward,” which is debatable given the
moral residue that would likely linger in such a situation, the scenario actually suggests a
number of other situations in which a health care environment populated by moral
strangers could engender even more moral distress in health care professionals. Perhaps
the physician might not consider the matter resolved after “simply” lecturing the patient
on religious doctrine (if the physician is allowed to do so in the first place). Or there
might be another physician involved in the case, or a nurse, or a respiratory therapist,
19

Engelhardt, Bioethics and Secular Humanism, 138.
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who believes the patient is requesting something reasonable, and are distressed by
this uncompromising physician who is refusing the patient’s request to relieve her
suffering.
That is, Engelhardt’s primacy of permission and its trumping of professional
health care’s value of beneficence, instead of creating an ethic for health care
professionals, could lay the groundwork for still more moral distress (even as he stresses
the equality of all people in their ability to enter into agreement). Thus, Engelhardt’s
proposal for how moral strangers might interact is not a useful strategy for the health care
professionals who, as shown in Chapter Three, ought to be participating as equals when
discussing a moral distress situation (unless one counts as resolution the option of
refusing to the agreement or its authority and walking away—but disengagement is a
symptom of, not a solution for, moral distress). Thus, an organizational solution to moral
distress cannot be built solely on Engelhardt’s secular ethics.
For his part, Engelhardt probably wouldn’t disagree with this criticism, since he
states that “secular morality is a wasteland without moral content, without the possibility
of moral guidance.”20 However, Engelhardt believes he is providing as much morality as
is possible in a pluralistic world, noting “the impossibility of discovering the secular,
canonical, concrete ethics” and that humanity must live with these consequences.21 He is
describing what secular morality looks like, not proposing an ideal and it is clear that
Engelhardt would build a content-full (and Christian) morality, had he his druthers, but
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on his view it’s just not possible. What we have is what we have, because what we
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don’t have is any universally-shared content on which to build a morality.
However, when thinking about his theory in the more limited context of health
care professionals, it is clear that Engelhardt is wrong to argue there cannot be content
grounding basic moral agreement. As shown in Chapter Three, health care professionals
share a content-thin common moral framework. Health care professionals need not share
enough in the way of moral conviction to be moral friends, but there is enough in
common given their professional moral obligations to assume a morality that isn’t
content-less and purely procedural in Engelhardt’s sense.22 In fact, in numerous places
Engelhardt allows for some version of shared goals and values specific to health care
professionals, stating, for example, “The idea of a profession carries with it commitments
to particular views of beneficence and proper action,”23 and as already stated, that “in
joining the health care profession, [doctors and nurses] have committed themselves to
achieving the best interests of patients.”24 Even more explicitly Engelhardt states,

22

Engelhardt addresses professional codes of ethics, but dismisses them as a possibility
for the content of morality: “When these rules are articulated as canons of probity for
professional conduct, and when the focus is primarily on issues of professional decorum,
ethics is best understood as etiquette” (Engelhardt, Foundations of Bioethics, 34). He also
questions the authority of such codes, as well as their foundations. However, this
dissertation does not focus merely on the professional codes of ethics, but also on the
shared professional moral obligations that are inherent in the practice of health care
professions. These need not be strictly codified in order to show that they are necessarily
shared by those that choose to, and are allowed to, enter a health care profession. Such
morality expands beyond mere “etiquette,” which seems a trite term to hand-wave away
something that seems quite substantial to the endeavor of professional health care.
23

Engelhardt, Foundations of Bioethics, 291.
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“Medicine in particular and health care in general are goal-oriented undertakings.
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They are focused on curing and preventing diseases and on caring for the worries, pains,
and anxieties of patients.”25 Professional commitments are necessarily shared insofar as
to decline them is to refuse to be seen as a health care professional, and if those
commitments involve obligations to certain values—even if the values are as content-thin
as “respecting autonomy” or “preserving life” or any of the other goals and values
examined in Chapter Three—these are common values that bind health care professionals
to the same broad moral commitments.26 Referring to a Seventh Day Adventist or a
Catholic hospital, Engelhardt acknowledges “they must recognize that they have created,
and are sustaining, a special moral exclave.”27 Yet Engelhardt fails to see that if health
care professionals share a content-thin morality, any health care organization could
become itself a “moral exclave,” albeit it one with thin moral concepts, if that is meant to
contrast with the secular morality Engelhardt has described. For as has been argued
above, there is no opting out of the common professional morality if one wants to
continue being a professional in the field.
In response to this criticism, Engelhardt might argue that health care professionals
are simply granting authority to the agreement consented to by health care professionals
upon entering the profession, and that those that do not agree to the commitments and
obligations of the profession merely are excluded from the agreement, and thus are
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See Ozar and Sokol, Dental Ethics at Chairside, Chapter Five.
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outside the group (i.e., not allowed to become a health care professional). However,
in regard to health care, this ignores two facts: first, society at large does expect health
care professionals to uphold the values they have agreed to uphold, and, in fact, has a
vested interest in them doing so; that is to say, society is not excluded from whatever
agreement health care professionals give their permission to.
Second, it is not solely up to the discretion of those that agree to enter the health
care profession to decide what their agreement entails—that is, those who become health
care professionals do not then unilaterally decide what the obligations of professional
health care are. While each health care profession is given a great deal of autonomy to
police itself and set its own standards and practices, this is due to the expertise and
knowledge necessary to effectively monitor the profession, and not because of the
principle of permission. Society at large is still part of the process of determining what is
or isn’t considered professional behavior, and who can undertake professional activity
(e.g., society doesn’t allow surgeons to perform unnecessary operations, and conversely
does not allow non-professionals to perform surgery on others, regardless of the parties’
permission or agreement).28 So it cannot be the case that health care professionals can
rely on the authority of agreement to guide their professional ethical obligations.
Engelhardt’s secular morality of moral strangers, it seems, is not a good fit for
how professional ethics work in practice. But because common professional morality is

See Ozar, “Profession and Professional Ethics.” Even if this premise is debated (i.e.,
even if one disagrees that society plays a part in determining the role of professional
health care), it would still be the case that the obligations of health care professionals
would be predetermined by their professions, and would not be re-agreed upon each time
a new professional entered the field.
28
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broad and content-thin, it is not the case that health care professionals share all that
would be necessary to be moral friends in Engelhardt’s theory. And unfortunately for this
project, Engelhardt leaves out the middle ground of a content-thin way of addressing
moral disagreement. But a few authors have noticed this gap, and a line of scholarship
has attempted to fill in that middle ground between moral friends and moral strangers
with a category called “moral acquaintances.” One philosopher, Kevin Wm. Wildes, has
explored the category of moral acquaintanceship in a way that is helpful in finding health
care organizations a forum for a kind of discussion that health care professionals involved
in a moral situation can employ to resolve the moral distress.29

29

Another bioethicist (and physician), Erich H. Loewy, discusses the notion of moral
acquaintanceship in his book Moral Strangers, Moral Acquaintances, and Moral
Friends: Connectedness and its Conditions. Like Wildes, Loewy believes there ought to
be a middle ground between the moral friends and strangers described by Engelhardt, and
attempts to determine what makes up the shared-by-all-humans content of moral
acquaintanceship. The content Loewy decides on is necessarily extremely broad, as his
project extends to all of humanity: “These six existential a prioris which constitute the
framework in which we act…are our (1) drive for being or existence; (2) biological
needs; (3) social needs; (4) a desire to avoid suffering; (5) a basic sense of logic; and (6) a
desire to live freely and to pursue our own interests” (Loewy, Moral Strangers, Moral
Acquaintances, and Moral Friends, 141). He is attempting to lay the groundwork for a
social contract that results from, and also strengthens, connectedness of both individuals
within communities and communities with each other. Loewy’s project, then, is one of
crafting an ethic for a full-fledged community (hopefully, Loewy says, a democracy) in
which the existential a prioris do, contrary to Engelhardt’s argument, salvage the
enlightenment project in that there is enough commonality among people that rational
argument—tempered with compassion that necessarily arises from being human—can be
used to build a framework for dialogue and social connectedness. However, given that
Loewy is building an ethic that can affirm individual rights in a society while keeping
commonality and community as a necessary component of that framework, his text is far
more political than what is needed (not to mention broad and impractical, given the
disagreements about such foundational concepts in ethics that Engelhardt justifiably
points out) to incorporate into a more limited scope of moral distress in health care
professionals. The commonalities among professionals highlighted in Chapter Three
focus this dissertation much more on the content for moral acquaintanceship among
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.....Moral Acquaintances
Like Engelhardt, Wildes understands that moral pluralism means that there can
never be full agreement—and thus no moral friendship—between all people for a host of
ethical issues. Unlike Engelhardt, however, Wildes does not want to concede that a
content-less procedural bioethics is the only workable solution in a world of moral
pluralism. Understanding that the world will never all be moral friends, Wildes doesn’t
want to relegate people to being moral strangers. The task he sets himself, then, is to find
the middle ground between the moral relativism that comes with finding only radical
pluralism in the world and the impossible option of somehow enforcing a single morality
for all people. This middle ground, Wildes argues, can be filled with the concept of moral
acquaintances.
As the subtitle of his book (Methodology in Bioethics) states, Wildes is primarily
concerned with the role methodology (i.e., how moral discourse works) can play in
crafting a viable bioethical theory. Further, Wildes is interested in the interplay between
methodology and moral communities. Wildes examines how different kinds of
communities act, in relation to themselves as well as other communities, in the hopes of
affirming a communitarian bioethic.30 Building on Wildes’ understanding of

health care professionals than Loewy’s, and what those commonalities are used for here
is much narrower than those Loewy is interested in. (See Chapter Five of Loewy’s book
for a concise description of his project.)
Given that Wildes’ discussion of communitarianism is in the context of approving of it
as an ethical system, whenever he says “community” he is specifically meaning a moral
community. That is to say, in Wildes’ text, a community is always a moral community.
Indeed, the index entry for “communities” in the book states “See moral communities”
30
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communities, this section will show that health care professionals do not create a
community of moral friends, but interact in a manner Wildes calls “moral
acquaintanceship.” And, if this is the case, then the possibility of resolving situations of
moral distress arises by means of discussions based on this relationship of moral
acquaintanceship.
Wildes begins by noting that there are numerous methodologies available to those
that wish to study bioethical dilemmas. To name but a few, Wildes discusses
utilitarianism, Donagan’s Judeo-Christian morality, natural law, contractarianism, virtue
theory, principlism (specifically as found in Beauchamp and Childress), and casuistry.
None of these methodologies, however, are merely procedural accounts like Engelhardt’s
theory claims to be, and for Wildes this points to the fact that no methodology can be
purely procedural. As he states, “method cannot be separated from content. The choice of
method is a decision to describe and articulate moral experience in one way over
another…rules or methods do not exist apart from a practice or way of life.”31 In
choosing one way to solve a bioethical problem over another, one is necessarily aligning
oneself with more than just a set of procedural instructions on how to solve the problem;
one is also aligning oneself with the assumptions (or with explicit foundational ideas)
about moral experience that are inherent in those instructions.
Wildes is accepting of the reality of multiple methodologies in bioethics, however
he believes each methodology has its limitations and flaws, as well as disagreement with
(Wildes, Methodology in Bioethics, 206). As in Wildes’ text, this dissertation will use the
two terms interchangeably.
31
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other methods, and thus no one can be chosen as “best.” Because of these limitations,
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Wildes states that he prefers a communitarian view of bioethics, where “communitarian”
refers the fact that “how women and men understand themselves is tied to the social and
cultural context in which they live.”32
Wildes supports this turn to communitarianism because he believes that no human
being truly exists as an isolated, purely autonomous individual, and that the main flaw
shared by most methodologies in bioethics today (including Engelhardt’s) focuses
primarily on how the individual as an individual exercises autonomy. Communitarian
thinking, however, acknowledges that humans don’t make decisions, or even experience
their moral lives, solely as individuals. By looking carefully at moral communities in
which moral friends reside and also at the realm of moral strangers, Wildes hopes to
better understand the relationship of moral acquaintances. For he believes that “there is a
common morality that is less robust than many assume but more vibrant than Englehardt
concludes,”33 and this middle ground between full communities and isolation is where he
hopes to find moral acquaintances.
Wildes makes it clear that his notion of “moral community” is a flexible one,
ranging from the very close-knit, separatist group with a very specific (thick) vision of
the good life and a strong understanding of moral authority, to a much looser assemblage

32

Wildes, Methodology in Bioethics, 125. The logic of the shift from the limitations in
other methodologies to communitarianism is not clear in Wildes’ text, though the
assumption is that a communitarian basis for bioethics allows communities to chose their
foundational methods without needing to justify them to all other morally serious people.
33
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of people with “a great deal of openness about [its moral] vision and its
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development.”34 This latter kind of community may be quite open to relationships with
other communities and accepting of a weaker or more democratic form of moral
authority—but there is moral authority and moral content nonetheless, and communities
are still made up of moral friends: “It is moral friendship that grounds the moral
community and moral community that supports moral friendship.”35 As will be shown
below and based on the thinness of the content of their common moral framework, heath
care professionals do not form a moral community as Wildes defines it, but his analysis
of communities will lead him to the category of moral acquaintances, and it is here that
health care professionals can find themselves in relation to each other. Thus, it is useful
to examine Wildes’ explanation of moral communities.36
Wildes identifies three elements that make up a moral community: “the content of
a community’s moral vision; a community’s understanding of moral authority and the
offices of authority; and the community’s self-understanding about how it should relate to
other moral communities.”37 Though communities of moral friends will vary in how they
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Though this dissertation argues for a common professional morality and a content-thin
common moral framework for health care professionals, the thinness of these concepts
precludes moral friendship. Though the phrases are similar-sounding, given the
definitions provided by this dissertation and by Wildes, the end result is that though
health care professionals have a common professional morality and common moral
framework, they do not form a moral community, as Wildes uses the concept.
37
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interpret their moral content, authority, and understanding, within each individual
community this will have been decided and agreed upon in some substantive way.
The content of a community’s moral vision, like a moral community itself, can be
narrow or broad. A moral community can form around a single issue (gun control, for
example) or an entire mode of living that seemingly disconnects its members from
society at large (the Amish). Wildes, himself a Jesuit, uses religion most often as his
example of a moral community, but stresses that the content of a community can be
varied and secular.
Wildes states, “A community not only has a set of moral commitments; it also has
a framework that puts [these commitments] in relationship to one another.”38 While it
was shown in Chapter Three that the shared moral obligations of health care
professionals provides a set of moral commitments (and uses the terminology of a
framework), it is not necessarily the case that there is a thick moral framework to put
those commitments in a specified relationship to one another. Indeed, the existence of
moral distress, at times, begins with a disagreement over which of these commitments
ought be prioritized over another. It seems that, in this regard, health care professionals
are not members of a Wildesian community,39 in spite of their shared moral
commitments.
In addition to content, Wildes believes communities can be analyzed by the role
of authority in a given community. Again, like the community itself, the role of authority
38
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In keeping with his definition of community, a Wildesian community is necessarily a
moral community.
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can be very thick (e.g., the Pope) or far more informal. Whatever authority there is,
though, “can be tied to knowledge, example, office, or all three.”40 As shown in Chapters
Two and Three, moral distress can be caused, and rarely resolved, by appeal to authority,
so again health care professionals coming together to address moral distress fall short of
forming a community by Wildes’ standard (though professional health care itself, of
course, has various authority roles, both in the professions and in the health care
organization, as was discussed in Chapter Two).
Finally, Wildes analyzes communities through how they engage with other
communities. Recalling the reality of different methodologies and the ethical differences
they imply, it is necessarily true that “moral communities in secular societies find
themselves living among others who often hold conflicting moral views.”41 Given this
fact, Wildes muses that, on first glance, it looks as if there are only two possible
responses from a moral community with regard to other communities: either decide that it
will withdraw from the secular world, or give in to moral compromise to engage with
other communities at the risk of losing its own identity. But Wildes suggests there is in
fact a middle ground, where a moral community understands its own positions by
learning about other communities of moral friends and what makes them different. This
can, hopefully, lead to the discovery of common (yet tenuous) ground between two
communities, as each community has discovered which premises align with other
communities, and which ones it is willing to compromise on. As Wildes states, “members
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of a particular community must recognize their own biases or background
assumptions (e.g., the ‘sacredness of life,’ or the ‘common good’) and those of others.”42
In thinking about how different moral communities can interact with each other
and find common ground, Wildes believes that Engelhardt’s dichotomy of moral friends
and moral strangers is too stark to be an accurate depiction of how moral agreement can
be possible in secular society. Though these two categories certainly exist, Wildes argues
that Engelhardt’s depiction of moral friends and strangers fails because his notion of
moral friendship is too constrictive, to the point where “anyone not in the category of
moral friends becomes a ‘moral stranger’ in his account.”43 Wildes believes Engelhardt’s
claim that moral strangers adhere to completely different ethics or metaphysical
commitments ignores “the possibility of a moral community that defines itself as open
and eclectic,”44 and is wanting to engage with members of other moral communities not
as moral friends, but certainly not as moral strangers.45 Thus, another category of
relationship is needed to accurately assess the moral landscape real people in the world
find themselves meeting in. This category, Wildes states, is moral acquaintanceship.
Wildes provides two different definitions for moral acquaintanceship. The first,
labeled A1, is when people understand another’s moral views, though they do not share
42
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As Wildes says, “There were, for example, significant metaphysical differences
between the Dominicans and Jesuits in the sixteenth-century disputes over grace and
freedom, yet it stretches the category to think of them as moral strangers” (Wildes,
Methodology in Bioethics, 138).
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candidate on the issues”). The second, A2, is when “the parties involved understand
another’s moral world and share it in part.”46 Wildes believes that it is this latter version
of acquaintanceship that is most often at work in secular (in Engelhardt’s meaning)
bioethics—it is why, he says, there is often consensus when it comes to basic ethical
principles and why even wildly divergent viewpoint can be discussed in a common
bioethical language. Most bioethical methodologies, Wildes claims, “rely on some
assumption of acquaintanceship [A2]” in order to resolve a given moral dilemma.47
Wildes clarifies this by stating that “moral friends may agree strongly on content;
moral strangers may be satisfied with procedural agreements; and moral acquaintances
may develop limited, overlapping, substantive, and procedural agreements.”48 However,
Wildes notes that moral acquaintanceship is often quite shallow in its substance—
otherwise, it would be little different from moral friendship. Because moral
acquaintances often have differences in the underlying foundations that lead to their
overlapping agreement, this overlapping may be superficial: two acquaintances may
share a word like “autonomy” and because of that assume that there is deep consensus
between the two of them about autonomy’s meaning. However, “some patients,
physicians, and courts may hold autonomy (i.e., patient choice) is sufficient to justify
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Wildes, Methodology in Bioethics, 139.
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Wildes, Methodology in Bioethics, 144.
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assisted suicide. Others may understand the realm of autonomy in health care as more
restrictive.”49
That is to say, it is not necessary that moral acquaintances share a single deep
justification for their moral beliefs in order to agree on the content of a given decision.
Mirroring Walzer’s discussion of thin “garden variety” concepts, Wildes admits that
“Acquaintances can share general principles, yet have different interpretations of the
meaning, ranking, and scope of application.”50 They may only share enough to find a
common language to make their views understood, and that may be sufficient for a
common ground for discussion and perhaps even some measure of agreement—even if
this common language and ground is fragile, and digging deeper may quickly uncover
differences between the “thick” meanings of their understanding of the concepts.
This dissertation argues that health care professionals should not be considered
moral friends or moral strangers, but instead be seen as Wildesian moral acquaintances.
As shown earlier, Wildes claims that moral friends agree on moral foundations,
reasoning, and justification. As was shown in Chapter Three, health care professionals
often do not, nor are they expected to, share foundations of morality, or methods of moral
reasoning. Health care professionals come from all different backgrounds with different
life experiences shaping their moral foundations, and such diversity in moral reasoners,
far from being seen as detrimental, is considered a positive for a profession. While it
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Wildes, Methodology in Bioethics, 140. It is quite likely that Wildes chooses this
example because as a Jesuit he counts himself as one of the “others” and assumes his
readers understand what he means by “more restrictive.”
50

Wildes, Methodology in Bioethics, 158.

might not be appropriate to integrate certain personal beliefs into one’s professional
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practice, it is certainly not the case that one loses one’s religious commitments, moral
foundation, or ethical education upon entering a profession. Thin professional moral
obligations are shared by all that enter a professional role, but individuals’ moral
foundations and moral reasoning are not shed upon doing so. There is a diversity of moral
belief in health care professionals that precludes the deep understanding that is the
hallmark of moral friendship. In serious moral disagreements among health care
professionals, it is not the case that “moral judgments may need little, if any,
explanation,” as is the case for moral friends.51 The very existence of ethics cases and
conflicts within caregiving teams bears witness to the fact that unexplained moral views
are rarely accepted when health care professionals are at ethical odds. Moreover, it seems
clear that when there are these moral disagreements, it is not the case that participants
“know the authority to which they can appeal to resolve their disputes.”52 Perhaps for this
or that hospital or organization there is an ethical authority,53 but it is clear from, for
example, arguments over abortion or physician-assisted death that health care as a whole
does not have an agreed-upon authority to solve disputes. Thus, labeling health care
professionals as moral friends is not appropriate.
It also seems clear that health care professionals ought not be thought of as moral
strangers. The content-thin common moral framework discussed in Chapter Three is
51

Wildes, Methodology in Bioethics, 137.
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Wildes, Methodology in Bioethics, 137-38.
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Though, as was shown in Chapter Two, this authority ought not be appealed to in order
to resolve moral distress anyhow.
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enough to guarantee that there is at least a common moral language with which the
goals of professional health care can be generally agreed upon. Quoting Engelhardt,
Wildes reminds us “moral strangers are any who have ‘differences in moral and/or
metaphysical commitments.’”54 But one cannot enter the health care profession without
adhering to at least a minimum of moral commitments; otherwise such a person would
not be welcome in the profession.
Wildes states that “men and women are morally acquainted when they share
enough moral vocabulary and values in common to allow them to understand one
another.”55 The values and vocabulary of health care professionals, this dissertation
argues, are shared through the content-thin common moral framework. While moral
justification does play an important role in decision making in health care and thus it
might seem that this shared vocabulary and values points to moral friendship, what
justification in health care decision making is understood to mean is not something as
deep or foundational as is implied in discussions grounded in moral friendship. Indeed, at
times justification for one decision over another might be quite far removed from
foundational issues of moral theory. But the moral content shared by health care
professionals, while thin, is enough “to speak with one another and to understand the
explanations given by others for the judgments that are made—even though they may not
accept these judgments.”56 That is, health care professionals, as moral acquaintances,
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have enough overlapping training and language that, even when different participants
might choose to resolve ethical dilemmas in different ways, the participants in the
discussion can understand each other by way of the content-thin common moral
framework, in terms of their common professional morality and shared obligations, and
thus have the opportunity to treat each other as equals in the work of moral reflection.
Even when there is agreement among moral acquaintances, it can often be based,
as noted above, on something relatively superficial and “will often lack a common
underlying foundation.”57 By way of analogy, Wildes states that a Supreme Court
decision “can be unanimous but still admit subtle and important distinctions that the
justices will express in their opinions.”58 When the Court unanimously upheld the
distinction between killing and allowing death, Wildes notes that though they “agreed,”
one Justice upheld the distinction based on the role of state legislatures, and another
based on ordered liberty. In the face of such different explanations for the same outcome,
Wildes is correct in calling this agreement “fragile.”59
Health care professionals, as moral acquaintances, realize that their common
morality has boundaries, and that it does not necessarily extend to moral foundations.
And yet, because of the content-thin common moral framework, “Moral acquaintances
can know the other’s views and positions, and agree on some points while disagreeing on
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others.” They will couch their explanations in terms of adherence to goals or values
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that are shared, but not in terms of conformity to a deep moral foundation. But even in
disagreement, moral acquaintances will understand why the disagreement exists, though
they may not accept the opposing argument as convincing. In disagreement, health care
professionals can be easily made aware of the distance between moral acquaintances that
doesn’t exist among moral friends. That is not to say some professionals are not moral
friends; it is quite possible that many are. However, this is a contingent relationship.
Moral acquaintanceship, however, is a necessary relationship given the shared moral
obligations of health care professionals, and it is on the basis of this relationship that
discussions of moral distress situations by the morally distressed individual(s) and the
other health care professionals involved, as equally qualified to participate in these
discussions, has the possibility of resolving the moral distress.61
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Wildes, Methodology in Bioethics, 19.

Stephen S. Hanson, another author that has dealt with moral acquaintanceship, argues
that moral friends and moral acquaintances ought not be categorized quite so divisively
as Wildes argues they should. As he states in Moral Acquaintances and Moral Decisions,
“Though moral friends and moral acquaintances may initially seem quite different, in fact
they are quite similar. I argue that a justification in a given moral acquaintanceship is as
valid as the justifications given by moral friends” (Hanson, Moral Acquaintances and
Moral Decisions, 141). He argues that moral communities and social communities can be
separated in order to show that moral communities are, in fact, chosen (rather than
inherited like social communities often are), and thus moral friendship and moral
communities do not rely on a social quality (Hanson, Moral Acquaintances and Moral
Decisions, 141-47). Because of this, Hanson argues, moral friends, in essence, choose to
overlap their moral views on particular issues, much like moral acquaintances do.
Justification of moral beliefs, then, is the same for moral friends and moral
acquaintances, because both involve a choice to engage with another on moral issues and
agree on content (Hanson, Moral Acquaintances and Moral Decisions, 148-49). The only
difference in agreement between moral friends and moral acquaintances, it seems, is that
“Persons are…not moral acquaintances ‘full stop,’ but rather are or are not moral
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Conclusion
This chapter continued Chapter Three’s examination of the relationship that exists
between health care professionals given their adherence to a content-thin common moral
framework. While Engelhardt’s vision of moral friends, or on the other end of the
spectrum his description of purely procedural bioethics of moral strangers, might have
seemed like promising avenues to explore; neither category ultimately describes health
care professionals in relation to one another. However, it was shown that a third category,
Wildesian moral acquaintanceship, does accurately describe what health care
professionals have in common, given the shared, thin ethical concepts that are inherent to
joining a health care profession.
There is now a theoretically plausible strategy for the resolution of moral distress;
a non-hierarchical, equal, inclusive discussion grounded in the content-thin common
moral framework of health care professionals. With this theoretical grounding in place,

acquaintances with regard to a particular issue or question,” depending on whether a
justification is accepted or not (Hanson, Moral Acquaintances and Moral Decisions, 149.
Emphasis in the original). However, the argument this chapter makes asks for a richer
notion of health care professionals as moral acquaintances than Hanson, who is basically
calling acquaintances “moral friends for this issue.” This is because health care
professionals cannot separate the moral from the social upon entering their profession. It
is not feasible to join a given health care profession and agree to take up the mantle of
only the social aspect, or the only the moral aspect. The nature of professionalism, in
general, is all-or-nothing: along with the social class one enters into when one becomes,
say, a doctor or nurse or physical therapist, comes part and parcel the moral duties
inherent in that profession. Thus, contra Hanson, health care professionals cannot be
moral acquaintances only “with regard to a particular issue or question.” Thus it is
Wildes’ understanding of moral acquaintances that is adopted in this project (and not
Hanson’s or Loewy’s). Or, to put it another way, by our understanding of professionals
being a social group with certain moral commitments, it must be the case that health care
professionals are moral acquaintances “full stop.”
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the next question is to ask how health care organizations can meet their ethical
obligations regarding moral distress and use this strategy in practice to resolve and,
ideally, limit or eliminate moral distress among its health care professionals. This will be
the focus of Chapters Five and Six.

CHAPTER FIVE
DISCOURSE ETHICS AS A RESPONSE TO MORAL DISTRESS
Chapter Three of this dissertation argued that health care professionals share a
content-thin common moral framework based in their common professional morality, and
the ability for all health care professionals to appeal to it is one reason that they should be
considered equal participants when working to resolve experiences of moral distress.
Thus, the possibility for non-hierarchical discussions the framework supports means that
the hierarchical responses to moral distress critiqued in Chapters Two and Three can be
set aside as ethically deficient efforts to address moral distress by health care
organizations. Chapter Four argued that in light of this common moral framework, health
care professionals can be considered Wildesian moral acquaintances, which means that,
in relating to one another, they need not rely on the pure proceduralism of moral
strangers. But it also means that they do not have the shared thick concepts of moral
friends to rely on in moral discussion. Instead, they have thin concepts about the ethics
and obligations of health care professionals that can be used as a starting point for
discussion and dialogue, and thus a middle ground of a response to moral distress is
needed, one that allows for thin concepts to be appealed to in and about a moral distress
situation and that can facilitate a resolution. As Wildes states, in such a situation, “we can
identify points of overlapping agreement for moral acquaintances, and we can find ways
to frame and talk about disagreements. A turn to structures [of this kind] creates the
125
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possibility for civil conversation in bioethics. It carries an underlying commitment to
inclusion in that no one is, a priori, excluded from the civil conversation.”1
It is now necessary to determine what this non-hierarchical response to moral
distress that respects the equality and moral acquaintanceship of health care professionals
might look like. In crafting a replacement to health care organizations’ current
hierarchical responses to moral distress, this chapter will look to Jürgen Habermas’
theories of communicative action and discourse ethics in order to offer a hypothesis for
how health care professionals can address moral distress. It will be shown that, in
“everyday” communication, health care professionals, because of their sharing in the
content-thin common moral framework, interact with each other much in the way
described by Habermas in Volume One of The Theory of Communicative Action and
analyzed by Brand in The Force of Reason. However, when moral distress is experienced
and a resolution is needed, something more is required. Habermas’ theory of discourse
ethics, most succinctly described in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action and
analyzed by David Ingram in Habermas: Introduction and Analysis, can provide
guidelines appropriate for discussions by moral acquaintances when addressing a moral
distress situation. While it must be acknowledged that Habermas’ description of
discourse ethics was not being offered as a response to moral distress (since Habermas
was discussing discourse ethics prior to Jameton’s introduction of the concept of moral
distress), Habermas’ work can be appropriated to provide the theoretical underpinnings
for a practical response to moral distress.

1

Wildes, Methodology in Bioethics, 173.
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.....Communicative Action
Habermas’ account of rationality and the reasoned basis of moral norms is
connected with how human beings use language to interact with each other because, he
argues, rationality, reason, and moral norms are communicative and, as Ingram states,
they “cannot be justified by the isolated individual, reasoning alone.”2 Habermas does not
believe that monological, theoretical reasoning is sufficient to create rationality; instead
rationality has to do with “how speaking and acting subjects acquire and use
knowledge.”3 Rationality, Habermas states, is expressed through interpersonal
interaction, through what he calls “communicative action.”
As a way to better understand what communicative action is for Habermas, it is
helpful to separate communicative action from strategic action, which Habermas also
differentiates as “orientation toward success [‘strategic’] versus orientation toward
reaching understanding [‘communicative’].”4 Simply put, strategic action is what occurs
when each participant in an interaction is interested only in achieving her individual
desired outcome, and thus each participant treats the others as means to that end. As
Habermas states, “coordination of the subjects’ actions depends on the extent to which
their egocentric utility calculations mesh. The degree of cooperation and the stability is
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Ingram, Habermas, 118.
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Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, 8. Emphasis deleted. For Habermas,
acquiring and using knowledge implies actors engaging with each other, and is
contrasted with the mere possession of knowledge, which seemingly could be done by an
isolated individual.
4

Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 133.

determined by the interest positions of the participants.” Teamwork starts and stops
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with how much it benefits each player’s own desired end. Indeed, “teamwork” may not
be the correct term here; at one point Habermas calls participants in strategic action
“opponents.”6
In that each participant in strategic action is only partaking in joint action “to the
degree that this fits with his egocentric calculus of utility,”7 strategic action resembles
Engelhardt’s principle of permission. Recall that for Engelhardt, moral strangers, lacking
common moral concepts, come together only to the extent that they give permission to
use and be used by one another for the specific purpose they have agreed to—only to the
extent their individual utility calculations happen to mesh, as Habermas puts it. As was
shown in Chapter Four, however, this is not the plane on which health care professionals
interact with each other because their interactions are framed by their common
professional morality and shared ethical commitments it entails. Though they are not
moral friends, as moral acquaintances who can appeal to a content-thin common moral
framework, the purely procedural principle of permission (in Engelhardt’s terms) and
strategic action (for Habermas) do not accurately describe the type of cooperation that
health care professionals enter into and interact within.
In contrast, communicative action is what occurs “when actors are prepared to
harmonize their plans of action though internal means, committing themselves to
pursuing their goals only on the condition of an agreement—one that already exists or
5

Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 133-34.

6

Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 133.

7

Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, 88. Emphasis deleted.

one to be negotiated—about definitions of the situation and prospective outcomes.”
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Communicative action is meant to create mutual, shared understanding of goals that
participants agree they ought to coordinate to achieve, and this “process of reaching
understanding takes place against the background of a culturally ingrained
preunderstanding.”9
Brand states that the “achievement of shared understanding…is reached in the
interpretive efforts of individuals who coordinate their action through criticisable claims

Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 134. “Internal means”
here refers to interpersonal cooperation and mutual participation, as opposed to external
means such as “weapons or goods, threats or enticements” (Habermas, Moral
Consciousness and Communicative Action, 133).

8

9

Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, 100. It should be noted that when
Habermas makes reference to “the background of a culturally ingrained
preunderstanding,” he is speaking about what he calls the “Lifeworld,” which is the
background and context of social action, and more closely describes the world of moral
friends than of moral acquaintances. However, Habermas states that, unlike the shared
understanding of rules and authority among moral friends, the content of the Lifeworld is
not made explicit in the context of social interaction. As Brand states, “Communicative
action does not only draw on explicit knowledge. It in fact takes place against the
background of an enormous fund of non-explicit, taken-for-granted notions, which have
great influence on the interpretation of explicit utterances. Following a phenomenological
tradition in philosophy and sociology here, Habermas uses the term ‘Lifeworld’ to
indicate this background. Though this ‘Lifeworld’ has great influence on the endless
range of interpretive activities which constitute social life, we cannot become conscious
of it as a whole and sum it up in a series of neat propositions” (Brand, Force of Reason,
34). However, even though what Habermas and Brand are pointing to is something more
akin to the communication of moral friends than moral acquaintances, the notion of
“preunderstanding” is a helpful one when referring to the communications between
health care professionals. Because their communications are taking place within their
roles as health care professionals, the content-thin common moral framework does create
something of a “preunderstanding,” especially as concerns the understanding of goals that
ought to be achieved and values that guide the care of patients (as was shown in the
discussion of the goals and values of professional health care discussed in Chapter
Three).

to validity.” Shared understanding occurs when a speaker makes a successful speech
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act; that is, when the hearer of a speaker’s assertion accepts it as valid on three different
levels: that it is true (in that it correctly relates to the objective world), that it is right (in
that it is normatively correct), and that it is authentic (in that the speaker is accurately
expressing her subjective experience).11 Thus, in a real-world situation between
interlocutors (recalling that Habermas believes rationality to be found interpersonally
through actual dialogue and not monologically), “agreement in the communicative
practice of everyday life rests simultaneously on intersubjectively shared propositional
knowledge, on normative accord, and on mutual trust.”12
Though Habermas surely does not have this specific purpose in mind for
communicative action,13 there are clear parallels between the goals and processes of
communicative action and the “everyday” moral discourse of health care professionals—
though perhaps the term “congruence” is more appropriate, as Habermas’ conception of
the Lifeworld as a background for communicative action (see footnote 9) simultaneously
implies a stronger but also less explicit bond between participants in successful
communicative action than is typically to be found in the content-thin common moral
framework of health care professionals. That is, in normal practice-related moral
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Brand, Force of Reason, 6.
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Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 136-37; Brand, Force of
Reason, 16.
12
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Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 136.

Though Habermas does believe that communicative action applies to any properly
structured social (i.e., interpersonal) interaction directed toward shared understanding
(Brand, Force of Reason, 25).
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discourse health care professionals are expected to engage in real, substantive
dialogue regarding: (1) the facts of the case, for example, the facts involved in
determining the correct diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment options; (2) the norms
involved in determining the right course of action; and (3) the belief that all health care
professionals are authentic in their statements about these matters.14
In most cases, it is assumed that health care professionals involved in a case will
in fact take for granted that other health care professionals’ assertions are spoken in
accord with the above three criteria accurately and in good faith so they can together use
their collective expertise in order to provide the best care for their patients. While it is of
course not always the case that all three of these criteria will be completely fulfilled in
every interaction between health care professionals, it can reasonably be argued that in
“everyday conversation” the moral acquaintanceship of health care professionals allows
for these three criteria of communicative action to be the basis of ethical discussion. That
is, situations of moral distress are exceptions to the ordinary ways in which health care
professionals engage, doing what Habermas calls communicative action. But as will be
seen, if the content-thin common moral framework that enables these interactions to
ordinarily proceed successfully can also be properly introduced into the moral stress
situation, it can provide a basis for non-hierarchical discussion aimed at addressing that
moral stress.

“Authentic” here means “that the manifest intention of the speaker is meant as
expressed” (Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, 99), as concerns her subjective
experience. This dissertation will use the word “authentic,” though the German is also
sometimes translated as “sincerity claims” (Bohman and Rehg, “Jürgen Habermas”), and
sometimes as “truthfulness” (Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative
Action, 137).
14
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The above three criteria describe claims to three types of validity for a given
communicative assertion. According to Habermas, from this it follows that the validity of
an assertion can be questioned on all three levels. While a person making an assertion
should be assumed to be claiming validity on all three levels, she must be able to provide
reasons for her assertion on each level if asked. Therefore, participants in dialogue are
allowed to argue the validity of those claims if they find them wanting, and this “practice
of argumentation” is “a court of appeal that makes it possible to continue communicative
action with other means when disagreements can no longer be repaired with everyday
routines.”15 However, this practice of argumentation is not meant to be adversarial: “no
one would enter into moral argumentation if he did not start from the strong
presupposition that a grounded consensus could in principle be achieved among those
involved.”16 This presupposition means that communicative action may be an iterative
process, in which participants question a speaker’s knowledge of the facts, understanding
of the norms, or, less likely, the authenticity of her speech, and the speaker (or
questioners) may need to adjust accordingly, and be open to being questioned yet again
about this new assertion (doubts about a speaker’s authenticity ought to be raised only
when one’s actions do not align with one’s words; otherwise, one’s subjective assertions
ought to be assumed to be dependable as accurately reflecting one’s subjective state).17
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Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, 17-18.
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Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, 19.

It is true of course that one can also be self-deceptive about one’s subjective claims,
rather than be outright lying. See Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, 21.
17
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Habermas also makes it clear that because rational actors may have their
validity claims questioned, there must be “a willingness to expose themselves to criticism
and, if necessary, to participate properly in argumentation.”18 That is to say, even when
asserting something authentically, a person expressing herself in communicative action
must be open to the chance that her understanding of the objective or her interpretation of
the normative is lacking and can be corrected through dialogue.
In normal moral discussion, health care professionals may also question and
clarify another’s claims of truth and claims of moral rightness, and to a lesser extent
claims of authenticity (perhaps if, say, a physician claims to care about her patients but
fails to attend bedside rounds many days in a row and instead plays games on her phone,
her authenticity could be questioned). Claims of truth may rest on determining if a health
care professional does, in fact, have all the relevant information about a particular patient
or case, and how that informs her understanding of the situation. Claims of moral
rightness may be questioned (within the content-thin common moral framework) by
citing other ethical principles at stake, or by using a different methodology for ethical
decision making that supports a different conclusion. Regardless of the specifics, it is
important to remember that—as Habermas stresses—there is in what is here being called
“ordinary” communicative action a presupposition that consensus is possible, or that
something approaching agreement is achievable, which may mean that some health care
professionals will, through this process of questioning, realize that their claims need
adjustment, and do so accordingly in order to reach communal understanding.
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Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, 18.
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.....Discourse Ethics
There are times, however, when “ordinary” communicative action fails to achieve
its intended aim of orientating participants toward mutual understanding and action. It is
at this point that speakers may shift to a more rigorous process of argumentation, which
Habermas calls “discourse ethics.” As Bohman and Rehg note, “When the offer made by
the speaker [in communicative action] fails to receive uptake, speaker and hearer may
shift reflexive levels, from ordinary speech to ‘discourse’—processes of argumentation
and dialogue in which the claims implicit in the speech act are tested for their rational
justifiability as true, correct or authentic.”19 This procedure still involves discussing
claims of validity and as such its basic description above resembles that of
communicative action; but it differs from communicative action in important respects.20
It should be once again acknowledged at the start of this section that Habermas’
discourse ethics, as a theory of moral reasoning through argumentation, was not designed
as a response to moral distress. Indeed, from looking at Habermas’ principle of discourse
ethics: “Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the
approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse,”21 it may
at first appear that the goal of discourse ethics is at odds with one of the main features of
19

Bohman and Rehg, “Jürgen Habermas.”
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In that the rules and premises of discourse ethics effectively provide a roadmap for
non-hierarchical, equality-based, inclusive discussions, they describe a process of
discussion, and thus can be termed “procedural.” However, this procedural method is not
Engelhardt’s purely procedural methodology. Obviously, having access to the contentthin common moral framework already builds ethical concepts into the procedure; but
furthermore, Habermas himself notes that at least some of his premises and rules in
discourse ethics are grounded by ethical content (See Ingram, Habermas, 132-34).
21

Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 66. Emphasis deleted.
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moral distress. That is to say, the purpose of discourse ethics is to test relevant norms
for validity; but when a health care professional experiences moral distress, she already
believes that some norm is being violated, a norm whose validity is not in question for
her. However, this section will show that the rules of argumentation in discourse ethics,
and the requirements for doing discourse ethics that Habermas describes, lend themselves
very well to a method of moral distress resolution for health care professionals.
At the heart of discourse ethics, like the theories of Kant and Rawls, is the
universalization of moral norms. In that regard, Habermas’ discourse ethics has the same
deontological goal as Kant’s categorical imperative and Rawls’ veil of ignorance.
However, as has been noted, Habermas rejects Kant’s belief that rationality (and thus
universalizability) can be a monological exercise, as this ignores human rationality’s
necessarily social aspects. As Ingram states, Habermas believes that “it is questioning by
others that enables us to become conscious of our interests so that we can responsibly
change them in light of others’ interests.”22 Kant’s conception of rationality does not
allow the rational thinker to engage with any other people, or even account for their
existence when creating norms, and in that regard, Ingram argues, it “violates our
intuition that norms are intended to advance our common good.”23
Rawls tries to rectify Kant’s error with his own universalizability test, in which
actors create norms under a veil of ignorance, where their individual identities and
idiosyncratic characteristics are hidden. Theoretically, this will result in actors creating
norms based on principles of justice, thus ensuring basic rights and limiting inequality
22

Ingram, Habermas, 123.
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unless it benefits the worst-off, and so on. However, Habermas is concerned that
discourse in Rawls’ theory is still hypothetical, and Rawls’ reliance on the impartiality of
actors (and the logical conclusion that this objectivity means they would all, even as
individuals, still ultimately come to identical principles of justice) means “that every
individual can undertake to justify basic norms on his own.”24 That is, for Habermas,
Rawls does not require real dialogue to come to agreement on norms, and thus falls prey
to the same monological fallacy as Kant.
Habermas, on the other hand, claims that properly conducted argumentation in
discourse ethics “suggests the perspective of real-life argumentation, in which all affected
are admitted as participants.”25 Given this difference, Habermas also must formulate a
new principle of universalization that takes into account real dialogue between actual (as
opposed to hypothetical) participants. To that end, Habermas introduces the following
principle of universalization (U): a valid norm is one where “All affected can accept the
consequences and the side effects [the norm’s] general observance can be anticipated to
have [in service of] the satisfaction of everyone’s interests (and these consequences are
preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation).”26 Thus, not only are
the actors engaging in real dialogue the ones validating a given norm, but also the actors
must take into account those who will be affected by the adoption of the norm, even if
they are not present or directly involved in the discourse.
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(U) is a principle, but also acts as a rule of argumentation in discourse ethics.

As a rule of argumentation, it states that “rational consensus is to be achieved by each
and every person revising their needs and wants in light of the impact their satisfaction
would have on the needs and wants of others.”28 As a principle, however, (U) is derived
from three premises: a principle of discourse, a content premise, and the rules of
discourse themselves.29 The principle of discourse looks similar to (U) but acts
differently; it states the only norms that can claim validity are ones “that meet (or could
meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical
discourse.”30 The content premise defines and delineates what a valid norm ought to do,
which is to mutually satisfy the interests of all participants, or to “give the participants the
knowledge that they have collectively been convinced of something.”31 The final premise
is the rules premise, or the rules of discourse, which is in turn divided into three rules, the
third of which is also divided into three.
Habermas makes clear that his principle of discourse ethics is “formal, for it
provides no substantive guidelines but only a procedure: practical discourse,”32 and the
rules premise is what creates that formal procedure. As noted, the rules premise has three

Technically, (U) is a “bridging” principle between norms and the real world, but that
distinction is unimportant in this dissertation.
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parts. The first is the rule of product, or logic, which means merely that participants
must reason logically, adhering, for example, to non-contradiction and treating like
objects alike. One specific example cited by Habermas, which will be important to the
proposal for moral distress resolution offered here, is that “different speakers may not use
the same expression with different meanings.”33 The second rule of discourse is the rule
of procedure, which states that participants must be authentic and accountable in their
discourse.34
The third rule of discourse is the rule of process, and itself is divided into three.35
The first part of the rule of process is a rule of inclusion, in which anyone with the
competence to take part in discourse is allowed to do so. The second is a rule of
symmetry, which states that anyone is allowed to assert anything she wants, and anyone
is allowed to question anyone else’s assertion, giving each actor an equal opportunity to
participate. The third of these is the rule of participation, stating that all actors must be
allowed to participate free from internal and external coercion, and thus they must be
open-minded in argumentation.36
Habermas believes that the above premises (discourse, content, and rules) provide
the basis for accepting (U). As Ingram summarizes, Habermas states that “a valid
(unconditionally binding) norm must be based on rationally universalizable interests that
have emerged out of an inclusive dialogue in which each and everyone’s interests have
33
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been critically modified as far as possible to accommodate their equal harmonious
satisfaction.”37
It is an open question whether or not Habermas manages to prove that his
principle of universalization is a “transcendental” concept rather than culturallydetermined and limited.38 Habermas appeals to “the universal and necessary
communicative presuppositions of argumentative speech” in order to validate his
principle,39 which themselves rest on “the intuitive preunderstanding that every subject
competent in speech and action brings to a process of argumentation.”40 It seems that
referring an “intuitive preunderstanding” in order to create “universal and necessary
communicative presuppositions” which will validate discourse ethics as universal can be
criticized on the grounds that Habermas is claiming the existence of a universal concept
in order to prove the existence of a universal concept, thus making his argument
circular.41 Yet importantly, Habermas also explicitly allows for discourse ethics to take
place in, and be relevant for, non-transcendental ethics (i.e., ethical questions that arise in
particular, concrete contexts), including the situations for which it is being proposed as a
guiding theory here, namely situations of moral distress among health care professionals.
He writes: “No harm is done, however, if we deny that the transcendental-pragmatic
justification constitutes an ultimate justification… If we cease striving for the
37
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foundationalism of traditional transcendental philosophy, we acquire new
corroborative possibilities for discourse ethics.”42 Thus, the question of whether or not
Habermas’ discourse ethics are truly universal and transcendent is unimportant here, as
this dissertation will use discourse ethics in a more limited scope, where something like a
“necessary preunderstanding” has been shown to exist in professional health care given
common professional morality and the content-thin common moral framework it
supports.
Discourse Ethics and Moral Acquaintances
Chapter Four of this dissertation asked if there existed a practical, nonhierarchical way for health care professionals, as moral acquaintances sharing a contentthin common moral framework, to address and resolve situations of moral distress. Given
the above description of Habermas’ discourse ethics, this section argues that discourse
ethics can provide the arena, and procedural structure, for this to occur. Though
Habermas’ purposes in describing a methodology for discourse ethics differ from this
dissertation’s, the procedural method he provides for norm validation can be applied here
to moral distress situations, using the premises and rules he lays out.
As moral distress requires a proactive response (recalling that Chapter Two
argued that a health care organization that does not adequately address moral distress can
be held to be failing its moral obligations), it was shown in Chapter Three that moral
distress resolution entails real dialogue, which discourse ethics requires as well—neither
discourse ethics nor addressing moral distress can be done monologically. Furthermore,
discourse ethics’ necessary inclusion of all affected parties via the universilization
42
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principle avoids the problems presented by a hierarchical response to moral distress
(including the distressed party and other involved health care professionals being denied
a say in the resolution process, or the inability to have a constructive, real dialogue before
the situation is taken over by an organizational entity removed from the conflict, thus also
removing the possibility for real dialogue among actual participants). Indeed, the
inclusion requirement supports the claim defended in Chapter Three that all involved
health professionals, and not just the morally distressed individual(s), should also be
included in the discussion of a moral distress situation. Habermas’ rules and related
premises of discourse, as well, provide helpful rules for participants in a moral distress
resolution.
The three premises included in the universalization principle are, as explained
above, the principle of discourse, the content premise, and the rules of discourse. The
discourse premise includes all affected parties in practical discourse, which was
elaborated on in the last paragraph. The content premise is meant to ensure that all
participants’ interests are mutually satisfied, which is in line with what a successful
resolution of moral distress would also aim achieve (i.e., not only would a successful
moral distress resolution alleviate a health care professional’s moral distress, but all other
participants would be satisfied with the outcome recalling that certain hierarchical
responses to moral distress may actually create moral distress in other involved health
care professionals). The third premise, the rules of discourse, create the guidelines and
space for a discussion that can lead to a moral distress resolution. These rules are not just
theoretical conclusions within Habermas’s account of communicative action and
discourse ethics. They provide a set of practical standards that the health care
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professionals involved in a moral distress situation can actually use to guide their
discussion about the situation to succeed in resolving it.
Habermas’ rule of product requires that participants speak logically, but also, as
noted above, that speakers must mean the same thing when using the same expression.
For health care professionals, ordinarily meeting this requirement of shared meaning is
made possible by the content-thin common moral framework, in that all participants are
assumed, in their daily dealings with one another, to be generally agreed on the thin
meaning of the concepts they use. But if someone is using a concept differently than
others normally would, this would need to be identified and corrected during the
discussion in order for the discussion to continue successfully; and this may, in fact,
uncover the cause of the moral distress, if the cause stems from a misunderstanding of the
application of a (thin) ethical principle.
The rule of procedure, which states that participants must be authentic, is in fact
already accounted for. This is because, as discussed in Chapter Three, adherence to the
goals and values of professional health care—which necessarily entail authenticity as
Habermas describes it, in that a health care professional’s statements and acts must
accurately reflect those goals and values—are a part of the ethical obligations necessarily
included in joining a health care profession.
Habermas’ rules of process—inclusion, symmetry, and freedom from coercion—
effectively insist that all affected parties have an equal chance to hear and be heard.
Given the moral acquaintanceship and equality of health care professionals, these rules
clearly are relevant to successful moral distress resolution as well. That is to say, if any of
these rules are broken and discourse becomes in some way asymmetrical, moral
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acquaintanceship and the equality of health care professionals are not being respected,
and hierarchies will begin to re-emerge in that an asymmetrical relationship means that
some are “more than” and others are “less than.” Furthermore, the process of iterative
argumentation in discourse ethics, in which participants are expected to open-mindedly
assert and accept for consideration assertions from all other participants, describes what a
real peer-to-peer, non-hierarchical, inclusive, respectful discussion of moral distress
should look like, building on the content-thin common moral framework for the language
and concepts shared by health care professionals.
At this point, it is once again important to note that, while in discourse ethics the
above premises come together in order to add up to the principle of universalization and
thus the validation of a given norm, this is not the purpose here. Indeed, it can be argued
that the content-thin common moral framework shared by health care professionals has
already validated the norms they use. Instead, based on the above analysis of discourse
ethics and its suitability for application to dialogue among moral acquaintances,
Habermas’ theory can be seen to provide a plausible structure for what a moral distress
resolution can look like in practice. Thus, instead of Habermas’ goal of universalization
of norms as an outcome, the goal in a moral distress situation is a resolution that has been
reached communicatively in accord with these standards of successful discourse ethics.
That is, when all parties in a moral distress situation are included in its discussion, though
individual interests and assertions may have to be modified to be harmonious with other
individuals’ by process of iterative argumentation, the procedure itself, as it follows the
formal rules and premises of discourse ethics, would be judged as fair and respecting the
equality and contributions of all. The outcome would be one mutually agreed-upon by all
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parties as being at least an acceptable-by-all solution (though a higher level of
agreement may emerge), because all parties will have heard and been heard, and ideally
all will have understood and been understood. In this regard, a successful moral distress
discussion will precisely mirror successfully implemented discourse ethics, as defined by
McCarthy: “Habermas’s discourse model, by requiring that perspective-taking be general
and reciprocal, builds the moment of empathy into the procedure of coming to a reasoned
agreement: each must put himself or herself into the place of everyone else in discussing
whether a proposed norm is fair to all.”43 This empathy and reciprocity of understanding
is the basis for health care professionals being able to arrive at the conviction that a moral
distress situation can be resolved even if total agreement about the specific case that is a
catalyst for the moral distress is out of reach. But the required empathy and commitment
to reciprocity are already characteristics of how health care professionals (including those
in differing health care professions who continually depend on one another’s
characteristic expertise in the interest of their patients’ best interests) routinely strive to
interact. While a moral distress situation is, as has been noted, an interruption of these
relationships, if it becomes understood that a non-hierarchical, mutually respectful
methodology is still available for the resolution of moral distress situations, there is good
reason to believe that both the morally distressed person and the other involved health
care professionals will be able to approach the discussion with the empathy and
commitment to reciprocity that McCarthy speaks of.
One last point made above ought to be emphasized: in a moral distress situation, it
is possible that an agreement on a course of action in the specific case under discussion is
43
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not found. Health care professionals are, after all, moral acquaintances, and not moral
friends. Disagreement may exist regarding the application of concepts beyond the thin
and superficial.44 Instead, by using the rules and premises of discourse ethics, this chapter
attempts to lay out a procedural solution grounded in the content-thin common moral
framework shared by health care professionals, at the end of which the parties in the
moral distress situation have had the opportunity for mutual and respectful
communication, in which each participant is included and affirmed as an equal moral
actor. But as Helft and colleagues recount after creating a forum in which health care
professionals could come together to discuss a moral distress situation,45 even if the kind
of resolution just described was not achieved, “the conversation has ‘worked’ because it
led to clarity about the issues underlying the participants’ distress. Participants emerge
with a better sense of how divergent views on the case derive from equally valid
considerations, and with some conviction that respectful discussion of different views and
44

Though it is also possible that this process may lead to a new agreement on a concept
that the participants had not previously considered. This kind of resolution of a moral
distress situation has yet another parallel with Habermas’ account of discourse ethics;
namely, Habermas’ two-stage explanation of the justification and application of a norm
(See Habermas, Justification and Application, 35-39). In justifying a norm, participants
affirm it as able to be universalizable, generally speaking, with the knowledge that their
temporal and mental finiteness limit their ability to reason perfectly. In application,
participants apply the norms available to a specific situation “to select the one prima facie
norm that is most appropriate” (Ingram, Habermas, 140). If two justified norms conflict
in application, the discussion can move to a process of reconciliation of the norms,
possibly justifying, and then applying, a new norm that the parties can all agree on. This
might be akin to two health care professionals sharing a thin concept, but realizing that
their thick conceptions are different, and through a reflexive dialogue, coming to a new
thin concept such that their thick concepts no longer conflict in practice, or coming to a
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of the feelings a case has engendered has been an important and valuable exercise.”
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That is, moral acquaintances may, at the end of the day, still disagree, but if the
discussion has conformed to the rules of discourse ethics, they will understand why they
disagree and the morally distressed person will have far less reason to feel isolated or
disrespected as a moral person or as an inadequately committed health care professional.
Conclusion
Having identified health care professionals as moral acquaintances that interact
within a content-thin common moral framework in Chapters Three and Four, this chapter
examined what kind of discussions could be had given health care professionals’
common professional morality. It was proposed that, in “everyday” discussion, health
care professionals use a model similar to Habermas’ theory of communicative action to
speak about their judgments of what ought to be done. However, when a moral distress
situation occurs disrupting this communication and thus needs resolution, health care
professionals can turn to the rules and premises of Habermas’ theory of discourse ethics
to create a forum in which this discussion focused on resolution can occur. With this
theoretical explanation in place, this dissertation now must turn back to the health care
organization, which has an obligation to address moral distress in its health care
professionals. The question then becomes, how should the health care organization do so
in practice? This will be the focus of Chapter Six.
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CHAPTER SIX
PRACTICAL PROPOSALS FOR HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS
Chapters Three, Four, and Five of this dissertation built an argument for nonhierarchical, inclusive, equality-based peer-to-peer discussions among health care
professionals as a model for responding to, and resolving, moral distress. Chapter Two
showed that efforts to resolve moral distress using an organization’s hierarchical system
are likely to be unable to do so. Given that health care organizations have an obligation to
address moral distress in its health care professionals for the reasons provided in Chapter
Two, it follows that health care organizations have an obligation to create and foster an
environment in which these discussions can take place. However, in order for an
institution to effectively address moral distress, it needs not only to be responsive, but
also proactively build the structures within which its health care professionals can resolve
moral distress by means of the kinds of equality-based discussions described in Chapters
Three, Four, and Five. Furthermore, if a health care organization adequately fulfills this
obligation, it may be that moral distress is not only resolved, but also in some instances
lessened or avoided in the first place, thus strengthening the relationship between the
organization and its health care professionals it is obligated to promote.
This chapter will examine and endorse practical recommendations for ways in
which health care organizations can respond to moral distress in health care
professionals. To do so, first a case of a poor institutional response to moral distress will
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be analyzed, in order to highlight inadequate structures for addressing moral distress.
Following this, positive methods to respond to moral distress will be offered, and in
doing so, proactive ways for health care organizations to address and lessen, and at times
eliminate, moral distress in health care professionals will also be explored.1 Before
concluding, some unresolved questions raised in this dissertation will be acknowledged,
and areas for further investigation identified.
A Case Analysis of a Negative Response to Moral Distress
In this section, an example of a poorly handled moral distress response (on the
part of the health care organization) will be analyzed. In highlighting the institutional
failings in this case, this section will show how insufficient responses to moral distress
can be rectified, which will lead to suggestions of how a health care organization can
positively respond to moral distress. Thus, the succeeding section will examine some
possible strategies health care organizations can implement in order to properly address
situations of moral distress and create an environment that would be actively supportive
of the proposed procedure for their resolution.
For this negative case example, this dissertation will analyze a moral distress
situation based on a case from the American Medical Association’s Virtual Mentor—the
only case, in fact, in the AMA’s archives that discusses moral distress (perhaps reflecting
the lack of attention this issue has received). In the case, Claire is an intensive care unit
(ICU) nurse caring for Mrs. Smith, an 80-year old woman with no significant past
Up to this point, this dissertation has mostly used the language of “responding to” moral
distress. However, as just noted and as will be shown later in this chapter, in that an
ethically adequate organizational response to moral distress may lessen or avoid moral
distress in the first place, it is not only being “responded to” but also “addressed,” so this
chapter will use both these expressions.
1
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medical history admitted for a myocardial infarction (heart attack). After her
admission to the ICU, Mrs. Smith soon became hypotensive (very low blood pressure)
with evidence of cardiogenic shock (an inability for the heart to pump enough blood) and
altered mental status. The attending physician in the ICU, Dr. Jones, recommends
catheterization to open a closed artery “to make her feel better and…give her the best
chance at living the longest,” to which Mrs. Smith’s children agree.2 Following the
procedure, Mrs. Smith falls into respiratory distress and is diagnosed with flash
pulmonary edema (fluid in the lungs), and so she is intubated (a breathing tube and
artificial respiration with a ventilator is put in place) and sedated (to avoid respiratory
distress and so she does not disturb the breathing tube). Claire is Mrs. Smith’s primary
caretaker, and at this point it becomes known that Mrs. Smith’s advance directive, filled
out years ago, refuses resuscitation or ventilation if she is in the process of dying. Dr.
Jones, however, doesn’t think Mrs. Smith is in the dying process and sees the intubation
as temporary—which it in fact is, as Mrs. Smith’s condition improves enough to remove
the breathing tube the next morning.
Following the removal of the breathing tube, while Mrs. Smith is stable and
awake, she tells Claire that she feels terrible and that it is near her time to die. Soon
thereafter, Mrs. Smith’s condition worsens, and she is re-intubated and diagnosed with a
pneumonia. Antibiotics are started, though Mrs. Smith consistently shakes her head
against receiving any new drugs or lines. At this point, Claire asks Mrs. Smith directly if
Mrs. Smith wants to continue life-saving measures: she shakes her head “no.” Claire tells
Dr. Jones of Mrs. Smith’s wishes, but Dr. Jones refuses to change the course of care,
2
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maintaining her full code status (full resuscitation if her heart and breathing should
stop), stating that Mrs. Smith was getting better, will eventually be able to breath on her
own, and her desire to stop treatment stems from her misunderstanding of her situation.
The following day, Mrs. Smith’s children tell both Claire and Dr. Jones that their
mother was clear in her advance directives and would not want to be ventilated. Dr.
Jones, however, states her hope Mrs. Smith’s recovery, causing the children to cede to
her judgment. Claire, however, is unsure of how to proceed. She would like to talk to Dr.
Jones again or an administrator about this case, but is afraid of getting in trouble for
unprofessionalism or impeding patient care if she continues to push the matter with Dr.
Jones or anyone else. Se feels that she knows this is not what Mrs. Smith would want,
and as her advocate, Claire wonders what she can possibly do in this situation.
The first step in moral distress resolution is to clearly identify and articulate the
cause of moral distress. In this case, Claire believes she has strong evidence and reasons
for believing that Mrs. Smith would not want the continued invasive treatment that the
medical team is providing, that the correct decision is to stop treatment of Mrs. Smith’s
pneumonia, remove her breathing tube, and focus on comfort and allow Mrs. Smith to
die. The attending physician, Dr. Jones, disagrees and overrides Claire, and so she cannot
act on her belief. Furthermore, Claire feels institutionally prohibited from escalating the
issue given her concerns of being labeled “unprofessional” or impeding patient.
In a moral distress resolution process based on discourse ethics, Claire would
have the support of her health care organization and leadership for there to be a
discussion about the ethical issues in the case with the members of the health care team.
All health care professionals providing care for Mrs. Smith would be invited. Indeed,
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though not mentioned in the case, it goes without saying that respiratory therapists,
interns and residents, cardiologists and infectious disease physicians, other nurses, and
more would be involved in Mrs. Smith’s care and might like to join the conversation. In
accordance with a notion of inclusion and the refutation of hierarchical responses to
moral distress, every person attending should be mindful to (or, if moral distress
discussions are assisted by a facilitator, should be reminded to) leave her job title and
status at the door, though each participant is not leaving her professional ethical (or
medical) judgments outside of the discussion. In fact, it would be helpful for the
participants to be reminded of their professional ethical obligations and the content-thin
common moral framework they can appeal as a point of agreement among all members.3
Using this content-thin common moral framework and its language and concepts
as a starting point, the members of the health care team could begin to talk about both the
case and Claire’s moral distress (and if any other team member also is morally
distressed). Each health care professional would use the framework to understand the
3

It is important to note that this discussion is not the same, in goals or in structure, as an
ethics consultation. Facilitation of a moral distress discussion will be explored later in
this chapter, but for now it is enough to say that, most often, an ethics consultation is
called so that trained ethics consultants can assist caregivers and/or families or patients in
ethical thinking about what is the best decision for their situation—the starting point of an
ethics consultation is usually, in some form another, a “moral dilemma” as was discussed
in Chapter One. In a moral distress situation, a health care professional has already come
to a decision about what the best plan is (and that plan is not being followed), and so a
moral distress discussion will be framed differently. Indeed, if a health care organization
had the resources, having ethics consultants and moral distress facilitators as separate
entities within the organization would be ideal, given that blurring the lines between the
two roles (if they are filled by the same person or persons) may create confusion as to the
goals of an interaction between a health care professional and a facilitator of a moral
distress discussion on the one hand, and a health care professional and an ethics
consultant or ethics consultation team, on the other. Generally speaking, however, an
ethics consultation may uncover moral distress that a health care organization then would
have an obligation to respond to.

other professionals’ understanding and application of their shared concepts, and
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where those concepts differ, are in discord, or are possibly misunderstood, thus
potentially leading to the conflict at hand in Mrs. Smith’s case. Following the rules and
premises in Habermas’ discourse ethics and its requirement that assertions must fulfill
certain validity claims, the participants would open-mindedly and respectfully question
and authentically respond when questioned regarding their knowledge of the facts of the
situation and their ethical judgments about the situation, and through this iterative process
refine their understanding and judgment. This reciprocal questioning would, hopefully,
allow each participant to empathetically hear and be heard, toward the goal of mutual
understanding of, and satisfaction with, the process of discourse. This in turn would
ideally lead all participants to judge the outcome of the discussion as one arrived at fairly,
as everyone involved in the process would have approached each other, and been treated
as, moral equals with the ability to contribute meaningfully to the resolution of Claire’s
moral distress (and that of any other morally distressed health care professionals that may
now voice their distress when given a non-hierarchical, inclusive forum in which to do
so).
When using the word “outcome” here, it is important to remember that the goal of
this moral distress discussion is explicitly not to determine a plan of treatment for Mrs.
Smith, or even to determine what the right thing to do is, much less to create a consensus
judgment on that question. The purpose is to provide a procedural framework to address
the participant health care professionals’ moral distress, and for the members of the team
to have a space in which to be understood and to understand the other participants in Mrs.
Smith’s care. It is possible that this process of asserting, questioning, refining, and

understanding everyone’s ethical concerns and stances might lead to a consensus and
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acceptance of a plan of treatment or other action. In practice, though, this may not be
achievable—Dr. Jones may not agree with Claire’s reasons for thinking that the present
course of treatment is not in accord with Mrs. Smith’s wishes, and so may choose to
continue Mrs, Smith’s intubation and to maintain her full code status.
If this were to occur, however, the pragmatic outcome of the discussion in relation
to Claire’s moral distress may be that, at the very least, Claire can better understand Dr.
Jones’ position and rationale for it, and will know that her concerns had been heard but
not agreed with for specific reasons, consistent with the content-thin common moral
framework, that have at least been openly discussed with all health care professionals
caring for Mrs. Smith. Though she does not have the power to alter the decision in this
case (recalling that health care organizations are still necessarily hierarchical in their
authority structure and that ultimately someone will hold decision making power with
regard to patient care), she will have been treated as a moral equal to the rest of the team
members, and the reason for her distress will have been empathetically listened to and
considered.
If Claire feels that a fair procedure has been followed in which Dr. Jones, the
health care team, and the organization understood her concerns and responded to them
appropriately, her moral distress may be resolved. However, this also depends on Claire
knowing that not only the other participants in the conversation but the organization itself
views moral distress as an important ethical matter worth both individual and
organizational effort to address.
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In the description of this example as written by the AMA, the organization
was obviously described in negative terms in how it handled moral distress. Not only was
there no mechanism in place for properly addressing moral distress when it occurs, but
there is a suggestion that the culture of the organization discourages open moral
disagreement and discussion, or even views it as an interference. Obviously, this
dissertation argues that the organization ought positively assist its health care
professionals in addressing situations of moral distress. What this might look like in
practice will be discussed more fully in the next section. But it is possible, especially if
the organization’s culture does in fact discourage moral discussion, that the hospital in
the case did not know that Claire was experiencing Dr. Jones’ decisions as a moral
problem, much less that such situations of moral distress had come up before. However,
the literature makes it clear that moral distress is a widespread and persistent occurrence
and so the hospital would do well to see if this is also the case within its walls and then to
analyze which policies or patterns of practice lead to moral distress in the institution.
Some questions that might be asked include: What recourse do concerned members of the
health care team have in cases of care they feel to be ethically inappropriate? Are there
pressures or relationships that prevent morally distressed health care professionals from
raising moral questions in the course of daily patient care, and what sort of
organizationally supported mechanism can rectify this?
More specifically, in relation to characteristics of Mrs. Smith’s case and previous
cases like it, the hospital might find specific policies (or lack thereof), including policies
about clinical matters, contributing to the prevalence of moral distress among its health
professionals. For example, how are teams structured in the ICU, and how much power is
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granted solely to the attending physician? What checks are in place to an attending
physician’s decision making? Are team atmospheres collegial or intimidating? Do the
hospital’s policies support the role of advance directives in planning the course of care, or
do they not? Are there institutional policies in place that treat artificial ventilation as an
all or not-at-all decision or is there room for limited ventilation trials? What are the
procedures involved in changing a patient’s code status?
Having looked at such questions, both generally about opportunities for health
professionals to discuss morally distressing situations and specifically about particular
kinds of situations or structures that may have led to moral distress in the past, the
organization could determine first of all how to directly respond to situations of moral
distress. It could determine how to best support appropriate kinds of discussion among its
health care professionals, including the potential value of trained facilitators assisting
teams of professionals in constructing discussions that conform to Habermas’ rules and
premises of discourse ethics. But in addition the organization could learn how to change
its culture so that its policies and patterns of practice actually prevent or at least lessen
moral distress in the first place.
With these suggestions for areas of improvement in mind, it is time to address the
larger question, posed in Chapter Two: What are health care organizations obligated to do
in order to address moral distress experienced by their health care professionals? Since a
central thesis of this dissertation is that health care organizations do in fact have
obligations to address moral distress, it is important to examine the positive proposals
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that have been offered to this end, most notably by Hamric, Epstein, and White, and
by Helft and colleagues.4
How Health Care Organizations Can Positively Address Moral Distress
In a recent book chapter titled “Moral Distress and the Healthcare Organization,”
Hamric, Epstein, and White offer practical strategies for health care organizations that
align with the theoretical discussion undertaken in this dissertation.5 The authors are
aware that organizational responses like those criticized in Chapters Two and Three of
this dissertation are likely unhelpful: “Strategies that have been adopted by nurses and the
clinical professions…may be inadequate to address what appears to be a pervasive
phenomenon from a systems perspective.”6 In regard to hierarchical initiatives
implemented by the organization, they state that “top-level administrative dictates will
not necessarily lead to unit-level changes without clinicians seeing the need and having
the skills to address moral distress.”7
Hamric and her colleagues argue that organizations must address moral distress
both on a case-by-case level and on a system-wide level. In individual cases, the authors
4

As was noted at the outset of this dissertation, very little has been written about
organizational responses to moral distress. But one positive response that has been
mentioned in the literature will not be addressed here: the University of Virginia Health
System has created and instituted a moral distress consultation service (Hamric and
Epstein, “Moral Distress, Moral Residue, and the Crescendo Effect.”). Unfortunately, the
moral distress consultants have not yet published a thorough description or analysis of
this service, and thus it cannot be discussed here.
5

These authors gave their chapter the same title as this dissertation, but the book
containing the chapter was not published until after the title for this dissertation had been
chosen and approved.
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state that health care organizations ought to promote dialogue among its health care
professionals, and their suggestions on strategies to do so support dialogue that closely
mirrors the discourse ethics-inspired discussion defended in the preceding chapters. They
state that discussions about moral distress need to focus on dialogue that is founded on
“open and respectful communication… Ground rules may need to be established to create
a safe space where every person is respected, heard, and does not fear reprisal.”8 The
authors do not state what these ground rules are, or what the safe space looks like, but if
the goal is for open and respectful communication, it seems that the proposals offered in
this dissertation about the equality of health care professionals as moral acquaintances
committed to a content-thin common moral framework and about Habermas’ premises of
discourse ethics would go a long way toward achieving this.
Regarding system-wide responses, these authors state that the health care
organization, in addition to fostering dialogue and reciprocal respect, must be supportive
in allowing staff time and space to have these discussions, as well as offering educational
opportunities so that health care professionals can learn to understand and recognize
moral distress in themselves and their colleagues. These educational opportunities
potentially could be beneficial for health care professionals in another way as well, in that
by better identifying their own moral distress they will be better prepared to initiate a
resolution process like the one described in this dissertation. This would, of course, be
possible only if the health care organization has fulfilled its other obligations to address
moral distress. For if a health care professional can identify her moral distress but cannot
resolve it, this could create the feedback loop of moral distress discussed in Chapter Two.
8
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So while moral distress education may very well be useful for health care
professionals, it is only a piece of a health care organization’s obligation to address moral
distress, and must also be packaged with the proposal offered in this dissertation and with
the other suggestions that Hamric and her colleagues provide.
The authors also state the important, though obvious point, that health care
administrators can play a crucial role in promoting interdisciplinary communication and
collegial practices, which can in turn possibly prevent the communication errors that
sometimes cause moral distress. Moreover, they can in this way help the organization
develop the atmosphere in which a moral distress resolution process like the one
described in this dissertation can occur.
In offering strategies on how to address moral distress on a systems level,
however, Hamric and colleagues acknowledge that, because every health care
organization is structured differently and each has a unique culture, no one-size-fits-all
solution exists. They note, for example, that a teaching hospital’s response to moral
distress might be different than a hospital that is focused on highly skilled patient care, as
the former places emphasis on training health care professionals (e.g., it has a residency
program), while the latter emphasizes the expertise of its health care professionals and
service delivery, and thus focus on maximizing different values. However, both of these
types of organizations need to have leaders who can champion the mission and values of
the particular health care organization, and one “important aspect of this advocacy role is
to apply the organization’s mission and values to all levels of the organization, from

high-level administration to individual units.” So if incorporating ways of properly
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addressing moral distress and adjusting organizational culture to support them is a
priority, then the specific moral distress interventions at each organization can be tailored
to the mission and values of that organization. One result of this would be that those
organizational values can be integrated into the content-thin common moral framework
of health care providers at that institution, yielding something much closer to a systemwide agreement on what values ought to be prioritized and contributing in this additional
way to the language and concepts available to health care professionals in their
discussions of moral distress situations.
The observation that there are no one-size-fits-all solutions to moral distress, and
the fact that health care organizations will need to determine how to disseminate and live
its mission and values based on how it is structured, are stark reminders that health care
organizations (like all organizations) operate hierarchically, and thus of the difficulty
organizations may experience in breaking free of current responses to moral distress that
produce the negative results associated with hierarchically structured interventions. The
thesis of this dissertation is that health care organizations have an obligation to create
non-hierarchical responses to moral distress, and while the theoretical groundwork for
this to occur has taken place in the preceding chapters, it must be acknowledged that in
practice it may be difficult. Indeed, as Rushton and Brooks-Brunn state, a collaborative
health care environment is the ideal, and the mission and values of a health care
organization may espouse to strive for such an environment, but “where hierarchical
decision-making…and traditional power structures are valued, there may be
9
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incongruencies between the stated philosophy, values and goals of the organization,
and the reality of the work place.”10
That is to say, regardless of how committed an organization may be to supporting
a mechanism for responding properly (according to this dissertation’s suggestions) to
moral distress when it occurs, it will remain a serious challenge for health care
organizations to determine how to implement these mechanisms without it appearing to
be committed to “top-down,” purely hierarchical solutions and thus falling into the same
inappropriate hierarchical patterns criticized in Chapter Two.
A possible way to address this concern is through the creation of an
organizational culture (also referred to as moral climate or moral culture), as proposed by
Hamric, Epstein, and White. By creating a moral climate of the proper sort, ideally health
care professionals within the organization will see the example set by administration and
take seriously the ethical issues of other health care professionals. It should be noted,
however, that typical strategies to create a moral climate that takes ethical issues
seriously “are not explicitly aimed at managing moral distress. …[Nevertheless] leaders
and managers who develop a culture anchored in sound ethical decision making and
procedures to use when ethical issues arise should find it easier to manage moral
distress.”11 Thus, while it is outside the scope of this dissertation to delve into what
organizational characteristics constitute such a moral culture, it is interesting to note that
“a culture anchored in sound ethical decision making” will probably not only find moral
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distress easier to manage, but also will probably see instances and/or severity of
moral distress decrease.
This hypothesis is based on the notion that health care professionals in, and
acclimated to, a moral climate of this sort will be more likely to have open dialogue
regarding potentially troubling ethical issues before they become morally distressing.
That is to say, morally attuned health care professionals will be better at identifying
situations that may create ethical tension, and will also feel able to raise these concerns
with other health care professionals in a culture that values addressing those tensions and
contribution to ethical discourse. As Rushton and Brooks-Brunn concede and as was
discussed in Chapter Three, while there will always be differences in opinions, judgment,
and moral deliberating in health care professionals, within a moral culture these
differences “could be openly acknowledged and truthfully communicated in order for
harmony to exist.”12 This harmony would exist because differences would be uncovered
and discussed before decisions were made and moral distress was created.
Another way in which a health care organization can properly address moral
distress is to proactively identify the contexts within the institution where it is most likely
to arise and to see if changing how these contexts operate will also reduce or even
eliminate those instances moral distress. In determining how to do this, Hamric and her
colleagues propose that health care organizations look carefully at the IntegratedEthics
Initiative developed by the US Department of Veterans Affairs, which is a system-wide
ethics program that combines an ethics consultation service, preventive ethics measures,
and ethical leadership, the last of which has already been mentioned. Though it is argued
12
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here that ethics consultations and moral distress resolutions are conceptually and
practically separate (see footnote 3), observations of an ethics consultation service and an
organizational commitment to preventive ethics may be a way to avoid some future
instances of moral distress. For even though the primary goal of an ethics consultation is
to assist decision-makers in making the best moral decisions they can in a particular
situation, ethics consultants are well-placed to observe reoccurring causes of moral
distress. These reoccurrences can then be looked at via root cause analysis, and then those
root causes can be addressed by the organization. As Rushton explains, root cause
analyses of morally distressing situations, can “explore the systems that have contributed
to moral distress. Root cause analysis is a process for identifying what, how, and why an
event happened in order to prevent its reoccurrence. Using a neutral process, [the analysis
would] identify interpersonal factors, interdisciplinary dynamics, policies, or practices
within the system. This type of process can lead to documentation of institutional
constraints that lead to moral distress and identify workable solutions.”13 Preventive
measures based on surveys, root causes analyses, and other sources of information within
the organization can then be used to target prevalent and frequent causes of moral
distress. For example, studies have shown that proactive ethics consultations reduced the
length of ICU stays and unnecessary treatment in terminally ill patients, thus alleviating
some cases of moral distress in health care professionals caring for patients in these
settings.14
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Unit-Based Ethics Conversations
Another positive institutional response worth examining has not only been
discussed in literature, but has been put into practice. Helft and colleagues began a
program for nursing staff in their health care system (Clarian Health in Indianapolis) that
they called unit-based ethics conversations, or UBECs.15 In this space provided by the
organization, conversations regarding ethical issues nurses faced that led to moral distress
were facilitated in such a way that that “reflective dialogue and sharing of experiential
narratives are encouraged.”16 In examining the methodology of the UBECs, many
positive practical responses to moral distress align with the philosophical suggestions
offered in this dissertation, and would be beneficial for other health care organizations to
consider implementing. For example, though the conversations were facilitated by
different members of the health care system staff who were not necessarily themselves
nurses and thus occupied different positions in the institutional hierarchy, the facilitators’
intent was specifically not to “teach a formal ethics curriculum or content, but rather to
provide a forum for processing and discussing the ethical issues…with no didactic

Bander, “A Study of Proactive Ethics Consultation for Critically and Terminally Ill
Patients with Extended Lengths of Stay.”
15

Note that this program was set up for nurses. As was noted in Chapter One, such a
program would not encompass all health care professionals who might benefit from the
service being offered (though the authors do state that non-nurses have attended UBECs;
the positive and negative effects the attendance of members of other health care
professions had, and potential ramifications of these effects on moral distress resolution,
will be discussed later in the chapter).
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goals.” Thus, though the health care organization had implemented this response,
the response avoided trying to “fix” moral distress via education from outside staff (i.e.,
hierarchically). Instead, the participant health care professionals were given a forum in
which to have an “open and honest conversation” on moral distress situations via
reflective dialogue18—the listening and being listened to asked for in discourse ethics.
It is also interesting to note that, when they were starting the UBECs, a physicianethicist acted as the primary facilitator even though the participants were mostly nurses,
and the authors “noticed that participants were less spontaneous in early meetings but
became less guarded over a period of 3 or 4 sessions.”19 The authors are most likely
correct in hypothesizing that this was because nurses were initially wary of a
conversation facilitated by a physician due to entrenched hierarchies and hierarchical
mindsets, and that it took time to acclimate to thinking of the facilitator as an equal and
no more than an equal.20 This is an important point for any organization that would offer
facilitators for moral distress discussions: A positive organizational response to moral
stress would need to be aware of the potential perception of the inequality of participants

Helft et al., “Facilitated Ethics Conversations,” 28; Helft et al., “Facilitated Ethics
Conversations,” 29.
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It is worth quoting the authors at length: “We have theorized that, because a great deal
of nurses’ ethical experiences are shaped or affected by interstaff relationships and
communication, particularly with physicians, each group of nurses needed time to build
trust with the physician-facilitator to trust that the environment was ‘safe’ and that issues
that might be perceived as negative or critical of physicians could be voiced without fear
of negative responses. Thus, over time, the conversations have become more comfortable
and more open” (Helft et al., “Facilitated Ethics Conversations,” 28).
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in the discussion, and to deliberately work to create a non-hierarchical environment,
like the one examined here, where equality can (perhaps over time) become presumed by
the participant health care professionals.
Indeed, as Helft and colleagues found, once participants were comfortable with
the facilitator and with the group environment, “there is a free exchange of feelings,
emotions, information, and insight.”21 As a part of this exchange, the facilitators refine
and define the participant health care professional’s statements “to help participants
uncover and put into words the issues that actually underlie their distress.”22 Thus, this
process of facilitation closely follows the guidelines based on Habermas’ premises and
rules of validity for discourse ethics recommended in this dissertation, in that the goal is
for participants to engage in authentic, mutual, and respectful iterative communication.
Furthermore, the facilitators assisted the participants in being able to give name to their
concerns in order to appeal explicitly to concepts and language of the content-thin
common moral framework to be able to share with one another the experiences,
information, and reasoning germane to the moral distress situation.
Helft and colleagues also provide a number of specific facilitation techniques that,
if used effectively, correspond to some of the procedural guidelines described in
discourse ethics. They include clarifying details, “pushing” participants, reflective and
supportive statements, resisting answers and solutions, and best practices.
As in discourse ethics, where the truth claim of a speaker can be questioned and
the speaker is expected to be receptive to this questioning and adjust her claims if
21
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necessary, UBEC facilitators are aware that partial understandings of the facts of a
case can lead to moral distress, and in clarifying details, a fuller understanding of the
facts may resolve the distress. Importantly, however, in UBECs, correction of factual
misperception “is done without a chart or medical records review, but by iterative
discussion with participating staff members.”23 That is to say, correcting an inaccurate
understanding of a situation is not done via appeal to an institutional document (i.e., the
medical record) or to a different member of the institutional hierarchy (i.e., the attending
physician on the case), but instead via an equality-based discussion where positions are
refined and adjusted as more information is provided by participants and their peers.
In “pushing” participants, the facilitators state that their goal is to gently coax
participants to “reflect out loud and articulate the central ethical issues” at stake while
still “allow[ing] the participants to remain in control of the direction of the
conversation.”24 This, again, is an attempt to have participants voice their experiences of
moral distress via the concepts and language of the content-thin common moral
framework so that their moral distress can be better understood by other health care
professionals who have access to the framework and concepts within it as well.
Furthermore, the act of gently “pushing” on participants to name their feelings mirrors
discourse ethics’ requirement that participants validate the claims they are making. That
is to say, if a health care professional says “Something didn’t feel right,” in both this
facilitated conversation and in discourse ethics another person may ask to probe that
feeling, and have the health care professional validate it by naming it, so all involved can
23
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share in understanding. Yet by not taking charge and not acting as a conductor, but
allowing participants to maintain control of the discussion (by allowing them to answer
open-ended questions and stopping at any time), the facilitator does not take on a
hierarchical role, but instead remains peer interlocutor for the participants.
Reflective and supportive statements from the UBEC facilitator, which occur
when the facilitator carefully listens and responds to participants with a summary of their
meaning and support of it, “fosters an atmosphere of trust and mutual respect,”25 which is
necessary to create a peer-to-peer conversation in an equality-based forum. By validating
participants’ expressions of experience as authentic, the UBEC facilitator is making a
concerted effort to show participants in a moral distress conversation that they are in a
safe environment built on trust, in which participants can feel comfortable expressing
their moral distress and know that they are being not only listened to but understood, and
ideally can work toward shared understanding.
Importantly, Helft and colleague state that UBEC facilitators resist offering
answers or solutions to the moral distress-causing situation, but do solicit ideas for best
practices from participants. As was made explicit in Chapters Two and Three, a health
care organization attempting to “solve” a health care professional’s moral distress is an
inappropriate hierarchical response that not only marginalizes the experience of moral
distress in a person, but also marginalizes the morally distressed person. Thus, an
institution that recognizes its own inability to “fix” a person’s moral distress and leaves
the resolution of moral distress with the individual and other health care professionals is
providing a more ethically appropriate response to moral distress than the hierarchically
25
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structured organizational responses examined in Chapter Two. Yet at the same time,
the facilitators “intentionally invite discussion of strategies for handling of difficult
situations.”26 They do so in order to provide the participant health care professionals a
space to offer advice and learn from each other, thus creating proactive solutions that
come out of this equality-based inclusive discussion rather than institutional hierarchy.
And given that health care professionals are sharing their clinical expertise in accord with
their shared professional obligations to the goals and values of professional health care,
the best practices that they arrive at are “consistent with ethical principles and with core
nursing values.”27 Here, the health care organization realized that it cannot adjudicate a
moral distress situation, but can offer the forum and the facilitators to provide a safe
space for health care professionals to come together with each other in order to think of
ways to resolve moral distress, and best practices to lessen or eliminate future causes of
moral distress. Importantly, these solutions are owned by the health care professionals
precisely because they were developed in a non-hierarchical manner, even though the
organization was present and involved.
Though the UBECs Helft and colleagues describe mostly attracted nurses, they
were open to all health care professionals, and the authors note “discussion is enriched
through participation of others who collaborate with the nurses in patient care.”28 While
this bolsters the hypothesis explored in Chapter Three that health care professionals from
different professions can come together and interact within the content-thin common
26
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moral framework, Helft and colleagues did notice that the presences of physicians as
participants sometimes challenged the inclusivity of the dialogue.
The conversations seem more guarded when physicians are present, and deference
to physicians’ opinions or personalities can interfere with more open airing of
views and opinions. Occasionally, physicians have monopolized discussion,
making it more difficult for nurses and others to present their own views. We
have observed that nurses in particular seem to be more reluctant to speak openly
when the physicians the work with are present.29
In response to this concern, it is worth recalling Hamric and colleagues’ proposal above
regarding the creation of a positive moral organizational culture. If health care
organizations are able to create a moral culture as discussed in this chapter, as a part of
this moral culture the organization could instill a more inclusive environment of respect
among its health care professionals that may alleviate some of the tensions associated
with physicians in attendance at UBECs. While a possibly fruitful avenue to pursue, as
stated above, determining what would characterize an organization with an appropriate
moral culture is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
Additional Questions
In addition to the concern just mentioned, there are a number of further questions
that are raised by this dissertation but that are beyond its scope to address. One is the
empirical question about what exactly is included in the content-thin common moral
framework argued for in this dissertation, and if and how it is actually used. Though
Chapter Three provided some examples of the content of this framework, answering
these questions fully and carefully would require some additional philosophical work to
achieve enough conceptual clarity about the contents of the framework that a meaningful
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empirical instrument could be designed to test the claim made here that it is
“common” to health care professions in our (and similar) society. But actually supporting
this claim with empirical evidence would require the skills of social psychology. It is also
possible that the preliminary philosophical work might prove to be a much larger project
than this dissertation has suggested.
Another set of questions that this dissertation has not attempted to answer derives
from the fact that contemporary health care teams include, in addition to health care
professionals, many non-professional employees of the health care organization. It is
reasonable to assume that these non-professional health care workers also experience
moral distress. But can the non-professional health care workers (such as patient care
technicians, support personnel in other departments of the organization, home health
workers, nursing home employees, etc.) who assist in the direct care of patients be
correctly said to share in the same content-thin common moral framework as the health
care professionals, or only to some extent and, if so, to what extent? And if not, how can
their moral distress be resolved?
One place to look for an answer to these questions is the moral framework
potentially formed through an institution’s own distinctive moral culture and mission and
values (“potentially” because a particular organization’s culture, mission and values may
not have enough cohesion or breadth of application to constitute even a thin moral
framework). If a health care organization is able to clearly define and create a moral
culture around its mission statement and institutional values, it is possible that each staff
member, regardless of professional status, would be able to have moral distress
discussions (employing discourse ethics as has been argued) with other employees on the

basis of the moral content of the organization’s vision or understanding of its mission
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and values, especially if the organization’s culture strongly supported moral discussion
throughout the organization. It needs to be said, however, that most organizations,
including many health care organizations, view their non-professional employees
primarily in terms of their contractual relationship to the organization rather than in terms
of a shared moral framework, and so this possibility is likely more aspirational than
feasible. In any case, since health care organizations often vary greatly in other respects,
it is a complex empirical question (that will depend on preliminary philosophical work, as
was noted above) whether their respective moral frameworks are sufficiently developed
so that more can be said about such organizations’ obligations to address nonprofessional employees’ moral distress. But if the answer to this question were to be in
the affirmative, the practical suggestions offered earlier in this chapter would seem to be
equally relevant to these organizations acting appropriately.
Another important question still unresolved is whether a discourse ethics
approach only reaches a satisfactory resolution if patients and families are also satisfied.
As was shown in Chapter One, acting on the wishes of patients and families for
interventions (or stopping or not starting an intervention) that a health care professional
sees as harmful to the patient can often be a catalyst for moral distress. But patients and
families have been excluded from discussion in this dissertation (necessarily so) because
the proposed resolution process depends on the content-thin common moral framework
and there is no reason to assume that patients or families share the framework of health
care professionals in our (and similar) societies. However, Habermas is explicit that all
affected should be invited to participate—or at least should be taken into account. In
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discourse ethics, as Ingram notes, when validating a social norm the participants must
pay attention to consequences of adhering to the norm, and “not only as these affect the
interests of those directly involved, but of other persons as well.”30 Does this mean that a
resolution that addresses a health care professional’s moral distress, restores team
cohesion, and allows all team members space to hear and be heard, is still ethically
insufficient if the patient and/or family is unsatisfied? Or can the case be made that, since
patients and families don’t adhere to the same content-thin common moral framework,
they are not “affected” in the same way as health care professionals? Here again an
adequate answer to these questions would require addressing a number of complex
philosophical and empirical issues. But given the central role of patients and, especially
for patients incapable of participating in decision-making, of family members in making
health care decisions for hospital patients, this seems like a topic well worth careful
examination.
Conclusion
It may be very useful to investigate these questions, among others. However,
because of the prevalence of moral distress in health care professionals and its negative
effects on patient care, which is a matter of the highest moral priority for a health care
organization, this dissertation focused its attention on these themes and argued that health
care organizations have obligations to address this moral distress. In order to demonstrate
this, a definition of moral distress was offered, as well as descriptions of its causes and
effects. It was shown that these effects have a significant negative impact on a health care
organization’s ability to provide quality care for its patients and to respect the expertise of
30
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its health care professionals. In order to make claims about organizational obligations,
and an organization’s ability to fulfill or fail those obligations, the concept of group
agency was explained, and widely supported arguments for this position were
summarized. Since health care organizations typically have a decision structure closely
similar to the Corporate Internal Decision Structure that these arguments refer to, it was
found reasonable to conclude that health care organizations can be morally evaluated and
correctly charged with an ethical failing if they do not respond to moral distress in an
appropriate way.
In light of this, examples of insufficient organizational responses to moral distress
situations were examined, and it was shown that these responses were insufficient
because they relied on the hierarchical structure of health care organizations. Hierarchical
responses to moral distress risk excluding both the morally distressed individual(s) and
the other health care professionals involved in the moral distress situation. It was then
shown that the argument for including all the health care professionals involved in the
moral distress situation in a discussion of the situation rests in part on the existence of,
and health care professionals sharing, a content-thin common moral framework, which is
turn is based on a common professional morality and the shared goals and values of
professional health care.
Following this, a philosophical understanding of the relationship of those
involved in the process of moral distress resolution was found in the argument that health
care professionals interact with each other as Wildesian moral acquaintances and thus can
use the shared concepts and commitments of their content-thin common moral
framework as a starting point for discussing moral distress situations. In order to provide

a philosophical grounding and a practical procedure for these discussions, Habermas’
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theories of communicative action and discourse ethics were appealed to in order to
describe how health care professionals can interact with each other, both in “everyday”
circumstances (communicative action) and in situations of moral distress (discourse
ethics). The rules of discourse ethics, it was shown, can be used to structure health care
professionals’ discussions about moral distress situations in order to resolve moral
distress.
The line of argument developed in this dissertation provides both a theoretical
basis and practical procedural rules for discussions aimed at resolving situations of moral
distress in health care professionals. Combined with the practical suggestions offered in
this chapter or embodied in other practical mechanisms that institutions might design, the
inclusive, non-hierarchical, equality-based discussions proposed here offer a way to
properly address moral distress that could be adopted by health care organizations
immediately, and there is a clear ethical obligation for them to do so.
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